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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to uncover the motivations, objectives, and outcomes of Iran’s foreign 
relations with Tajikistan between 1991 and 2013. In doing so, the thesis maps out the 
course of relations between Iran and Tajikistan throughout the post-Soviet period, and in 
the process seeks to better understand the domestic, regional, and international obstacles 
that have faced Iran in its efforts to build ties with its so-called “close cultural cousin”, 
Tajikistan. Furthermore, this dissertation seeks to better understand how the presence of 
strong ethno-linguistic bonds and a set of shared mutual threats and strategic interests 
have acted as key drivers in building ties between these two countries. In attempting to 
outline the basis of Iranian-Tajik ties, this thesis argues that relations between these two 
states have been consistently hampered by not only mutual mistrust and misunderstanding, 
but also significant regional and international instability, which has often cruelled the 
ability for Iranian and Tajik elites to sustain close bilateral political, economic, cultural, 
and strategic relations over the past two decades.  
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Note on Transliteration 
Persian words that appear in this work were transliterated into their most common English 
forms. However, for words that are not often used in English, I applied a simplified 
version of the Iranian Studies journal guidelines. For simplicity I did not use diacritical 
marks. Iranian calendar dates have been translated into their Western calendar equivalent. 
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Introduction 
Iran and Tajikistan share the same destiny, therefore Iran’s progress is Tajikistan’s 
progress.1 
- Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
Cooperation between Tajikistan and Iran….is based on the eternal background of 
common language, culture and historic traditions of friendship and brotherhood of the 
peoples of both countries.2  
- Tajik President Emomali Rahmon 
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy interests, motivations, and behaviours have 
been the source of considerable controversy and analysis for more than three decades. 
Iran’s post-revolutionary regional and international ambitions, theocratic form of 
governance, and nuclear program have provided vital sustenance to Western political 
analyses, and placed Iran front and centre of global affairs. Although Iranian foreign 
policy has been a subject of significant academic importance throughout the post-
revolutionary period, overwhelmingly the existing corpus of scholarly literature has 
focused upon a limited, albeit prominent, set of issue areas. In particular, scholars have 
almost obsessively focused upon Iran’s confrontational relations with a number of states 
within the Middle East and the West, and proffered a variety of analytical accounts 
relating to Iran’s involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the spread of Islamist militancy, 
the politics of oil, and nuclear proliferation. While such accounts have played a major 
role in shaping understandings of Iran’s foreign policies and interactions within the 
international system, they have also had the effect of implying Iran’s actions outside of 
                                                 
 
1 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad quoted in "Iran Urges Enhanced Ties with Tajikistan," Ettela'at International, 
June 28,  2013. 
2 Emomali Rahmon, "Congratulatory Message to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad," President of the Republic 
of Tajikistan (October 1, 2010). http://www.prezident.tj/en/node/978, accessed September 3, 2014. 
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such contentious contexts are of little importance, or are indeed peripheral to the study of 
Iran as a political subject. This, however, is not the case.  
Over recent years, a number of developments have taken shape within Iranian foreign 
policy that have either escaped widespread attention or systematic scholarly analysis. This 
is particularly apparent in the context of Iran’s relations with the post-Soviet states of 
Central Asia. Within this geographical and political context, Iran has made a considerable 
effort to develop important political, economic, and cultural relations with a number of 
states within this region. These efforts have been especially apparent in respect to Iran’s 
relations with the post-Soviet Central Asian state of the Republic of Tajikistan. Although 
Tajikistan is small in geographical size, it has, on the surface at least, assumed a 
prominent and symbolic position within broader Iranian foreign policy-making, and 
international politics more generally.  
Overwhelmingly over the past two decades Iranian elites have sought to highlight an 
exceedingly harmonious bilateral relationship with Tajikistan that is anchored in the 
depths of not only shared culture, language, and history, but also common politico-
strategic interests. While such narratives have often been taken at face value by regional 
observers, rarely have the empirical foundations of Iran’s ties with Tajikistan been 
examined. This dissertation seeks to make a modest contribution to overcoming this state 
of affairs by providing the first in-depth Western (English language) scholarly analysis 
of this important, yet very new, bilateral relationship.  
Research Question 
This thesis at the fundamental level seeks to uncover what the motivations, objectives, 
and outcomes of Iran’s foreign relations with Tajikistan were between 1991 and 2013.  
In answering this research question, the dissertation will map out the course of relations 
between Iran and Tajikistan throughout the post-Soviet period, and in the process attempt 
to better understand the domestic, regional, and international obstacles that have faced 
Iran in its efforts to build ties with its so-called “close cultural cousin”, Tajikistan.  
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Furthermore, this dissertation also seeks to better understand how the presence of strong 
ethno-linguistic bonds and a set of shared mutual threats and strategic interests have acted 
as key drivers in building ties between these two countries. 
In attempting to outline and uncover the basis of Iranian-Tajik ties, this thesis argues that 
relations between these two states have been consistently hampered by not only bilateral 
mutual mistrust and misunderstanding, but also significant regional and international 
instability, which has often cruelled the ability of Iranian and Tajik elites to sustain close 
bilateral political, economic, cultural, and strategic relations over the past two decades.  
Scope of Thesis 
In studying the course of Iranian-Tajik relations, this thesis focuses primarily on the 
period between Tajikistan’s independence in 1991 up until the close of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency in 2013. There are two major reasons for this limited time 
frame. 
While it is conceded that people-to-people contacts between Tajiks and Persians have 
taken place for hundreds of years, this thesis places the focus of its attention almost 
exclusively on inter-state political and diplomatic relations. Therefore, Tajikistan as a 
state—defined at the most basic level as a political entity exercising sovereignty over a 
territory and recognised by other states—did not “exist” until after it gained independence 
in 1991. While the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (and later the Tajik 
Soviet Socialist Republic) was founded in 1924, it was never a sovereign state, being fully 
subsumed under the political framework of the broader Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR).  
Secondly, by concluding the study before the inauguration of the presidency of Hassan 
Rouhani in 2013, this thesis provides a better understanding of the changes and 
continuities which took place throughout the presidential terms of Ali Akbar Rafsanjani 
(1989-1997), Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-
2013). At the time of writing, the presidency of Hassan Rouhani (2013-2015) is still at its 
early to middle phase. Focusing on only a limited period of Rouhani’s presidency would 
not have provided a clear picture of the trajectory of Iran’s ties with Tajikistan. This self-
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imposed time limitation does not detract from the significance of changes and continuities 
in the preceding periods.  
Finally, it is important to note at the outset that this thesis should not be viewed as a 
comprehensive history of Iranian-Tajik relations. Instead, it is an analysis which largely 
limits itself to inter-state and inter-political elite interactions that have taken place 
between the two countries. By taking such an approach, this thesis provides important 
context to what are a much broader, and indeed richer, set of societal, and cultural 
relations which exist outside of the frame of so-called high politics.  
Structure of Thesis 
Introduction 
The introduction lays out the key components of the analysis, situating the research within 
the existing corpus of literature, outlines the theoretical, methodological, and analytical 
framework, and explains the contributions of the thesis.  
 Chapter One: The Islamic Republic of Iran: The Domestic Context 
This chapter provides a broad overview of some of the more salient elements of Iran’s 
domestic environment, which influence its foreign policy agendas. This chapter outlines 
Iran’s geographical situation and resource base, describing the vulnerabilities, 
opportunities, and unchangeable material realities that face Iranian policy elites in the 
making of foreign policy. Furthermore, a description of Iran’s national identity is 
provided, examining the role nationalism and Islam play in informing Iran’s foreign 
policies and the worldviews, and perceptions of its elites. Finally, a broad overview of 
Iran’s byzantine political system is provided, with an examination of the key institutions 
and figures that influence and implement foreign policy in the Islamic Republic. 
Chapter Two: The Islamic Republic of Iran: The Regional and International 
Context 
This chapter analyses the significant regional and international challenges Iran has had to 
face in attempting to establish relations with Tajikistan and the Central Asian region 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The chapter contends that Iran’s arguably 
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very limited success in the region can be directly attributed to the formation of a post-
Soviet unipolar international system overseen by Iran’s bitter rival and the world’s sole 
superpower, the United States. Over the past 20 years, the United States has conducted a 
range of foreign policy actions that have restricted Iran’s policies in Central Asia. 
Furthermore, Iran has also had to confront significant instability, and a series of regional 
rivals and so-called “partners”, most notably Russia and Turkey, who have consistently 
sidelined and undermined Tehran, thus further weakening its regional and international 
position throughout the past 20 years.  
Through analysing the wider regional and international dynamics that have affected Iran’s 
interactions with Central Asia, this chapter provides the context for the investigation by 
this thesis of Iran’s bilateral relations with Tajikistan, which has often been held to ransom 
by regional and international dynamics far beyond either state’s control. 
Chapter Three: The Historical Context of Iranian-Tajik Relations 
This chapter provides an historical overview of Iran’s relations with Tajikistan prior to its 
independence in 1991. The chapter contends that despite the popularisation of the 
narrative that Iran and Tajikistan are irredeemably linked by more than 1000 years of 
shared history and culture, relations between Iranians and Tajiks prior to 1991 were 
instead characterised by long periods of disjuncture, apathy, and distrust on both a societal 
and political level. The chapter highlights that warm Iranian-Tajik state and societal 
relations are very much a new phenomenon, which have their roots more in the political 
exigencies of the past 30 years than in the depths of a 1000-year historical past.  
Chapter Four: Iran and Tajikistan 1991-1997 – Independence and War 
This chapter analyses Iran’s early interactions with independent Tajikistan during the 
presidency of Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997). This chapter focuses its attention 
upon Iran’s foreign policy behaviour during the Tajik Civil War, and its interactions not 
only with the Tajik government and opposition, but also with the other prominent regional 
party to this conflict, Russia. In doing so, this chapter provides context to the conflict that 
tore Tajikistan apart, necessarily outlining the key factors and actors involved in the Tajik 
Civil War, and examines Iran’s actions throughout this conflict and the drawn-out peace 
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process which followed the terrible violence that gripped Tajikistan between 1992 and 
1997. 
The chapter argues that Iran’s support for opposition groups, in particular the Islamic 
Renaissance Party (IRP), has been considerably exaggerated. Furthermore, the notion that 
Iran was attempting to spread its Islamic Revolution to Tajikistan is not accurate. Rather, 
promoting Islamic revolutionary ideologies, and supporting the Tajik “Islamists” were 
never paramount in Iran’s political calculations. The chapter argues that throughout the 
conflict Iran overwhelmingly acted as a pragmatic—if not surreptitious—actor, which 
placed its own material state interests and regional position above all other concerns.  
 Chapter Five: Iran and Tajikistan 1997-2005 – Regional Competition and 
Instability 
This chapter analyses the political, cultural, and economic interactions between Iran and 
Tajikistan throughout the eight-year period of the Mohammed Khatami administration 
(1997-2005). This chapter argues that Iran’s foreign policies in Tajikistan throughout the 
presidency of Khatami, while continuing on the pragmatic path set during the Tajik Civil 
War period, underwent both a period of stagnation and transformation. It is argued that 
the Khatami administration throughout its first four-year term displayed an almost 
complete disregard towards developments in Tajikistan. However, following the events 
of September 11, 2001, which saw a greater US presence in the Central Asian region, 
Iran’s engagement with Tajikistan was forced to rapidly shifted gears.  
The chapter argues that Iran’s renewed interest in Tajikistan following 9/11 was 
motivated by geopolitical concerns, and can be considered to be ad-hoc, reactive, and 
overwhelmingly defined by the United States’ encroachment into the Central Asian 
region, alongside developments occurring in neighbouring Afghanistan.  
Chapter Six: Iran and Tajikistan 2005-2013 - Ahmadinejad and Foreign Policy 
Dysfunction 
This chapter examines Iran and Tajikistan’s relations throughout the presidency of 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013). This chapter notes that Ahmadinejad devoted 
significant attention to establishing relations with Tajikistan, which went well beyond the 
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efforts of his predecessors. Tajikistan, according to Ahmadinejad, was a “strategic 
partner”, and in fact Iran and Tajikistan’s “common history and culture” made them 
inseparable. Backing this rhetorical flourish, Ahmadinejad made a special effort to ensure 
that Tajikistan would play a critical part in his broader regional foreign policy approach. 
Iran during this period expended significant political, cultural, and economic capital in 
Tajikistan. 
However, despite the public amity that existed between the two states, and the 
considerable efforts made by Iran during this period, this chapter argues that strong and 
substantive Iran-Tajik relations were not achieved by the close of Ahmadinejad's 
presidency. This was due in part to a dysfunctional Iranian foreign policy approach, which 
often led to the mismanagement of this inter-state relationship. This factor, along with the 
unwillingness of Tajik elites to go from words to deeds, and the broader impact of 
sanctions, international isolation, and regional rivalry, meant that Iran was largely unable 
to fulfil its prominent political and economic objectives in Tajikistan. 
Conclusion: 
Finally, the conclusion summarises the key themes and evaluates the findings of the 
research and suggests possible directions for future research.  
Literature on Iranian-Tajik Relations 
The scholarly literature relating to Iran’s foreign policy in Tajikistan, as already noted, is 
limited. Overwhelmingly, the existing literature focuses on Iran’s relations with 
Tajikistan in the broader context of the Central Asian region,3 or examines a very limited 
                                                 
 
3  See Pierre Pahlavi and Afshin Hojati, "Iran and Central Asia: The Smart Politics of Prudent 
Pragmatism," in The New Central Asia: The Regional Impact of International Actors, ed. Emilian Kavalski 
(New Jersey: World Scientific, 2010): 215-38; Mehdi Sanaei, Relations between Iran and Central Asia: 
Trends and Prospects (Tehran: Institute for Political and International Studies, 2011); Edmund Herzig, 
"Iran and Central Asia," in Central Asian Security: The New International Context, ed. Roy Allison and 
Lena Jonson (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001), 171-98; Shireen Hunter, "Iran's 
Pragmatic Regional Policy," Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 2 (2003): 133-47; Adam Tarock, 
"Iran's Policy in Central Asia," Central Asian Survey 16, no. 2 (1997): 185-200; Oles M. Smolansky, 
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time frame or issue area.4 Furthermore, in recent years interest in examining the influence 
of Iran in Tajikistan and Central Asia has faded considerably. At the outset of the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, numerous journalists and academics predicted that Iran would 
become a key player in the Central Asian region. Many accounts breathlessly predicted 
that the Central Asian republics, most notably Tajikistan, would become heavily 
influenced by Iran as it attempted to spread its Islamic revolutionary ideology. 5  In 
forwarding such arguments, many authors were of the opinion that in the vacuum left by 
Soviet rule, only two choices awaited Tajikistan and the other Central Asian republics: 
Either they would join the Western camp through the establishment of close relations with 
Turkey, or would seek inspiration in Iran’s revolution and eventually morph into Islamic 
republics themselves.6  
According to a number of these accounts Tajikistan, as a Persian-speaking state, would 
be a natural candidate to fall under Iran’s revolutionary sway. Such predictions seemed 
                                                 
 
"Turkish and Iranian Policies in Central Asia," in Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future 
Prospects, ed. Hafeez Malik (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 283-310. 
4  See Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Emma Murphy, "The Non-Arab Middle East States and the 
Caucasian/Central Asian Republics: Iran and Israel," International Relations 12 (1994): 81-105; Muriel 
Atkin, "Iran, Russia and Tajikistan's Civil War," in Iranian-Russian Encounters: Empires and Revolutions 
since 1800, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London: Routledge, 2013), 361-76; Azadeh Joharifard, "Iran, 
Afghanistan, and Tajikistan Alliance: Assessing the Potential of a Persian-Speaking Association," (Masters 
Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 2008); Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Iran and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization: Ideology and Realpolitik in Iranian Foreign Policy," Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 69, no.1 (2014): 1-16; Kirill Nourzhanov, "The Politics of History in Tajikistan: Reinventing the 
Samanids," Harvard Asia Quarterly 5, no. 1 (2001): 13-21. 
5 See Dilip Hiro, Inside Central Asia (New York: Overlook Duckworth, 2009); Ahmed Rashid, The 
Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (London: Zed Books, 1994); John Calabrese, "Iran and 
Her Northern Neighbors: At the Crossroads (Part 1)," Central Asia Monitor, no. 5 (1994): 27-30; Kenneth 
Katzman and James Nichol, Iran: Relations with Key Central Asian States, (Washington D.C.: United 
States Congressional Research Service, 1998). 
6 See "Is an Islamic Revolution Inevitable?," GOLOS November 18 1991 [Russian Press Digest]; Mark 
Fineman, "Birth of Islamic Republics in Soviet Asia Envisioned," The Los Angeles Times September 28, 
1991.These commentaries were joined by experts who took an alarmist position relating to religious ties 
between Iran and Tajikistan. For discussion and canvassing of the views of some of these experts, see John 
W. Parker, Persian Dreams: Moscow and Tehran since the Fall of the Shah (Washington D.C: Potomac 
Books, 2009), 39-56; Graham E. Fuller, "Central Asia and American National Interests," in Central Asia: 
Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, ed. Hafeez Malik (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 
129-42. 
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to bear fruit when Tajikistan fell into a messy civil war between 1992 and 1997. The 
influence of Islamic groups such as the IRP, and the presence of Iranian revolutionary 
slogans in the early parts of the conflict, were viewed as undeniable proof that Tajikistan 
would be the next site for Iran’s apparent Islamic expansionist agendas. However, 
following the failure of Islamic opposition forces to take control of the Tajik state, the 
imposition of secularist government under former Communist Emomali Rahmon, 
alongside the unwillingness or inability of Iran to spread its apparently nefarious 
ideologies in Tajikistan, it seems that many regional observers and academics lost interest 
in attempting to uncover Iran’s influence in Tajikistan. This state of affairs was further 
solidified following the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, when studies of Iran’s 
bilateral relations with Tajikistan took a backseat to analyses which focused upon Iran’s 
problematic relations with the US in the context of Central Asia,7 or Iran’s relations with, 
and influence in, neighbouring Afghanistan.8  
Despite, the dearth of literature relating to Iran’s relations with Tajikistan, scholars 
Mohiaddin Mesbahi and Kirill Nourzhanov have provided accounts which offer useful 
and instructive directions in the study of this topic. Mesbahi, in particular, has published 
a number of journal articles and book chapters on Iranian foreign policy in Tajikistan.9 
                                                 
 
7 Enayatollah Yazdani, "Iran's Policy Towards Central Asia and Its Implications for US-Iran Relations," 
International Journal of Central Asian Studies 10 (2005): 131-49; Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local 
Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Nicholas 
Schmidle, "In Central Asia, New Players, Same Game," The Washington Post, January 29 2006; Lutz 
Kleveman, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia (London: Atlantic Books, 2003). 
8  Andreas Wilde, "Continuity and Hiatus: Structural Patters of Iran's Policy in Afghanistan," 
Internationales Asienforum 40, no. 1-2 (2009): 11-38; Martha Brill Olcott, "Iran’s Unavoidable Influence 
over Afghanistan’s Future," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (August 15, 2013). 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/08/15/iran-s-unavoidable-influence-over-afghanistan-s-
future/gii0?reloadFlag=1, accessed December 3 2013; Mohsen M. Milani, "Iran's Policy Towards 
Afghanistan," The Middle East Journal 60, no. 2 (2006): 235-56; Brenton Clark, "Iranian Foreign Policy 
Towards Tajikistan and Afghanistan During the Ahmadinejad Presidency: The Rising Salience of Persian 
National Identity," Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies 7, no. 13 (2012): 73-105. 
9 For examples, see Mohiaddin Mesbahi, "Iran and Tajikistan," in Regional Power Rivalries in the New 
Eurasia: Russia, Turkey, and Iran, ed. Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Oles M. Smolansky (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 
1994): 109-39; Mohiaddin Mesbahi, "Tajikistan, Iran, and the International Politics of the ‘Islamic Factor’," 
Central Asian Survey 16, no. 2 (1997): 141-58; Mohiaddin Mesbahi, "Iran and Central Asia: Paradigm and 
Policy," Central Asian Survey 23, no. 2 (2004): 109-39. 
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However, his accounts have usually revolved solely around the role ideational factors 
have played in shaping Iran’s relations with Tajikistan. In providing such accounts, 
Mesbahi has argued that Islam and Persian culture, as the major elements of Iran’s 
national identity, have influenced the course of its relations with Tajikistan. Mesbahi 
notes that Iran’s cultural affinities, in the form of a common language and Persian cultural 
milieu, have ensured that a special bond exists between the two countries. However, these 
bonds are tempered by the presence of Iran’s Shi’ite revolutionary ideology, which has 
overwhelmingly acted as an obstacle in the way of Iran’s efforts to become an influential 
actor in Tajikistan. Mesbahi highlights that there is broad negativity towards Iran’s 
Islamic revolutionary identity among Tajikistan’s staunchly secularist political elite. In 
particular, Mesbahi argues that the spectre of Iran’s influence is often used by Tajik elites 
to gain support from Iran’s major international rival, the United States, and to legitimise 
intermittent crackdowns on Islamic opposition groups, who are often accused of receiving 
support from Tehran. Mesbahi’s accounts of Iran’s relations with Tajikistan, while highly 
informative and extremely well-researched, capture only a limited timeframe of Iranian-
Tajik bilateral relations. Mesbahi’s work mainly focuses upon the period of the Tajik 
Civil War, and he has rarely sought to touch upon the development of Iranian-Tajik 
relations throughout the less exciting, but equally important, post-Civil War period, where 
it appears that ties between the two states have evolved considerably. It should also be 
noted that this work, while considerably indebted to Mesbahi’s accounts of Iran’s 
relations with Tajikistan, particularly during the civil war period, differs in its focus upon 
the “material factors” that have shaped ties between the two countries. Mesbahi’s work 
has the tendency to over-emphasise the role Islam and culture have in shaping relations 
between the two states, and neglects the arguably equally important economic and 
strategic drivers of this relationship.  
A much more up-to-date account, which focuses less on the “ideational” and more on the 
“material” motivations which have shaped bilateral Iranian-Tajik relations is that offered 
by Nourzhanov.10 Nourzhanov notes that throughout the 1990s, Iran rarely found much 
                                                 
 
10 Kirill Nourzhanov, "Omnibalancing in Tajikistan's Foreign Policy: Security-Driven Discourses of 
Alignment with Iran," Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 14, no. 3 (2012): 363-381. 
12 
 
favour among Tajiks. However he argues that following the national reconciliation 
process, which brought an end to the civil war in Tajikistan in 1997, perceptions towards 
Iran have gradually become much more positive. Iran’s friendly behaviour towards 
Tajikistan, and Tehran’s support for Dushanbe in overcoming a range of security threats 
in the post-civil war period, has led to greater political and strategic alignment between 
the two states. In forwarding this argument, Nourzhanov focuses on the discourses 
employed by Tajik security and political elites, or so-called “security intellectuals”, to 
frame relations between the two countries. Nourzhanov does not dismiss the presence of 
shared cultural and linguistic traits, which indeed influence relations between Iran and 
Tajikistan, however he argues that realistic and pragmatic concerns are the principle 
defining factors that shape this bilateral relationship—a conclusion with which this thesis 
strongly agrees. Nevertheless, this thesis departs from Nourzhanov’s work in its efforts 
to provide an account which gives the “Iranian side of the story”. Nourzhanov’s account 
almost solely focuses on the motivations which shape the decisions of Tajik political elites 
or “security intellectuals”. Furthermore, although this thesis agrees with Nourzhanov that 
the main motivating factors behind the Iranian-Tajik relationship are based in the realm 
of material and pragmatic concerns, it does not agree with Nourzhanov’s view that a 
strategic relationship is developing between the two countries. Rather, the thesis contends 
that the rhetoric employed by political elites in both countries does not adequately reflect 
the underdeveloped level of relations that exist between the two countries. 
Both Mesbahi and Nourzhanov’s accounts provide strong analyses on important, albeit 
very limited, aspects and timeframes of Iran and Tajikistan’s bilateral relations, to which 
this thesis is considerably indebted. This thesis seeks to build on the work provided by 
both of these authors, but examines the Iranian-Tajik relationship on a much broader scale 
and comes to different conclusions, particularly in regards to the role of Islam in this 
bilateral relationship, and the presence and trajectory of strategic ties between the two 
countries.  
Methodology 
This thesis relies almost solely on a qualitative approach to examine the development of 
Iranian-Tajik relations. The inability to gain access to primary documentation issued by 
the Iranian and Tajik Governments has ensured that this thesis has relied considerably 
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upon literature produced by Western, Iranian, and Tajik think tanks, research schools, and 
non-government organisations. Furthermore, a wide set of journalistic and academic 
sources in both the Persian and English languages were also consulted.  
In addition to these aforementioned secondary sources, a key component of the thesis is 
comprised of data gleaned from interviews conducted with former and current 
government officials of both the Iranian and Tajik Foreign Ministries, the Iranian Trade 
Promotion Office, Members of the Iranian Parliament, various Iranian and Tajik 
university faculty members, members of Iranian and Tajik think tanks and research 
centres, as well as individuals informally associated with both governments with 
knowledge of various aspects of this bilateral relationship.  
All interviews were conducted in person by the researcher, from January to May 2013, in 
Tehran, Mashhad, and Dushanbe. The interviews themselves were semi-structured, 
centring on the core themes of the research, and were catered to the relative experiences 
and knowledge of the interviewees. When consent was given, these interviews were 
recorded by the researcher to enhance the accuracy of their accounts. When consent was 
not given, interviews were either documented with hand-written notes or, if requested, 
not documented at all. The majority of these interviews were recorded with the approval 
of the participants. However, due to sensitivity towards the domestic political situation in 
both countries, all of those who took part in the interviews were given the option to remain 
anonymous, and to have no attribution of their remarks in this thesis, or to be clearly 
identified and have their answers attributed. This approach was adopted to increase the 
likelihood that individuals concerned about speaking candidly would participate in the 
research. Finally, all interviewee participation was entirely voluntary and no interviewees 
were paid by the researcher.  
There were limitations in the interview process. In particular, the ability to gain access to 
high-level officials in both countries was extremely difficult. The researcher was able to 
interview and hold discussions with a number of former mid and high-level officials who 
had intimate knowledge of bilateral relations between Iran and Tajikistan. However, high-
level officials in office at the time of the fieldwork research were largely unwilling to 
speak to the researcher due to security concerns, or work constraints. Therefore, the 
researcher was forced to rely upon lower-level officials, or those outside of governmental 
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structures, to gain a better understanding of the most recent developments taking place 
within Iranian-Tajik bilateral relations. However, the profile of those interviewed should 
not be seen as an indicator of the experience level and knowledge of the interviewees. 
Many of those who had a lower profile or informal associations with the Iranian and Tajik 
Governments often had an equal or much better knowledge of this research topic then 
their superiors.  
Theoretical Framework 
A range of theories, approaches, and perspectives can be applied to the study of Iranian 
foreign policy, with the field of international relations known for both its theoretical 
diversity and analytical eclecticism. Although this is the case, in analysing the dynamics 
of Iranian-Tajik relations this thesis will not take an overly theoretical approach, nor will 
it attempt to use this topic as a case study to validate, or debunk, any particular paradigm 
or theoretical model. As already noted, this thesis provides an exploration of Iranian-Tajik 
relations, and is the first comprehensive analysis of this topic conducted within the 
English language scholarly literature. Therefore, in the researcher’s opinion, by adhering 
slavishly to a single theoretical approach or paradigm will only lead to an over-simplified 
explanation of what is a multifarious and highly complex bilateral relationship. 
Nevertheless, the researcher is also mindful that without providing some kind of 
framework or theoretical scope of analysis, the thesis will lack the parsimony necessary 
to provide clear insights into Iranian-Tajik relations.  
With these concerns in mind, this thesis will apply insights and methods used in the 
neoclassical realist approach to international relations. The benefit of applying this 
approach is that it can be used in a very loose and pragmatic fashion to better explain 
various aspects of international relations and foreign policy. Although neoclassical 
realism lacks the parsimony offered by approaches such as structural realism, it 
sufficiently overcomes this shortfall in its analytical utility. Neoclassical realism provides 
the ability to not only study how the international structure of politics shapes the actions 
of states, but also allows scope to understand how ideational factors such as identity and 
elite perceptions—emerging at the complex and often messy domestic level of politics—
have in influencing foreign policy conduct.  
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Neoclassical realism emerged during the 1990s in response to structural realism’s 
inability to explain the foreign policy conduct of states, or account for major historical 
events and shifts in the systemic structure of international politics.11 In particular, the 
failure of structural realism to explain the end of the Cold War encouraged a number of 
realist scholars to search for a theoretical approach that could take into account the 
influence of the international structure of politics, while also retaining the analytical and 
descriptive richness of earlier classical realist accounts that had largely been disregarded 
by the rush of scholars who sought to provide purely systemic accounts of international 
relations.12 A range of realist scholars such as Schweller,13 Zakaria,14 Lobell,15 Dueck,16 
and Wohlforth17 combined structural realist explanations with domestic-level intervening 
variables, such as state elite perceptions, intra-national institutional conflict, identity, and 
the extractive abilities of the state to form what Beach characterised as “Lego-like” 
theoretical models, which were both parsimonious and theoretically consistent.18 
The emphasis upon what Schweller termed the “peculiar domestic structures and political 
situations” of states marked a significant departure from Waltzian structural orthodoxy, 
which viewed realism as a purely systemic theory that was hostile to domestic 
                                                 
 
11 Derek Beach, Analyzing Foreign Policy (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 63. 
12 Randall L. Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,” in Progress in International 
Relations Theory – Appraising the Field, eds. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2003), 311-347 
13 Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 
14 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998). 
15 Steven E. Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Realist Model,” 
in Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, eds. Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and 
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 42-75. 
16  Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy 
(Princeton University Press, 2006). 
17 William Curti Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1993). 
18 Beach, Analyzing Foreign Policy, 64. 
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theorisation.19 This attention to the interactions between system-level and domestic-level 
political factors provided greater explanatory power than its classical and structural realist 
forebears.20 The need to account for domestic processes and internal characteristics of a 
state allowed neoclassical realists to “explain variation in the foreign policies of the same 
state over time or across different states facing similar external constraints”, without 
reducing explanations of international politics and a state’s external actions simply to its 
internal characteristics.21 Rather, internal characteristics are viewed as a guide only to 
national responses to international pressures. 22  They are not a sole contributing or 
explanatory factor of state conduct. This was summed up explicitly by Rose, who 
contended that there was “no immediate or perfect transmission belt linking material 
capabilities to foreign policy behaviour. Foreign policy choices are made by actual 
political leaders and elites, and so it is their perceptions of relative power that matter, not 
simply relative quantities of physical resources or forces in being.”23 In essence, pressures, 
constraints, and opportunities proffered by the international system are translated and 
defined by the political processes that take place within the state, which play the role of 
channelling, mediating, and redirecting policy outputs in response to such systemic 
forces.24 Therefore, while domestic dynamics are important in shaping a state’s foreign 
policy, the anarchical system is the ultimate arbiter of its conduct, providing a state with 
both opportunities and constraints.  
In analysing the role of internal characteristics and their influence in shaping state actions 
towards systemic opportunities and constraints, neoclassical realists seek to understand 
                                                 
 
19 Randall L. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” 
International Security 29, no.2, (2004): 164. 
20 Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables,” 
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21 Lobell, and Ripsman and Taliaferro, “Introduction,” 21. 
22 Ibid, 22. 
23 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no.1, 
(1998): 146. 
24 Schweller, “Unanswered Threats,” 164. 
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the strength and structure of a state relative to its society. 25  The state, according to 
Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman, is “epitomised by a national security executive, 
comprised of the head of government and the ministers and officials charged with making 
foreign security policy”. 26  The executive sits at the ‘juncture’ of the state and the 
international system, and has access to privileged information from the state’s various 
security, political, and military apparatuses, and “is best equipped to perceive systemic 
constraints and deduce the national interest”.27 Depending on the structure of the state 
under study, the executive can act largely autonomously from society. However, 
depending on the context of the domestic political arrangements, the executive must 
negotiate and bargain with a range of domestic actors including, but not limited to, the 
legislature, political parties, opposition groups, economic sectors, and the public to define 
and achieve the state’s national interests.28 Therefore the process of conducting foreign 
policy and reacting to the exigencies of the international environment is considerably 
difficult due to this bargaining process. The state in the neoclassical realist conception 
does not necessarily function as a unitary actor. This view diverges considerably from 
structural realism, which views the state as a unitary actor that is largely able to assess 
challenges and opportunities in the international environment in an efficient, objective 
manner, autonomous from domestic society.  
Neoclassical realism should not be conceived as little more than an attempt to “smuggle 
in” domestic-level variables into a structural realist framework.29 Instead, neoclassical 
realism offers a distinct methodological perspective, which argues that theorists must take 
better account of the causal chain that links material power and systemic influences to 
foreign policy behaviour.30 The core realist insight that systemic forces and material 
power shape and influence foreign policy behaviour should not be ignored, and by no 
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means does neoclassical realism ignore the importance of these factors. As noted by Rose, 
“people who ignore this basic insight will often waste their time looking at variables that 
are actually epiphenomenon. Yet people who cannot move beyond the system will have 
difficulty explaining most of what happens in international relations.”31 In essence the 
structure, or system of international politics —or as Waltz describes it “the third image” 
—lays the basic foundation and building blocks of the neoclassical realist approach. 
However, neoclassical realism also attempts to take into account the “first and second 
images”, namely the individual and domestic level of politics.32  Without taking into 
account these two images it is very difficult, even impossible, to understand the factors 
that determine foreign policy choices and behaviour.  
As is the case with structural realism, neoclassical realism views a state’s relative position 
within the international system as the independent variable. Furthermore, neoclassical 
realists agree with the structural realist assumption that anarchy is epitomised by 
uncertainty and threats, with a lack of guidance as to how to respond to such factors.33 
These characteristics render anarchy as a self-help environment. However, neoclassical 
realists disagree with the structural realist assumption that state action is directly impacted 
by systemic pressures.34 Instead, state elites have significant difficulty in interpreting how 
to react to systemic pressures, and will not automatically respond in the most efficient 
and effective manner, with considerable delays and missteps being a characteristic of state 
behaviour.  
This inability to react in an efficient and effective manner is due to a range of intervening 
domestic-level variables, “which channel, mediate and (re)direct systemic pressures”.35 
As outlined by Juneau, structural realism’s “assumption that a black-box corresponding 
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to “the state” can correctly assess the distribution of power and directly translate it into 
policy is problematic”.36 While a range of domestic influences can be chosen to act as 
intervening variables within the neoclassical realist approach, this thesis seeks to focus 
primarily upon two domestic influences it considers to be particularly salient in Iran’s 
foreign policy towards Tajikistan in the post-Cold War systemic environment. These two 
domestic factors are elite perceptions and national identity.  
Elite perceptions are indeed critical in shaping how Iran, and for that matter all states, 
conduct foreign policy. Foreign policy choices are made by real people, occupying real 
positions, and should not be underestimated or disregarded. Zakaria contends that 
“statesmen, not states, are the primary actors in international affairs” and it is their 
“perceptions, not objective measurements that truly matter”. 37  In such a view, 
neoclassical realists argue that the international distribution of power shapes the foreign 
policy of states, however, it is how governing elites perceive and calculate this 
distribution of power that truly determines and defines a state’s foreign policy. If indeed 
the structure of the international system and power distributions within this system 
influence the conduct of international politics, then they “must do so largely through 
perceptions of the people who make decision on behalf of states”.38 How a state reacts 
through foreign policy conduct to the opportunities and constraints proffered by the 
international system can be completely unrelated to the “actual reality” of this system, 
and more to do with the perceptions of those in charge of a state’s foreign policy 
conduct.39  
The second intervening variable for this study is the concept of national identity. Identity 
plays a crucial role in shaping how a state views itself and others, thus defining its 
interests and foreign policy preferences. States do not simply decide on what they want 
through material calculations. Rather, a state’s conduct is considerably influenced by how 
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state elites conceive of their state’s identity, and how elites view other states within the 
international system. Identities formed within the domestic milieu of the state provide 
signposts for elite action, shaping how elites think they should act, and what strategies 
they can actually entertain in the pursuit of foreign policy.40  
In applying the neoclassical realist approach to the study of Iran’s relations with 
Tajikistan, this thesis aims to provide a multi-layered account that links the domestic 
environment of Iranian politics to the structure of the regional and international system. 
Therefore, the domestic imperatives and motivations—both ideational and material—of 
Iran’s foreign policy elites, and the institutional structure of foreign policy-making, will 
be examined alongside and in conjunction with the opportunities, constraints, power 
balances, and dynamics of the international political system within which Iran and 
Tajikistan interact.  
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Chapter One: The Islamic Republic of Iran: The Domestic Context  
It is difficult to fully understand the foreign policy of a state without taking into account 
its domestic environment and circumstances. The domestic societal, economic, and 
political context of a state greatly determines what a state can conceive and achieve in the 
international arena. As highlighted by Fearon, domestic politics matter in the sense that 
they cause a state to pursue “suboptimal foreign policies”, and differences in a state’s 
“political institutions, cultures, economic structures, and leadership goals” have the 
potential to cause a state to pursue differing foreign policy choices, which are completely 
unrelated to the systemic environment or the concept of relative power.1 This chapter 
seeks to provide a broad overview of some of the more salient elements of Iran’s domestic 
environment, which influence its foreign policy agendas. Although much of Iran’s rich 
and complex domestic situation cannot be covered in this chapter, a number of variables 
have been selected to provide a better grasp on how Iran’s internal characteristics impact 
its external actions and agendas. This chapter will firstly outline Iran’s geographical 
situation and resource base, describing the vulnerabilities, opportunities, and 
unchangeable material realities that face Iranian policy elites in the making of foreign 
policy. Secondly, a description of Iran’s national identity is provided, examining the role 
nationalism and Islam play in informing Iran’s foreign policies and the worldviews of its 
elites. Thirdly, a broad overview of Iran’s byzantine political system is provided. Finally, 
this chapter examines the key institutions and figures that influence and implement 
foreign policy in the Islamic Republic.  
1.1 Geographical Situation and Resource Base 
Situated between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, and straddling the European, 
Turkic, Arab and Indian worlds, Iran effectively sits at a strategic crossroads. Acting as a 
link between two continents and a vital gateway to the Indian Ocean, the ability to control 
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Iran has historically meant the ability to dictate the flow of cross-continental trade and 
communication between Europe and Asia. 
This geographical importance is only enhanced by Iran’s rich hydrocarbon resources.2 
Control over hydrocarbons is a key factor in the distribution of global power, wherein 
whoever controls such resources can exponentially increase their share of that power, and 
consequentially weaken the power of rival states by depriving access to this vital resource. 
3 Although Iran’s abundance of oil and gas has given it considerable economic and 
political clout in international affairs, its domestic economic, military, and technological 
limitations have often made it the target of larger, much more powerful states.4 Great 
Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States have all at different periods throughout 
the twentieth century attempted to control Iran’s vast hydrocarbon resources and take 
advantage of its material vulnerabilities in the hope of improving their national power and 
strategic positions. International rivalry stemming from Iran’s hydrocarbon resource 
endowment, the continuing and growing reliance of the world’s economy on these 
resources, and Iran’s technological, economic, and military deficiencies has therefore 
shaped Iran’s foreign and domestic policy options and placed both Iran’s pre and post-
revolutionary political elites in a repetitive, and at times, perilous political bind.5  
In the face of consistent interference in its domestic affairs, Iranian political elites have 
entered into a series of alliances with rival great and extra-regional powers in an effort to 
extract benefits from the consistent international rivalry over their state’s strategic 
position and resources. However, from the Franco-Persian Agreement signed between 
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Napoleon and Fath Ali Shah in 1807, to Iran’s close military and economic relationship 
with the United States during the Cold War, such alliances have usually ended with Iran 
entering into a relationship of dependence, having its territorial and political interests 
overlooked, or becoming little more than a pawn in larger political games.6 In the face of 
these traumatic, Machiavellian experiences, Iranian political leaders of all stripes, both 
pre and post-revolutionary, have held up the lofty dream of domestic economic, 
technological, and military self-sufficiency as the remedy to ensure Iranian political 
independence and freedom of action within international affairs.7  
The dream of gaining such independence and self-sufficiency seemed in the grasp of Iran 
during the 1960s. Iran was able to accumulate capital from its oil rents at a much faster 
rate than any time in its history.8 The oil price shocks of the 1970s dramatically sped up 
this process of capital accumulation, and fuelled Iran’s former leader Mohammad Reza 
Shah Pahlavi’s (1941-1979) ambition to transform Iran into a great power, with the 
economic, political, and military wherewithal to control its own destiny. In the drive 
towards independence and self-sufficiency, the Shah sought to expand Iran’s domestic 
economy, and to develop Iran’s manufacturing and industrial base through import 
substitution strategies.9 Throughout the 1970s, Iran’s economic and political position 
improved dramatically, which provided Iran with the capabilities to influence the region 
around it. The Shah was confident that the road to a “Great Civilisation” was upon Iran 
and that in a short period of time his country would be one of the top five global military 
and economic powers. However, rather than this road opening the way towards greater 
independence, it instead led the country towards increased economic and political stress 
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and vulnerability. By relying so heavily upon oil rents to increase its technological and 
economic base, Iran opened itself to international economic pressures and shocks, which 
were beyond its control. In the words of Ehteshami and Hinnebusch this “increased the 
country’s dependence on the outside world and the key Western powers like the USA. In 
short, oil wealth had become both the salvation and the curse for the country’s 
modernising elites; its Achilles’ heel.”10  
Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, an event that was in no small part fuelled by 
popular domestic resentment towards Iran’s economic dependence and political 
subservience to outside powers, and its significant and worrying economic deficiencies, 
Iran’s Islamic revolutionaries attempted to recalibrate their country’s structure of 
alliances, and overwhelming reliance upon hydrocarbon rents. Although Iran’s post-
revolutionary leaders displayed an almost identical interest as that of the Shah in obtaining 
an independent position for Iran within global affairs, their means of gaining such 
independence were radically different. The Shah viewed reliance on outside investment 
in Iran’s domestic economy, and development of Iran’s hydrocarbon wealth, as a 
necessary evil on the road to economic, and therefore political, independence. The 
revolutionaries, on the other hand, considered the breaking of Iran’s alliance with the 
“Great Satan”—the United States—and its reliance upon hydrocarbons as a necessary 
first step in achieving Iranian independence, and ensuring self-sufficiency.11 However, 
the entrenched structure of the global capitalist system, the Islamic regime’s emphasis 
upon spreading the values of Islam, its growing alienation of regional neighbours through 
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bellicose and violent rhetoric, and most importantly its long eight-year war with Iraq, 
stymied these goals.12  
The need to break free from international isolation, and attend to the needs of national 
reconstruction after the economically and politically devastating Iran-Iraq War (1980-
1988) again led to an overwhelming reliance upon hydrocarbon rents to sustain Iran’s 
economic and political future. While post-revolutionary Iran has been able to minimise 
the influence of outside forces in its domestic affairs, and has pursued a largely 
independent and non-aligned foreign policy, predicated upon spreading the word of Islam, 
and protecting and defending the “rights of all Muslims”.13 These goals could not be 
achieved without relying on the same resources that unravelled the Shah’s futuristic 
vision. In essence, Iran’s post-revolutionary leaders have been forced to read from the 
same playscript as that of the Shah, where “oil revenues are being used to spur economic 
growth and military strength”, which in turn have been continuously used to ensure Iran 
has a leading place in regional security affairs.14 This does not mean that there is no place 
for revolutionary ideology in Iran’s foreign policy approach. Rather, there is sober 
realisation among Iran’s elites that without the development and improvement of the 
country’s domestic vulnerabilities, meeting its ideological and strategic goals on the 
international level are impossible.15  Despite relatively large human, agricultural, and 
mineral resources, Iran continues to rely upon hydrocarbons as the legs to prop up its 
economy. Furthermore, its weak economic, technological, and military capacity has 
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ensured that Iran’s foreign policy options are indeed limited, and not of the scope its elites 
wished for upon the eve of revolution.16  
1.2 National Identity 
National identity has been an ever-present and critical theme throughout Iran’s modern 
political history, having had a significant impact upon Iran’s political behaviour and elite 
conceptualisations of foreign policy interests. Iranian elites have engaged in at times 
violent struggles over conceptions of Iran’s national identity, with a particular point of 
conflict stemming from which element of Iranian national identity—Iranian or Islamic—
should take precedence.17 These dual, but not necessarily mutually exclusive, elements 
of Iran’s national identity have become key points of political, cultural, and social friction 
within Iran, friction which Hunter argues has had “significant socio-political 
consequences whose legacy is bedevilling Iran today and is deeply affecting the self-
perception and worldview of important segments of its people and polity”. 18  The 
importance of understanding these two important facets of Iran’s national identity cannot 
be understated; for instance, Iran’s political and societal elites, who view their country’s 
national identity mainly through the prism of Iranian nationalism, generally tend to favour 
an approach to foreign policy that privileges Iran’s so-called “pragmatic” national 
interests. The opposite holds true for those who identify strongly with Iran’s Islamic 
identity, in which case Iran’s foreign policy becomes orientated towards fulfilling Islamic 
and trans-national interests, with strictly national interests taking a backseat. 19  The 
following two sections will briefly outline these two important elements of Iran’s national 
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identity, placing them in historical context, and displaying how they have impacted Iran’s 
political trajectory and approaches to foreign policy in recent history. 
Iranian Nationalism 
Nationalism must be considered a crucial element in the creation and binding together of 
a unitary Iranian state in the early twentieth century. While Iran’s history spans thousands 
of years, modern Iranian nationalism emerged in much more recent times. Similar to 
processes which occurred in other developing societies in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, modern nationalism in Iran had its genesis in internal disorder and chaos, and 
consistent military and political defeats at the hands of European powers. 20  This 
devastating and embarrassing process brought to the fore considerable soul-searching and 
debate within Iran’s ruling and elite circles.21 In particular, Iran’s political vulnerability 
and social decay inspired growing reformist tendencies among segments of Iran’s 
intelligentsia, and provided a fertile breeding ground for European modernist ideas such 
as nationalism.22 In attempting to understand why Iran was so vulnerable internationally, 
and so chaotic and disordered domestically, nineteenth century intellectuals placed the 
blame squarely upon the shoulders of Iran’s traditional Islamic religion and customs, 
which in their eyes had facilitated and encouraged Iran’s backwardness and lack of 
modern social and political development.23 In criticising Islam, these intellectuals found 
succour in Iran’s vast corpus of centuries old legends, myths, and writings, which 
glorified past Iranian civilisational triumphs. For instance, Mirza Fath Ali Akhunzadeh 
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(1812-1878)24, a prominent thinker and literary critic, promoted a narrative of Iranian 
history which privileged Iran’s pre-Islamic past. According to Akhunzadeh, Iran had been 
a great culture and civilisation until the seventh century Arab invasions. However, 
following the introduction of the Islamic faith and Arab cultural moors, Iran had decayed 
and become a shadow of its once powerful self. Pre-Islamic Iran was a period of power, 
justice and progress, whereas Islamic Iran was characterised by the imposition of a 
foreign culture and religion in the form of “Arab” religion of Islam, which had effectively 
strangled Iran’s indigenous culture and innate progressiveness. 25  Iran’s intelligentsia 
assembled a narrative in which the peoples of Iran were a self-conscious collectivity for 
millennia that were considerably distinct from their Arab neighbours and, according to 
McGregor, were imbued with “the same progressive tendencies as Western civilization 
ranging from a talent for technical invention through to supposed interest in the 
foundations of constitutional politics”.26 In the eyes of prominent segments of Iran’s elites, 
their country had to return to its much more authentic non-Islamic, and European-like, 
civilised past, and disassociate itself from the Arab Islamic culture if it was to again 
become a progressive, powerful modern state. 
These ideas of reclaiming Iran’s glorious past in the service of its future were mainly 
restricted to the upper echelons of Iran’s secular intelligentsia.27 However, following the 
1925 overthrow of Ahmed Shah Qajar (1909-1925)—a figure many within Iran’s 
intelligentsia believed strongly symbolised Iran’s backwardness—this nationalist 
narrative became the foundational element for the modernisation and consolidation of the 
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Iranian state. Under both Reza Khan, later Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925-1941), and his son 
Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, this nationalist discourse thrived, and both monarchs, 
enamoured by the myths of Iran’s pre-Islamic past, appropriated the achievements and 
symbols of this period as a means to legitimate their monarchical rule and solidify, 
centralise, and develop Iranian state and society.28 In particular, Muhammad Reza Shah 
became an almost obsessive proponent of linking his dynasty and Iran’s political present 
with its pre-Islamic past, and characterised Iran’s economic and political development 
and modernisation with the revival of a new Persian empire, which he hoped would 
eventually see Iran become one of the most technologically and economically-developed 
countries in the world, and the region’s dominant military power.29 In forwarding such 
elements of Iran’s past, the Shah consistently rejected Islam as a critical component of 
Iranian political, social, and cultural life, and believed that Islam was not conducive to 
his interpretation of Iranian values, history, and customs.30 The Shah instead sought to 
instigate a range of secularist reform agendas, and applied a range of pre-Islamic national 
symbols to legitimise his lofty and at times overly-ambitious plans.31  
In the realm of foreign policy, the Shah sought to reassert Iran’s “former place” in the 
region and the world.32 The Shah’s foreign policies were in many respects motivated by 
a misguided and chauvinistic reading of Iran’s pre-Islamic past, whereby he almost 
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obsessively focused upon past Persian military dominance and imperial grandeur. 33 
Driven by the Shah’s ambitions, Iran throughout the 1960s and 1970s engaged in a series 
of aggressive and provocative acts against its Arab neighbours, which included Iranian 
military forces occupying three small Persian Gulf islands claimed by the United Arab 
Emirates, the engagement in a number of small-scale battles with Iraqi forces, and the 
deployment of troops to crush an armed insurgency in Oman.34 These actions, according 
to Maloney, were driven by the Shah’s yearning “to put Iran into a preeminent position 
in the region”, and reassert Iranian dominance throughout the Middle East.35  
Islam 
The Shah’s efforts to reassert Iranian dominance throughout the Middle East, and more 
controversially his efforts to marginalise the role of Islam within Iranian society, were 
deeply confronting to many Iranians. As noted aptly by Ansari, although the Shah 
emphasised the splendours of Iran’s ancient pre-Islamic Aryan past, many of his subjects 
disagreed, arguing that Iranian civilisation was in fact being denigrated by a wilful 
ignorance of Islam and subservience to the West. This omission had to be addressed, and 
in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, Islamic Iran was emphasised at the expense of 
pre-Islamic Iran.36 
The eventual establishment of a theocratic government following the overthrow of the 
Shah irrefutably shifted the relationship between Islam and Iran’s national identity. The 
Shah’s emphasis upon reinvigorating Iran’s imperial past and promoting Iran’s cultural 
superiority at the expense of Islam was considered anathema to Ayatollah Ruhollah 
                                                 
 
33  Fereydoun Hoveyda, The Shah and the Ayatollah: Iranian Mythology and Islamic Revolution 
(Westport: Praeger, 2003), 25. 
34 Maloney, "Identity and Change," 96 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ali M. Ansari, "Civilisational Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case of Iran," in The Limits of Culture: 
Islam and Foreign Policy, ed. Brenda Shaffer (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006), 262. 
31 
 
 
Khomeini and his Islamic revolutionary cadres.37 Khomeini initially set out to abolish the 
Iranian nationalist elements, which had become strongly entrenched within Iranian state 
and society following more than 50 years of Pahlavi rule. Khomeini derided the 
glorification of nationalism, considering it to be a man-made imposition incompatible 
with the religion of Islam, and an affront to the inherent equality and unity of Muslims 
throughout the world.38 In Khomeini’s view, Islamic precepts had to guide the policies of 
Muslim states, not narrow national territorial interests. By pursuing national interests, 
Iran and the world’s other Muslim states had allowed divisions to develop between what 
he believed was a united world community of Islamic followers.  
In the post-revolutionary Islamist project, no longer would Iran’s identity be built upon 
the “pagan darkness” of pre-Islamic times, nor by the “despotic” monarchical Persian 
empires so revered by the Shah and the secularist elite; rather it was the spirit of Islam, 
the infallibility of the Qur’an, the feats of Muhammad the Prophet, and the sacrifice of 
Shi’ite martyrs which would now inform Iran’s identity and place in the world. In line 
with this vision, Khomeini set out to Islamise Iranian state and society, and attempted to 
completely reorientate Iran’s foreign policy practices, interests, and behaviours, which 
became based upon defending the “rights of all Muslims”. 39  Khomeini saw post-
revolutionary Iran as the vanguard of what would eventually be a global Islamic 
movement that would liberate the world’s Muslims from oppressive rule and transform 
the international political order.40 Hunter believes that Khomeini’s worldview, which had 
a deep impact upon Iran’s national identity and foreign policy, was deeply polarised: 
[Khomeini] saw all things in terms of a battle between truth and righteousness and 
falsehood (Haq va Bail) between the arrogant powers (Mustakberin) and the 
downtrodden nations (Mustazefin). He also saw Iran as the standard bearer for and 
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champion of all deprived nations and not only Muslims. This was so because, 
according to him, Iran’s Islamic system was the only one based on true Islam.41 
Khomeini’s simplistic views were followed with vigorous intent by early Iranian 
governments, adding a new, and at times radical, ideational layer on top of Iran’s foreign 
policy agendas. 42  Under the auspices of “exporting the Islamic Revolution”, Iran 
attempted to spread its message and its decidedly Islamic identity beyond its borders, 
destabilising its “un-Islamic”, and Sunni majority regional neighbours.43 Iran’s leaders 
saw their revolution and its Islamic ideals as universal and above cultural and sectarian 
divisions, however the discourse that informed Iran’s Islamic identity was couched in 
decidedly Shi’a sectarian terms, which was deeply confronting to Iran’s mainly Sunni 
Arab neighbours. This impacted the ability to spread Iran’s Islamic, yet Shi’ite revolution, 
beyond its borders, with only a small number of mainly like-minded co-sectarians, such 
as Lebanese Hezbollah, attracted to Iran’s Islamic message. Furthermore, Iran’s efforts 
to destabilise its neighbours, which saw it implicated in a coup attempt against the 
government of Bahrain in 1981, and its efforts to encourage Shi’a minorities to rise up 
against their Sunni, Western-backed leaders, created a deep sense of unease and suspicion 
throughout the region and the world, and saw Iran labelled as a rogue state. This unease, 
coupled with Iran’s brutal eight-year long war with Iraq, had the effect of isolating Iran 
from regional and global politics.44 
This isolation and the inability to spread the Islamic Revolution beyond its borders saw a 
gradual weakening of the Islamic-inspired aspects of Iran’s national identity, but at the 
same time led to a reassertion and reinvigoration of the nationalist aspects that Khomeini 
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sought so strongly to cast aside in the early days of the revolution. The ability to 
completely reorientate the symbols of Iranian state and society was impossible. The 
inability to spread its Islamic, albeit Shi’a, message, and the need to muster domestic 
support for the war against Iraq, saw Iran’s leaders frame their political discourse again 
in nationalist terms, a process which only increased following the death of Khomeini in 
1989.45 While the Shah attempted to nullify and silence the Islamic character of Iranian 
society, Iran’s Islamic elites since Khomeini’s death have on the other hand displayed a 
keen awareness that both sides of Iran’s identity must be fostered and employed within 
both domestic and foreign policy.46 From President Muhammad Khatami’s efforts to 
strike a balance between “Iranian-ness” and “Muslim-ness” in domestic policies,47 to 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s hankering to populist and nationalist Persian rhetoric,48 it is 
clear that one cannot describe Iranian national identity without also taking into account 
its Islamic and nationalist elements, both of which are used in the process of legitimating 
a range of both domestic and foreign policies.  
1.3 The Islamic Republic Political System 
The Islamic Revolution of 1979, while solidifying Iran’s long history of authoritarianism, 
did institute a unique form of rule, which has no precursor or current counterpart in world 
politics. The Islamic Republic of Iran is unique within state governing systems due to its 
combination of a semi-theocratic system of rule based upon the velayat-e-faqih (Rule of 
the Jurisprudence), institutionalised in the 1979 Constitution. This system of rule moulds 
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both theocratic elements, which find their basis in Islamic texts, with elements of 
republicanism that have their antecedents in Western political thought and in the 1906 
Iranian Constitutional Revolution. Both Rakel and Chehabi argue that Iran’s system of 
government is characterised by totalitarian, authoritarian, and democratic tendencies. 
However, Rakel and Chehabi both agree that Iran must be considered an authoritarian 
system.49 This is due to the fact that Iran has only a limited level of political pluralism, 
with feudal and patrimonial characteristics. Although Iran does have parliamentary and 
presidential elections, the Iranian electorate has only a limited choice of candidates who 
fit within the narrow ideological boundaries as set out by the ruling regime. The roots of 
this system lie in the ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini, who during the 1960s and 1970s 
sought to reinterpret the role of the Shi’a clergy within modern political and social life.50 
In traditional Shi’a thought, it is widely accepted that the political authority of the Imams 
was suspended following the occultation of the Twelfth Imam in the ninth century, and 
while the Imam’s authority and role as religious experts were passed on to Shi’a clerics, 
their political authority was not.51 Khomeini sought to overturn hundreds of years of 
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mainstream Shi’a religious thought, and expand the authority of Shi’a clerics into the 
realms of politics and governance. According to Arjomand, Khomeini 
was the first Shi’ite jurist to open the discussion of “Islamic Government” in a work 
of jurisprudence, and he took the radical step of claiming that the Imam’s right to 
rule also devolved upon the jurists during the occultation of the Twelfth Imam.52 
Khomeini insisted that until the Twelfth Imam had returned to Earth, responsibility for 
governing the worldwide umma should be placed into the hands of a vali-e faqih 
(Jurisprudential Leader), who would have the same authority as Muhammad and the 
Imams.53 In the words of Rizvi, Khomeini believed that any “matter, whether public or 
private, relating to anyone living in the Islamic world would come under the jurisdiction 
of the vali”.54 In effect, the vali-e faqih would be the “guardian” and leader of the Islamic 
nation, a role Khomeini saw as no different from that of a guardian responsible for a child.  
Following the overthrow of the Shah, Khomeini quickly sought to institutionalise his 
novel, yet radical theory of velayat-e-faqih (Rule of the Jurisprudent). However, in 
attempting to do so Khomeini faced stiff resistance from nationalist, liberalist, and 
secularist political opponents led by provisional Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan. 55 
Bazargan and his allies believed Iran’s post-revolutionary political future lay in popular 
democracy rather than theocracy, and endeavoured to implement a constitution and 
system of governance based upon Charles de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic, which would 
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enshrine “liberty, equality, and social justice”.56 Such ideas were considered repulsive by 
Khomeini and his followers, who were committed to ensuring the establishment of a 
theocracy at the expense of temporal and foreign ideals such as democracy. Although 
Khomeini and his followers were ultimately successful in ensuring that they got their way 
in establishing an Islamic government, the process of attempting to formulate a 
constitution, which would form the basis of Iran’s post-revolutionary political system, did 
entail making considerable concessions to the democratic ideals championed by his 
opponents. Furthermore, the ability to mould Khomeini’s unique theory of Islamic 
governance on top of a state that that had undergone significant modernisation over the 
twentieth century, with a complex set of legal codes which were well established, was 
considerably more difficult than the Islamic revolutionaries had ever imagined.57 Turning 
Khomeini’s theory of velayat-e-faqih and the vast corpus of Shi’ite religious law into the 
law of a modern state required a complex process of codification, legislation and the 
expansion of activities well beyond matters of religious rituals and ethics.58 This process, 
and the political battles that ensued in the heady days of the revolution, ultimately 
bequeathed upon Iran a constitution and a system of government writhing with internal 
contradictions and ambiguities, which to this day remain largely unresolved.  
Such contradictions are obvious in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Constitution, which 
clearly displays in its 175 clauses the struggles that took place between Iran’s 
heterogeneous post-revolutionary elites, and the difficulty in establishing a modern 
system of government based solely upon religious laws and customs.59 As noted by 
Abrahamian, Iran’s Constitution is a hybrid 
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between Khomeini’s velayat-e-faqeh and Bazargan’s French Republic; between 
divine rights and the rights of man; between theocracy and democracy; between 
vox dei and vox populi; and between clerical authority and popular sovereignty.60 
Despite this hybridised and contradictory constitution, Khomeini and his followers 
ensured that populist and democratic notions such as “the sovereignty of the people” were 
sidelined and sacrificed on the pyre of Islam and Khomeini’s own personal political 
power agenda. The sacrifice of the popular will was neatly summed up by Ayatollah 
Mohammad Beheshti, a prominent figure in his own right, and a close member of 
Khomeini’s inner circle, who declared: “As the first slogan, ‘Islamic government’ was 
chosen, which was very good and expressive, and when it was decided that the regime 
would have a President, it was called the ‘Islamic Republic’, but the true and perfect name 
for this regime is the ‘regime of the umma and Imamate’ (nezam-e ommat va emamat).” 
Beheshti’s views are confirmed in the Constitution, whereby any notions of popular will 
took a back seat to Islamic precepts.61 This is strongly affirmed in the Constitution’s 
preamble, which states faith in God, Divine Justice, the Qur’an, Judgment Day, 
Muhammad the Prophet, and Shi’ite concepts such as the Twelve Imams, and the return 
of the Mahdi.62 Article Two of the Constitution declares that Iran’s political system is 
Islamic and based upon the notion that: “There is only one God … who is by right ruler 
and lawgiver, and man must submit to His command.” And in the world of temporal 
affairs, “The Imamate will provide the leadership and will play a fundamental role in the 
progress of the Islamic Revolution”.63 The republican elements of the Islamic Republic 
are marginalised by Article Four, which states that all “civil, penal, financial, economic, 
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administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations must be based 
on Islamic criteria”.64 And it is the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council65 of clerics 
who decides if these laws meet such criteria. Furthermore, the parliament and the 
president, both popularly-elected bodies are unable to make decisions without the support 
or approval of the Supreme Leader, and consultative clerical bodies such as the Guardian 
Council. For instance, the parliament was not seen by Khomeini as a body that had true 
legislative power, but was instead an institution that would be responsible for the 
development of programs for the implementation of Islamic laws. Therefore, according 
to Hunter, “the people’s representatives can only participate in setting programs or 
legislating on matters on which Islamic law is silent”.66 The Constitution therefore leaves 
open only a very narrow space for the Iranian electorate to participate in the formation of 
Iranian government policies and agendas.67 Power is effectively corralled in the hands of 
a small body of unelected clerical elites, namely the Guardian Council, and reigned over 
by the Supreme Leader who has power reminiscent of Il Duce.68  
The hybridised nature of the Iranian Constitution has had the effect of creating a series of 
institutions which effectively overlap, replicate roles, and conflict with each other in the 
policy formulation and implementation processes. These institutional arrangements have 
undermined the ability of any institution to gain too much power, and have effectively 
led to the “Balkanisation” of the Iranian state, whereby the multiple centres of power have 
created divisions that go well beyond traditional forms of checks and balances and lead 
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to friction, competition, and deadlock among policy elites.69 While the Iranian political 
system is hierarchical in structure, with the Supreme Leader overseeing almost every 
organ of the Iranian state, there are often only very few connections between each 
institution and power centre, and very little horizontal cooperation.70 In essence, the 
Iranian state is itself the “principal arena in which the competition (over power and 
influence) takes place. Rival claims over parts of the state and its resources are constantly 
played out, at times with considerable acrimony.”71 Increasing this acrimony, and only 
adding to institutional deadlock, is the emphasis the Iranian system places upon 
personalities and informality, which further weakens the system’s institutional 
arrangements as set out by the Iranian Constitution. Economically, ideologically, and 
politically like-minded individuals and factions within this system often form loose 
coalitions based around personal patronage and family links, and seek to use both their 
informal and formal positions to influence the Supreme Leader and undermine the 
agendas of rival institutions and individuals.72 Such personal networks trump the formal 
bureaucratic structure of the Iranian political system, and it is often more useful “to view 
the bonds of patronage and loyalty among various individuals than to view the system’s 
ideological, formal, or bureaucratic characteristics”. 73  According to Buchta, Iran’s 
decentralised, quasi-feudal power and economic structure is a carryover of the 
hierarchical but decentralised structure of the Shi’a clergy.74 However, this system of 
governance is nothing new to Iran: Bill, in his 1972 study of Iran, outlined similar 
informal tendencies, whereby Iranian elites engaged in fierce battles “to gain greater 
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favour with the Shah and at the same time to capture more control in the Iranian economic 
arena”.75 This situation is not dissimilar to how the Iranian political system works in the 
post-revolutionary period, with the Supreme Leader taking the place of the Shah in the 
game of political upmanship and patronage that has led to a chaotic, and at times 
ineffective, policy-making environment.  
Adding another level of rivalry and conflict within the Islamic Republican system are the 
differing factions of the political elite, known widely and informally as the Conservative, 
Pragmatist, and Reformist factions. These factions developed out of the ashes of the 
Islamic Republican Party (IRP) founded by Khomeini and his followers in 1979.76 The 
IRP consolidated its control over the Iranian state during the 1980s, but was plagued by 
internal ideological and political disputes among its members, and was dissolved in 1987. 
Since the dissolution of the IRP, hundreds of political groups and organisations77 have 
developed which all work within Iran’s ideological and political framework, and can be 
considered to fall under the banner of one of these three fluid and at times overlapping 
factions, which rather than acting as cohesive and unitary entities are generally built 
around powerful political personalities, and tend to act as political “fronts”.78 These major 
factions cut across the formal state institutions, coalesce on common ideological and 
political grounds, and seek to influence economic, social, and foreign policy.79 Broadly 
speaking, the Conservative faction strongly supports notions of a patriarchal Islamic 
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76 Buchta, Who Rules Iran?, 13. 
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government, traditional social life, the consolidation and expansion of revolutionary 
principles in both the domestic and international spheres, and political and economic self-
sufficiency.80 The Reformist faction generally supports the promotion of civil society, the 
diminishing of state control over political and social life, economic liberalisation, and 
greater interaction with the outside world. The final and third faction, the Pragmatists, 
agrees with much of the Reformist’s agenda on the economy, and considers interaction, 
in particular with the West, as a necessity in ensuring Iran’s economic growth. However, 
in the spheres of politics and culture, the Pragmatists are much more conservative in their 
approach and views.81  
In the realm of foreign policy, Thaler et al. consider the Conservatives to be 
overwhelmingly supportive of adopting “an assertive foreign policy in defence of Islamic 
interests”.82 The Conservatives privilege relations with fellow Islamic countries and the 
wider Muslim world, and are reticent in engaging in rapprochement with the United States. 
The Reformists, and Pragmatists on the other hand, are more interested in ensuring that 
Iran is “at peace” with the international community, and generally pursue a moderate 
foreign policy agenda that safeguards Iran’s national interests, rather than any form of 
Islamist ideological agenda. 83  These two different foreign policy agendas create 
considerable conflict within Iran’s body politic, and overlaid on top of the complex and 
weak institutional structure, have stifled the Islamic Republic’s ability to formulate 
coherent domestic and foreign policies throughout the post-revolutionary era.84  
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The Formal Power Structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran85 
 
1.4 Key Institutions and Figures in Foreign Policy Decision-Making  
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s complicated system of governance has had a major impact 
on how foreign policy has been conceived and implemented since the revolution.86 This 
                                                 
 
85 As can be seen in the figure above, the Supreme Leader has oversight over every arm of government, 
in the form of the legislative, executive and judiciary. Furthermore, the heads of the military and Iran’s 
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picture of the dynamics at play within the Iranian political system. This subsection is heavily indebted to 
both Buchta and Rakel’s work.  
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section will outline the key institutions and figures involved in foreign policy-making. 
This focus, therefore, makes it unnecessary to outline the whole institutional structure of 
the Islamic Republic. Institutions such as the Assembly of Experts87, the Expediency 
Council88, religious foundations89 and the judiciary, while important in understanding 
Iran’s internal power dynamics, are not examined due to their peripheral formal and 
informal role in the foreign policy-making processes of the Islamic Republic.  
The Supreme Leader (Vali-e Faqih) 
Sitting at the apex of the Iranian foreign policy pyramid is the Supreme Leader (Vali-e 
Faqih). The Supreme Leader is the most powerful figure within the Islamic Republic of 
                                                 
 
87 Other than the president and the parliament, the Iranian people also elect the Assembly of Experts. 
The assembly is made up of 86 clerics who serve an eight-year term. After ideological and political vetting 
is conducted by the Guardian Council, the assembly has the constitutional capacity to elect a Supreme 
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the Supreme Leader. For instance, the Head of the Expediency Council, former President Ali Akbar 
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tasked with safeguarding the Islamic principles of the revolution and have a wide interest in Iran’s domestic 
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and their presence and influence only further narrows popular participation in Iran’s governing processes. 
See Rakel, Power, Islam, and Political Elite, 38-39. 
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Iran, and the Office of the Supreme Leader is the centre around which all other institutions 
of the Islamic Republic revolve.90  
The Supreme Leader “supervises” the legislative, executive and judicial branches of 
Iranian government, and has the authority to appoint jurists to the Guardian Council, and 
can appoint Iran’s highest judicial authority. Furthermore, the Supreme Leader is also the 
Commander-in-Chief of The Guardians of the Islamic Revolutionary Corps (IRGC) 
(Sepah-e Pasdaran), appoints the Commander-in-Chiefs of the three branches of the 
Iranian armed forces, oversees the Supreme National Security Council (Shura-ye 
amniyat-e melli) (SNSC) through two representatives appointed by himself, and has the 
authority to mobilise troops and declare war or peace. The Supreme Leader also signs the 
appointment certificate of the president; he can also dismiss the president if the Supreme 
Court finds the president has violated his legal duties, or if the parliament (Majles-e 
Shura-ye Melli) finds the president to be “politically incompetent”. As summed up by 
Rizvi, the principle of the velayat-e-faqih gives the Supreme Leader “total control over 
the affairs of the state … all religious and political powers … thus rest in one person, and 
hence the vali-e faqih’s powers are far beyond those of any contemporary head of state”.91  
In foreign policy, the Supreme Leader oversees and controls a vast array of organisations 
and institutions that at times run parallel to, or in conflict with, policies enunciated by the 
popularly-elected president. However, rather than the Supreme Leader taking direct 
control over the vast organs of Iranian foreign policy-making, he instead appoints clerical 
representatives, or “commissars”, who embed themselves in every important Iranian state 
institution, both civilian and military, and play a major role in ensuring that the Supreme 
Leader’s views and ideological proclivities are adhered to when foreign policy is 
formulated and implemented.92  According to Buchta, these “commissars” are “more 
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powerful than ministers and other government functionaries and they have the power to 
intervene in any matter of state”.93  
The Supreme Leader also influences the direction of Iranian foreign policy through 
personally affiliated organisations and Iranian cultural and Islamic centres situated 
throughout the world. Organisations such as the Islamic Propagation Organisation 
(Sazeman-e tabliaghat-e eslami), the Hajj and Welfare Organisation, and the World 
Assembly for the People of the House of the Prophet (Majma-e jahani baraye ahl-e bait) 
are all closely associated with the Supreme Leader’s office, carrying out an array of 
functions such as the distribution of aid and monetary resources to Islamic movements, 
particularly in the Middle Eastern region. These organisations fall outside the scope of 
Iran’s foreign ministry, although they play a key role in furthering Iran’s “soft power” in 
a range of states. Also falling outside the responsibility of the Iranian foreign ministry are 
cultural centres attached to Iran’s worldwide network of embassies. These cultural centres 
report directly to the Supreme Leader through their head representatives, receive 
diplomatic protection due to being “attached” to Iranian embassies, and also pass on 
substantial support to Islamic movements, groups, and organisations throughout the 
world.94  
Outside of Supreme Leader Khamenei’s shadow of influence over foreign affairs is the 
SNSC. The SNSC is the “nerve centre” for Iranian foreign policy-making, consisting of 
some of the most powerful figures 95  within the Iranian government. The SNSC 
coordinates all activities involving the ministries of defence, intelligence, and foreign 
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95 The members of the SNSC chaired by the President are the heads of the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, head of the Planning and Budget 
Organisation, the ministers of foreign affairs, the interior, and intelligence, departmental ministers if their 
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policy.96 Although constitutionally the SNSC is controlled and chaired by the president, 
the role and influence of the Supreme Leader shapes all decisions made by the SNSC. 
During the foreign policy formulation process, the Supreme Leader’s representatives 
convey his views to the rest of the council and the president, thus ensuring that the 
Supreme Leader’s perspectives are taken upon board before any final decision is made.97  
Rather than that of a hands-on operator controlling all levers of foreign policy-making, 
the Supreme Leader sets out the general parameters of Iranian foreign policy-making and 
ensures such policies are in line with the ethos of the Islamic Revolution. In doing so, the 
Supreme Leader largely bases his decisions on consensus, ensuring a number of differing 
views on foreign policy issues are canvassed through formal institutional channels, such 
as the SNSC, and through his informal channels of closely-linked intellectuals, religious 
leaders, business people, military commanders, and past and present politicians who may 
or may not have significant formal power, but due to their proximity to the Supreme 
Leader have considerable informal power in influencing his views on foreign policy.98 
Although the Supreme Leader oversees a decision-making process which is characterised 
by consensus, no major foreign policy decision is made without his personal consent.99 
Furthermore, it should also be mentioned that any decisions made must also take into 
account Khamenei’s somewhat idiosyncratic worldview. Since the outset of his reign 
Khamenei has aligned himself closely with conservative clerics and political figures as a 
means to solidify his rule and fend off challenges by those of a reformist bent to 
economically and socially reform the Islamic Republican system. 100  In the realm of 
foreign policy, Khamenei has tended to stick closely to the platform set out by Ayatollah 
Khomeini rather than form his own approach to international affairs. However, according 
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to Sajjadpour, Khamenei has also displayed pragmatism, often allowing others “leeway 
to initiate alternative policies—such as Rafsanjani’s rapprochement with Saudi Arabia (a 
government which Khomeini denounced as ‘evil’) and Khatami’s warming of relations 
with Europe”.101 Although this is the case, there have been two areas of foreign policy 
Khamenei has sought to maintain as the pillars of Iranian foreign policy—namely enmity 
and opposition towards the United States and Israel.102 This loathing of the United States 
and Israel has been a remarkably consistent aspect of Khatami’s views on foreign policy, 
and the idea of rapprochement with either state goes beyond the pale of what is possible 
for Iranian foreign policy elites.  
The President 
The president is Iran’s most powerful official after the Supreme Leader. Every four years 
Iranians vote to elect a new president, who is restricted to two consecutive terms. 
Presidential candidates are tightly vetted, with the Guardian Council tasked with selecting 
appropriate candidates who fit within the council’s and Supreme Leader’s conservative 
world view.103 This process thus has the effect of significantly diminishing the role of the 
Iranian public in the electoral process.104  
The president is mainly responsible for the day-to-day decisions regarding economic and 
socio-cultural affairs. The president has the power to appoint and dismiss cabinet 
ministers, controls the Planning and Budget Organisation (Sazeman-e Barname va Buje), 
appoints the director of the Iranian Central Bank, and is the chairman of the SNSC.105 
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Furthermore, the president implements legislation passed by the Iranian parliament, signs 
international agreements and treaties, is responsible for the state budget, accepts the 
credentials of foreign ambassadors, and signs the credentials of Iranian ambassadors.106 
 In relation to foreign policy and national security, the president is subjected to significant 
political and constitutional barriers. The president has little formal control over foreign 
policy, and has no control over Iran’s armed forces, which constitutionally fall under the 
umbrella of the Supreme Leader.107 Despite this, every Iranian president has sought to 
expand their own power vis-à-vis the Supreme Leader in the realms of foreign policy and 
national security, with varying degrees of success.108 Iranian presidents have scope to 
shape Iranian foreign policy during the formulation and implementation stages, and while 
always needing to take the Supreme Leader’s guidance and direction into account, have 
shown a history of backing the Supreme Leader into corners on certain foreign policy 
issues to ensure that their own views and ideas take precedence. As described by Thaler 
et al. a good example of this was 
Ahmadinejad’s assertion that Iran’s nuclear program [was] a national right. Painting 
the issue as a fundamental matter of sovereignty and independence makes it 
difficult for anyone (including Khameini) to compromise with the international 
community.109 
Generally however, for the president to have a major impact on the direction of foreign 
policy, the Supreme Leader’s views must be taken into consideration, and the president 
must not stray too far from the ideological red lines as set out by the Supreme Leader and 
his informal and personal cadre of military leaders, clerics, and policy elites. If the 
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president does not do this, he will potentially find his foreign policy initiatives white-
anted, and given very little institutional support. 
The Supreme National Security Council 
As already noted above, the SNSC is an integral institution in the formulation and 
implementation of foreign policy-making in the Islamic Republic. According to the 
Iranian Constitution, the SNSC is tasked with protecting the “national interests and 
watching over the Islamic Revolution, as well as the territorial integrity and the national 
sovereignty of the country”.110 According to Article 176 of the Constitution, the SNSC’s 
functions and tasks are 
determining the country’s policies concerning defence and security within the 
framework of general government policy. Coordinating political, social, cultural 
and economic activities that affect security, together with the general measures 
adopted for defence and security within the country, making use of all the country’s 
material and spiritual resources in order to mobilise resistance against domestic and 
foreign threats.111 
The SNSC is made up of the president who is the chairman, the ministers of foreign affairs, 
interior, and intelligence, the commanders of the regular army and the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps, the heads of the legislative and judicial branches, and two 
personal representatives of the Supreme Leader. According to Schirazi, the SNSC can be 
viewed as a “super government”: 
It makes decisions which should [constitutionally] at the very least, be supervised 
by parliament. In fact, its decisions are an outright infringement upon the powers 
of the legislature. And yet, parliament generally learns of these decisions only after 
they are made. In some cases the council’s decisions contradict those of 
parliament.112 
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As noted above, although the president chairs this powerful institution, it is the views of 
the Supreme Leader, voiced by his two representatives that must be adhered to. No 
decisions are made by the SNSC without the approval of the Supreme Leader. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Unlike the case of most other states, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays only a minor 
role in the formulation of foreign policy. Rather, the ministry is responsible for the 
implementation of decisions made by higher-level officials, in particular, the Supreme 
Leader, and decision-making bodies such as the SNSC.113 Furthermore, Foreign Ministry 
acts as a valuable source of information for decision-makers higher up within Iran’s 
institutional structure. According to Maleki, analysis of foreign countries and 
international events comes directly via the Foreign Ministry through ambassadorial 
dispatches, and 
[T]he Director Generals of various departments also send reports to the Deputies 
and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Input also is obtained through security agents, 
from miscellaneous media sources, from libraries abroad, from individual citizens 
of one country or another, and from think tanks and scholarly authorities in germane 
subject areas.114  
Although the Foreign Ministry plays an influential role in the dissemination and analysis 
of information within the foreign policy decision-making process of Iran, the organisation 
is plagued by inefficiencies, and appointments are often made less on merit and more on 
links with powerful patrons. A number of Iranian scholars interviewed by the author were 
scathing in their criticism of the Foreign Ministry, commenting on its inability to 
implement policy in either an effective or efficient manner.115 These criticisms were also 
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publicly elucidated in a roundtable discussion conducted by prominent Iranian think tank, 
the Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies, in 2000. During this roundtable, a number 
of prominent Iranian scholars discussed different issues facing Iranian foreign policy. 
According to Massood Qassemzadeh, an advisor to the Foreign Ministry, Iranian 
diplomacy since the Islamic Revolution had not been conducted in a “scientific” manner, 
and very little attention was given to developing expertise and knowledge within Iran’s 
diplomatic corp.116 In particular, Iran faced capacity issues in regions outside of Europe 
and the Middle East, wherein many of Iran’s most talented diplomats and other 
technocrats were unwilling to take assignments in emerging states based in Central Asia 
or Africa for instance.117  
The Majles (Islamic Consultative Assembly) 
Every four years the Iranian public votes to elect 290 members to the Majles-e Shora-ye 
Eslami. The Majles is responsible for the drafting of legislation (Article 71-75), the 
ratification of international treaties (Article 77), approving the initiation of a state of 
emergency (Article 79), approving loans (Article 80) and the annual budget (Article 52), 
and has the ability to remove the president and his appointed ministers from office if they 
are found to be politically incompetent. 118  The constitutional responsibilities of the 
Majles on paper are significant, but in practice this body has been constrained by 
executive power, and the unelected bodies of the Islamic Republic. For example, the 
Supreme Leader has displayed a history of intervening in the legislative process through 
so-called “state orders”, which have removed certain items of legislation that he does not 
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agree with.119 In the realm of foreign policy, the SNSC has opposed and contravened the 
Majles’ legislative mandates, and has left parliament out of the loop on many of its 
decisions, most notably over nuclear issues. For instance, operations at the gas enrichment 
facility located at Natanz and the heavy water production facility at Arak had been 
conducted in secret for more than 18 years, and was only disclosed to the Majles when 
these operations were uncovered by the international community in 2002. The budget for 
these operations had not followed constitutional protocol, without funds being 
appropriated from the Planning and Budget Committee. Furthermore in theory all 
international treaties and agreements should be ratified by the Majles according to Article 
77 of the Constitution. However, SNSC sidelined the Majles in acquiescing to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol (2003-2006) and other 
additional agreements including the Paris Agreement of 2004, and more recently the Joint 
Plan of Action in 2013.120 However, the Majles does have a long history of bringing the 
executive to account. For instance, the floor of the Majles and the Majles foreign policy 
committee are both vibrant outlets for discussion on foreign policy issues. Members of 
the Majles often ask for written clarification and responses regarding foreign policy 
decisions made by the executive. This provides members of the Majles a key opportunity 
to bring to the attention of the public decisions made by the executive, and to influence 
public opinion on foreign policy. Ehteshami and Hinnebusch contend that “although it 
may not always pay off, influencing public opinion is the traditional method of putting 
pressure on the executive to revise or continue to pursue a particular policy”. And this 
partly explains why for an authoritarian state, post-revolutionary Iran has had a 
comparatively vibrant public debate on political matters.121 On the balance, however, in 
theory the Majles should play a much larger role in foreign policy, but in practice its 
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functional input is circumscribed, with its members concentrating mainly on local issues 
concerning their electorates.122  
The Council of Guardians 
The 12-member Council of Guardians’ role in domestic politics cannot be understated. 
The council is tasked with ensuring that Iranian laws comply with the Iranian Constitution, 
and approves the candidates to be elected to the presidency, Majles, and the Assembly of 
Experts. In the area of foreign policy, the Guardian Council is also tasked with ensuring 
that Iran’s foreign policies comply with the Iranian Constitution. For instance, the 
Guardian Council played a critical role during the contested election of 2009, declaring 
that Ahmadinejad had indeed won against his reformist rival Mir Hossein Mousavi. 
Furthermore, the Guardian Council outright rejected the prospect of a fresh election, 
calling the vote the “healthiest” Iran had carried out in years.123 The Guardian Council’s 
head, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, is a particularly influential figure within the Islamic 
Republic. Holding the chairmanship of the Guardian Council since 1988, Jannati is a 
strong supporter of the conservative status quo, and was considered a key spiritual and 
ideological ally of controversial president, Ahmadinejad. 124  Jannati’s position in the 
Guardian Council, along with his membership of the Assembly of Experts and the 
Expediency Council, makes him one of the most powerful figures within Iran, and a 
number of observers have criticised his role in hindering political and social reform within 
Iran, and of favouring conservative elements of the Islamic Republican system.125 
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The Armed Forces 
The Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran are split between a regular military, 
which consists of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, Air Force, and Navy, and a 
revolutionary military, which consists of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—Army, 
Navy, Air Force (IRGC), a paramilitary militia (basij), and the Law Enforcement 
Forces.126 Both the regular and revolutionary arms of the armed forces are under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics, while the Law 
Enforcement Forces are subordinate to the Ministry of Interior. Both the regular and 
revolutionary Armed Forces are responsible for defending Iran’s territorial integrity. 
However, the IRGC acts as a counterbalancing force against the regular military, whose 
loyalty to the revolution was questioned following the fall of the Shah. The IRGC is also 
tasked with defending the “ideological purity” of the Islamic Republic, and also maintains 
domestic order. Providing support for the IRGC’s tasks is the paramilitary basij, which 
was established by Ayatollah Khomeini to protect the Islamic Republic against “domestic 
enemies” and US influence.127  
Iran’s regular armed forces are often called “the silent beauty” due to their distaste for 
intervening in the daily cut and thrust of Iranian politics; the IRGC, on the other hand, is 
highly politicised, and involved in a number of Iran’s political, social, and economic 
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spheres.128 The IRGC’s economic and political power substantially outweighs its military 
significance, with many current and former members of the IRGC in positions of great 
influence in both Iranian politics and business. Due to it being one of the more 
autonomous power centres within the Islamic Republic, the IRGC has consistently fended 
off efforts by the clerical elite and the executive to rein in and control its activities.129 
This independence has seen the IRGC’s role in domestic and foreign politics expand 
considerably over recent years. 130  The clearest indication of this was during the 
presidency of the reformist Mohammad Khatami. The IRGC spearheaded a number of 
confrontations with the Khatami regime, and successfully undermined many of its 
political, economic, and social agendas, both domestic and foreign, acting as a “praetorian 
guard” for more conservative political factions and societal groups.131 Buchta asserts that 
in “contrast to the regular military, the IRGC considers itself less a professional military 
force and much more a revolutionary political force, though the two are not considered 
mutually exclusive”.132  Current and former IRGC members head a range of Iranian 
organisations, such as economic foundations, bonyads133, two universities, two think 
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130 In 2003 veterans of the IRGC took control over a number of city and provincial councils, opening 
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tanks, policy journals and a number of media outlets.134 According to Wehrey et al. “from 
laser eye surgery and construction to automobile manufacturing and real estate, the IRGC 
has extended its influence into virtually every sector of the Iranian market”.135  
This significant economic clout and political independence has allowed the IRGC to play 
a major, albeit constitutionally informal, role in Iranian foreign policy-making. IRGC 
companies and bonyads have invested significant amounts of money136 and conducted a 
range of activities, independent of the oversight of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, in a 
number of foreign countries. 137  The IRGC also plays a key role in the “official” 
formulation of policy, with IRGC commanders taking part in SNSC meetings. However, 
the IRGC’s informal influence is much more significant. According to Byman et al., the 
IRGC “routinely exploits its access to the Supreme Leader’s office, volunteers advice on 
national and foreign policy matters to the Leader and his key staff, and actively aims to 
influence policy and debate on security issues”.138  In particular, the IRGC is highly 
prominent in shaping Iranian security policy in the context of the Middle East, where it 
has developed its own independent network of contacts with groups and individuals 
outside of the formal foreign policy-building process. For instance in Lebanon and Syria, 
the IRGC is often seen as the most prominent of Iranian state bodies in the development 
of policy, and generally very few decisions are made without consulting the IRGC 
leadership. However, in regions such as Central Asia, the IRGC wields very little 
influence over Iranian foreign policy, nor does it see the region as a great priority within 
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Iranian security calculations.139 Furthermore, the IRGC plays a key role in shaping the 
discourse of Iranian foreign policy through its ownership of a number of news media 
outlets, and contacts with Friday prayer leaders. The IRGC often criticises and “warns” 
the president from taking certain decisions on foreign policy matters, and places the views 
of its commanders and former members front and centre within public debate. 140 
Although the IRGC’s influence is difficult to measure due to its informality, its members 
have ensconced themselves within every level of Iranian foreign policy-making over 
recent years, and have become key players in some of Iran’s most important foreign 
policy endeavours, such as Iran’s nuclear program, and in the alleged export of “terrorism” 
and Islamic propaganda.141  
Outer-Core Elites and Opinion makers 
Outer-core and discourse elites can be considered those who sit outside, or have informal 
links with, the formal foreign policy decision-making apparatuses within the Islamic 
Republic as described above. Prominent non-establishment and establishment clerics, 
intellectuals, academicians, semi-independent think tanks, and journalists all attempt to 
shape and influence internal decision-makers and the wider public opinion and discourse 
surrounding Iranian foreign policy-making.142 As already mentioned, the Iranian political 
establishment is highly fractured. Therefore, those with a considerable political, clerical, 
and social profiles and gravitas attempt to influence the foreign policy process through 
informal mechanisms. For instance, former foreign ministers, presidents, and military 
commanders often seek to use their former positions of power to shape the internal 
dynamics and processes of foreign policy-making. Furthermore, politicians and regime 
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figures who are not able to play a direct role in formal decision-making processes also 
attempt to place their views into the wider public domain.143 These elites use Iranian 
domestic media, informal professional, family, and personal networks, and prayer groups 
to outline and disseminate their ideological and political viewpoints, with the goal of 
encouraging and discouraging those responsible for formal decision-making from 
undertaking certain measures in the pursuit of Iranian foreign policy. 
In particular, the importance of the media in disseminating the views of the outer-core 
and discourse elite, and shaping public opinion in Iran on foreign policy matters cannot 
be understated. This importance is outlined by Hunter, who states: 
The press serves as a platform for various politicians, religious leaders, and 
intellectuals to voice their views on foreign policy challenges faced by Iran and on 
how to deal with them successfully. The Leader is apprised of the diverging views, 
and various analysis and policy options are also presented to him.144 
Prominent members of Iran’s Reformist, Conservative, and Pragmatist political factions 
seek to score political points over their rivals, and to push their faction’s ideological and 
political viewpoints to the wider public, through media publications affiliated with their 
faction or party.  
During the 1990s and early 2000s, there was a considerably large and vibrant media 
establishment within Iran. In 2000 for instance, there were 16 daily newspapers in 
circulation, six weeklies, a number of bi-weeklies, and three political monthlies dedicated 
to debating political matters available in Iran. 145  This media openness declined 
significantly during the presidency of Ahmadinejad, with many periodicals and 
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newspapers closed down due to their criticism of government policies. 146  However, 
during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the use of non-traditional forms of media, particularly 
online media, grew substantially. This growth came about despite a number of restrictive 
measures instigated by the Iranian state, such as internet filtering, the slowing of 
bandwidth, and the blocking of websites. For instance, in 2005 only 10.8 percent of the 
Iranian population had internet access, however, in 2012, 53.3 percent of the Iranian 
population had access to the internet147, a staggering increase, which allowed the Iranian 
public to obtain a variety of different views on foreign policy matters.  
1.5 Conclusion  
This chapter outlined a range of domestic variables that influence Iranian foreign policy-
making. Although it is difficult to do justice to the vibrancy of Iran’s domestic culture, 
and the sheer complexity of its governmental dynamics, it is clear that Iranian state and 
society are far from homogenous. While Iran’s unique resource endowment and key 
strategic position have placed Iran’s leaders, both pre and post-revolutionary, into similar 
foreign policy quandaries. The overlay of a rich and double-headed national character 
that reifies both Islam and nationalism has ensured its elites have a range of differing 
worldviews, which shape how Iran deals with its foreign policy challenges. Furthermore, 
the institution of a unique form of government following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, 
which adopts theological and republican elements, has only added another layer of 
difficulty in explaining how foreign policy decisions are made within the Islamic 
Republic.  
This chapter has set out to display that foreign policy decision-making is not as clear cut 
as imagined by lay observers of Iranian politics. A range of inputs, worldviews, factional 
                                                 
 
146 “Iran closes Leading Newspapers,” Al Jazeera, (October 6, 2009), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2009/10/2009106141922771476.html, accessed February 5, 
2015. 
147 "Iran: Internet Usage, Broadband and Telecommunications Reports," Internet World Stats: Usage 
and Population Statistics http://www.internetworldstats.com/me/ir.htm, accessed August 10, 2015. 
60 
 
 
positions, and historical and cultural factors must be taken into account when analysing 
Iranian foreign policy. While this may be the case, perhaps the domestic element that 
influences Iranian foreign policy-making the most is the at times chaotic nature of Iran’s 
factional and highly informal system of government. Those who have power in the 
“official” and constitutional sense do not always have real power within the Iranian 
political system. The highly factionalised and informal nature of the Iranian political 
system, which has its basis Iran’s Islamic Republican Constitution, has placed 
considerable constraints on the ability of Iran’s political elites to deal with foreign policy 
matters in a cohesive and efficient fashion. This has had a deleterious impact on Iran’s 
international position and standing, and as the following chapter will show, this chaotic 
domestic environment, coupled with a challenging and volatile systemic environment, 
has left Iran excluded from greater international affairs, and placed it in an extremely 
vulnerable position, which has an undeniable impact on its relations with Tajikistan since 
the fall of the Soviet Union.  
61 
 
 
Chapter Two: The Islamic Republic of Iran: The Regional and International 
Context 
Overlaid on Iran’s complex internal political structure is an unstable and fractious 
regional and international environment. From its establishment, the Islamic Republic has 
had to contend with near-constant upheaval on its borders and difficult challenges 
stemming from its unique geographical location.1 These challenges were made all the 
more difficult following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, which completely 
reorientated Iran’s strategic environment, and led to a range of new dilemmas that Iranian 
foreign policy planners continue to grapple with to the present day. This chapter analyses 
the influence regional and international factors have had on Iran’s post-Cold War foreign 
policy in Central Asia. 
The establishment of five newly-independent states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) brought a range of new 
opportunities and challenges, which policy planners in Iran sought to capitalise upon. 
However, Iran had only very limited success in the region, which this chapter argues can 
be directly attributed to the formation of a unipolar international system overseen by 
Iran’s bitter rival and the world’s sole superpower, the United States. The United States 
over the past 20 years has conducted a range of foreign policy actions that have caused 
deep alarm within Iran’s foreign policy establishment. From efforts to contain Iran 
through an ever stricter program of sanctions, to the invasion of neighbours on Iran’s 
eastern and western borders, Iran’s scope for external action throughout the post-Cold 
War period has been circumscribed by the United States’ so-called “unipolar moment”.2 
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Furthermore, not only has Iran had to deal with the American dominance of the 
international system, it has also had to confront significant regional instability, and a 
series of regional rivals and so-called “partners” who have consistently sidelined and 
undermined Tehran, thus further weakening its regional and international position 
throughout the past 20 years. Through analysing the wider regional and international 
dynamics that have affected Iran’s interactions with Central Asia, this chapter provides 
the context for this thesis’ analysis of Iran’s bilateral relations with Tajikistan, which have 
largely been held to ransom by factors far beyond either state’s control. 
2.1 1991-2001: Iran, Central Asia and the United States’ Unipolar Moment 
The end of the Cold War provided the United States with an unprecedented opportunity 
to reshape the global order and maintain its political and military dominance for decades 
to come. Much of these goals were elucidated in an internal Pentagon document that was 
leaked to the New York Times in 1992. The doctrine formulated by the then Under 
Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz, stated that the United States’ “first objective is to 
prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union 
or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. 
This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defence strategy and 
requires that we endeavour to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose 
resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power.”3 
Seeking to consolidate and expand this power, the United States turned its gaze towards 
the strategically vital region of Central Asia. As aptly highlighted by Brzezinski in his 
seminal work, The Grand Chessboard, how the United States “managed” Central Asia, 
and the Eurasian landmass more broadly, would be “critical” in deciding the United States’ 
                                                 
 
Kaplan, titled “Power and Society” published in 1950. For further discussion of Laswell and Kaplan’s work, 
see Martin A. Smith, Power in the Changing Global Order: The US, Russia and China (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2012), 48. 
3 Patrick E Tyler, "US Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop: A One Superpower World," 
New York Times, 8 (1992). 
63 
 
 
political future.4 Bordering real and potential US political rivals—Iran, China, Russia, 
and India—Central Asia’s strategic location, along with its weak political regimes, 
proximity to the wider Islamic world, and its potential to act as an important future 
hydrocarbons supplier, sharply focused American attention to a much neglected and little 
spoken of region within international affairs. In the words of Brzezinski, if the United 
States could dominate and control Central Asia, this region could act as a vital 
“springboard” for the “attainment of continental domination” and secure the United States’ 
place as a global hegemon.5 The United States therefore made it a key focus of its post-
Cold War foreign policy to both encourage and cajole the Central Asian states that had 
once formed part of the Soviet political architecture to move towards the US political 
orbit, open their markets to investment by American private enterprise, and accept the 
primacy of liberal market-based capitalism.6 
The United States was not the only state to display an active interest in Central Asia. Iran 
also viewed the development of economic and political ties with a region it felt 
“irredeemably a part of” with considerable excitement, and also set out quickly to 
consolidate and establish its influence within the region.7 However, the prospect of Iran 
influencing and developing relations with the newly-independent Central Asian republics 
was viewed with utter distaste by US officials. As a state that had a history of pursuing 
Islamist-based agendas, and one which sought to increase its relative power through the 
maintenance of a largely independent and often anti-Western foreign policy stance, Iran 
was viewed in Washington as a major threat to the emerging interests of the United States 
not only in Central Asia, but also within the much broader post-Cold War international 
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security environment.8 In response to the “threat” of Iran, the United States throughout 
the administrations of both George H.W. Bush (1989-1993), and Bill Clinton (1993-2001), 
built up a formidable and permanent military presence to Iran’s south in the Persian Gulf, 
consistently blocked Iranian access to new technologies and financial resources through 
ever-tightening and draconian sanctions measures, and sought to freeze Iran out of the 
Central Asia region. The most vicious of these sanctions was imposed by the 1996 Iran 
and Libya Sanctions Act, (ILSA). ILSA was designed to ensure that no American, or any 
other foreign company for that matter, could invest in Iran’s hydrocarbon sector.9 The 
United States was cognisant of the fact that Iran’s fragile post-war domestic economy 
required massive levels of international private investment and expertise. If this private 
investment did eventuate, Iran could potentially reinvigorate its economy, and further 
expand its economic and therefore political presence beyond its borders, a prospect that 
the United States found deeply alarming.10 
According to US policy planners Iran was a dangerous, ideologically-driven actor that, if 
given the opportunity, would spread its unique messianic vision outside its borders and 
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promote instability.11 The worst case, albeit far-fetched scenario for political apparatchiks 
in Washington was the potential that an expansion of Iranian influence into Central Asia 
could auger the beginnings of an anti-American, pro-Iranian, Islamist bloc of states, 
which could act as an obstacle to US strategic, economic, and political agendas in the 
post-Soviet regional political vacuum.12  
While American policy planners sought to hype the potential of Iran spreading its 
ideology in the region, Iranian elites themselves were more than aware that attempting to 
spread their state’s much maligned religiously-informed revolutionary ideology—which 
had formed the basis of its foreign agendas in the Middle Eastern region throughout the 
1980s—to the Central Asian region would be exceedingly difficult, and counter-
productive in forwarding their country’s interests. As highlighted by Akiner, despite the 
fact that many experts and Western policy planners predicted that Iran would be at the 
forefront in any external attempt to reintegrate the Central Asian region into the wider 
world of Islam, at the outset of Central Asian post-Soviet independence, Iranian clerics 
had been “conspicuous largely by their absence”. According to Akiner, 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union delegations from Iran began to visit the 
Central Asian states and to acquire first hand familiarity with the region. They soon 
realised that an Islamic revolution along the lines of the Iranian model was not a 
realistic prospect; this was partly because of the very low level of knowledge of 
Islam among the population at large, but also, and very importantly, because of the 
lack of a trained, independent-minded ulama (body of trained Muslim scholars). 
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The fact that the Iranians represent the Shi’a tradition also placed them at a 
disadvantage.13  
Alongside these very important internal dynamics, unique to the Central Asian region, 
was the weakening of Iran’s ideological pretensions towards the end of the 1980s. After 
more than eight years of war with Iraq, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, and the 
desperate need to rebuild Iran’s floundering economy, Iran’s government focused much 
less on spreading Islamic revolution and much more on so-called pragmatic national 
interests. Therefore, by the time of Central Asian independence, Iran was much less 
burdened by the weight of its revolutionary ideology, which alongside the fact that 
Central Asia had rarely rated a mention in official religious discourse, and had no real 
“symbolic significance” for the Islamic Republic in comparison to areas such as Palestine 
and Jerusalem in the Middle East, ensured that ideology rarely raised its head in Iran’s 
actions towards the region.14  
However, even though the Iranian government placed very little emphasis on its Islamic 
identity, and its policies towards the Central Asian region were “overwhelmingly 
pragmatic” and free of ideological agendas, Iran was viewed with considerable suspicion 
among many of the region’s elites.15 In particular, during the period of the Tajik Civil 
War (1992-1997) Iran was often accused by the region’s leaders of supporting Islamist 
movements and stoking disorder, which often left it at a disadvantage in the scramble to 
influence the Central Asian region. Most notably Uzbekistan was at the forefront in 
offering itself to the West as a rampart against Islamic fundamentalism and as a barrier 
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to Iranian influence.16 On a number of occasions, Uzbek President Islam Karimov made 
inflammatory remarks and pointed allegations towards Iran and its apparent Islamic 
agendas in the region. Furthermore, Karimov fully supported the US containment efforts, 
much to the chagrin of Tehran. Although none of the other Central Asian republics 
displayed as much hostility towards Tehran as Uzbekistan did, all at different times raised 
suspicions towards Iran and its foreign policy agendas in the region.  
In an attempt to overcome these suspicions, Iranian elites sought to focus much of their 
diplomatic efforts in promoting trade links with their new eastern neighbours. In 
particular, Iran sought to capitalise on its apparently “natural role” as a trade link between 
east and west, proposing the construction and expansion of road, rail, and energy 
networks, which would bind Iran closely to the region.17 Among such projects proposed 
by Iran were pipeline routes which would link oil and gas rich Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan to the Persian Gulf, and road and rail networks that would eventually 
connect Iran to China. Such Iranian proposals offered the Central Asian republics a cost-
effective and efficient means to link their economies to world markets, while reducing 
their dependence upon Russia, which stemmed from the Soviet system of infrastructure 
that had placed the Central Asian republics in a major economic bind, wherein all pipeline 
and transport routes were linked to Russian markets. In the post-Soviet period, Russia 
attempted to maintain its monopoly over these routes, and consistently sought to block 
efforts to diversify the infrastructure links of the Central Asian republics to the outside 
world. 18  These Russian efforts had the potential to stymie the future growth of the 
                                                 
 
16 Hunter, "Iran's Pragmatic Regional Policy," 142. 
17 See Pahlavi and Hojati, "Iran and Central Asia," 215-38; Ehteshami and Murphy, "The Non-Arab 
Middle East States and the Caucasian/Central Asian Republics: Iran and Israel," 81-105; Ertan Efegil and 
Leonard A. Stone, "Iran's Interests in Central Asia: A Contemporary Assessment," Central Asian Survey 
20, no. 3 (2001): 353-65, and Maleki, "Iran," 167-92. 
18 The most prominent and expensive of these proposals was a United States plan to link European 
markets to Central Asia through a submarine gas pipeline extending from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Turkey onwards to Europe, effectively bypassing not only Russia, but also Iran. See Ariel 
Cohen, "The New Great Game': Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia," The Heritage Foundation 
(January 25, 1996). http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1996/01/bg1065nbsp-the-new-great-game, 
68 
 
 
economies of Central Asian republics, and would allow Moscow to fully dictate their 
future political orientations. In such circumstances, Iran’s proposals to act as a window 
to the outside world were attractive, however Tehran only had minor success.  
In the early years of Central Asian independence, Iran established a series of gas and oil 
swap arrangements in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and established trade relations with 
the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; overall however, its economic relations 
with the region throughout the 1990s were quite minor. Iran was hamstrung by a weak 
economy, a lack of technical expertise, and also the inability to provide the capital 
required by the Central Asian republics to develop their foundering national 
infrastructures. 19  Furthermore, the nature of the Central Asian republics’ borders, 
whereby each is landlocked and all relied upon a secondary state to fulfil many of their 
infrastructure and supply needs, hampered many of Iran’s economic proposals. While 
Iran had the potential to act as a “window to the outside world”, the practicalities of 
coordinating infrastructure projects, which either relied upon the cooperation of two or 
more Central Asian states or an extra-regional state, often posed an insurmountable 
challenge. For instance, to establish a pipeline from Iran to Tajikistan would have required 
infrastructure to pass through an unstable Afghanistan, or through Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, the latter of whom benefited from a weakened and isolated Tajikistan. Instead 
of working together, the Central Asian republics more often than not competed against 
each other and rarely exhibited political or economic solidarity and unity. Moreover, the 
rulers of the Central Asian states were so busy trying to just survive and maintain stability 
within their own borders that attention to much larger, albeit unified, issues were often of 
secondary importance. 
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Overlaid on top of these complex regional dynamics were the unilateral steps taken by 
the United States against Iran, which blocked the achievement of many of Tehran’s 
regional economic and political goals. To this day, Iranian political elites bemoan lost 
opportunities within Central Asia. For instance, an Iranian politician interviewed by the 
author, stated that the United States was the major obstacle for the establishment of 
Iranian projects—such as pipelines, railways, and roads in Central Asia. The politician 
further declared that a renaissance of a “great Silk Road” in Central Asia could have been 
possible following post-Soviet independence, but the United States had acted as a 
“negative element” in the region, and had “fully influenced” how the countries of the 
region interacted and continue to interact with Iran, convincing them to not engage in 
trade and political dialogue with Iran.20 
This is not to say that the Central Asian republics lacked political agency, or were unable 
to make their own decisions in attempting to build relations with Iran. However, in the 
face of sustained and overt US political pressure, and Iran’s continued isolation on the 
international stage, no Central Asian state would sacrifice broader relations with the 
United States or the West, bringing as they did the prospect of economic investment, 
developmental aid, and international legitimacy, for the sake of a tight and multifaceted 
relationship with a weakened and politically sidelined Iran.21 
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Central Asian states to cooperate with each other and with the United States, rather than with Iran. See 
Katzman and Nichol, Iran: Relations with Key Central Asian States,4. 
21 An example of this was US President Clinton’s pressuring of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev 
support energy pipeline routes that bypassed Iran. Nazarbeyev said he would support such routes if the 
United States could arrange finance. See David Ottaway and Dan Morgan, "U.S. Backs Non-Iranian, 
'Eurasian' Corridor West for Caspian Sea Oil," Washington Post, November 20, 1997. For further US 
70 
 
 
2.2 The ‘Sidelining’ of Iran and Regional Rivalry in Central Asia 
Iran’s difficulty in engaging fully and productively with the Central Asian region was 
only accentuated by the actions of a number of regional rivals who sought to take 
advantage of the United States’ newfound post-Soviet global dominance. States such as 
Pakistan and Turkey distanced themselves from Iran and increased their own strategic 
value in the eyes of the United States “by promoting themselves as barriers to the spread 
of Iranian style Islamic revolutionary ideas to Central Asia and the Caucasus”.22 For 
instance, Turkey as a secular, and apparently democratic partner of the West, 
enthusiastically acted as a cat’s paw for United States influence in the Central Asian 
region. 23  US policy planners strongly supported Turkish political engagement and 
economic initiatives in Central Asia as an alternative to a so-called “Iranian model” of 
Islamic governance. According to Bal, Turkey was seen within the West as a successful 
example of a democratic secular state, with a liberal economic system fused with an 
Islamic culture. Therefore, policy planners in Washington believed that Turkey could 
bring so-called “European values” to the Central Asian region, as opposed to the “Islamic 
values” propagated by Iran.24 Furthermore, former President of the United States George 
H.W. Bush described Turkey as a “beacon of stability”, while “US companies were 
encouraged to find Turkish partners for joint ventures in Central Asia”, and “US 
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diplomats encouraged Central Asian politicians and bureaucrats to travel to Turkey to see 
a modern country at work”.25 On the back of this US support, Turkey made substantial 
inroads, quickly becoming a major economic, cultural, and political player in Central Asia, 
usually at the expense of Iranian initiatives, which were actively discouraged by the 
United States.26 
Further to this encouragement for Turkish foreign policy in Central Asia, the United 
States paradoxically supported the Central Asian foreign policy agendas of two states that 
had a long history of supporting Sunni fundamentalism and political violence, Saudi 
Arabia and Pakistan. Disturbingly, both states were the main financial and political 
supporters of the Taliban, who took control over most parts of Afghanistan in 1996. The 
US State Department even went as far as welcoming the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, 
viewing the Taliban in a favourable and embarrassingly misguided light due in no small 
part to their anti-Iranian stance.27 Certain segments of the Clinton administration were so 
obsessed with isolating Iran from the Central Asian region that they favoured the 
establishment of pipeline and trade routes to and from Central Asia through Taliban-
controlled Afghanistan. Such trade and pipeline routes would provide the Taliban’s ally 
and patron Pakistan, and by extension American private enterprise, with greater influence 
within the region at the expense of Iran.28 Prominent figures in Washington welcomed 
the potential for the Taliban to act as a countervailing force against Iran in the region, and 
were not displeased as the Taliban expanded its presence throughout Afghanistan. For 
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instance in 1996, Zalmay Khalizad, later the first post-9/11 US Ambassador to 
Afghanistan, actively lobbied the Clinton administration to engage with the Taliban, 
claiming that there were “common interests between the United States and the Taliban”,29 
and “the US should actively assist the Taliban because even though it is fundamentalist, 
it does not practise the anti-US style fundamentalism of Iran”.30 As is now known, such 
plans quickly turned awry for US policy planners, and throughout their short and brutal 
rule in Afghanistan the Taliban sought to foster links among Central Asian Islamist 
groups, and became the major security threat to the region; a development, which in many 
respects can be blamed on US acquiescence at best, and support at worst, for Pakistani 
and Saudi foreign policy in the region.31 
2.3 The Impact of a Weakened Russia 
The efforts by the United States and its regional allies to limit Iran’s interactions with 
Central Asia were only enhanced by the inability of Russia to fulfil its former role as an 
international and regional balancer to US power. Russian weakness effectively allowed 
the United States to act with regional impunity, and with the absence of a major power 
that it could bandwagon with, Iran became increasingly more vulnerable following the 
Soviet collapse. Prior to the end of the Cold War, Iran had a fractious relationship with 
Russia’s predecessor, the Soviet Union, which was viewed as no less satanic then the 
United States. However, only three weeks after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, 
Iran’s speaker of parliament and future president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, made 
a historic visit to Moscow, signing a number of trade, economic, and military technical 
assistance contracts worth almost US $6 billion. 32  Rafsanjani’s visit was received 
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positively by then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who hoped that the agreements 
signed could act as a vital first step in the improvement of relations between the two 
neighbours, and provide both states with significant political, economic and strategic 
benefits in the years to come. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the reincorporation of Russia into international 
politics therefore created major uncertainty for Iran, which had counted on Soviet support 
to break free from international isolation. Russian President Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999), 
while inheriting the agreements signed between Moscow and Tehran prior to the fall of 
the Soviet Union, initially took a considerably different tack towards Iran than that of his 
Soviet predecessors. 33  Rather than viewing Iran as a potentially important regional 
political partner against its former Cold War rival, the United States, Russia instead 
sought to develop a strong alliance with the United States, which Yeltsin hoped would 
culminate in Russia joining the so-called Western “civilisational club”. Such an alliance, 
according to Yeltsin, would ensure the success of Russian domestic economic and 
political reforms, and eventually lead to the restoration of a Russian status equal to that 
of the United States.34 Within Yeltsin’s government were a plethora of policy planners 
who were enamoured of the idea that Russia and the United States could forge some form 
of “strategic alliance”. This pro-American and Western bias predictably led to the 
deterioration of Iran’s ties with Moscow, and set off bitter arguments within Russian 
domestic politics. 
In particular, Russian foreign policy throughout the 1990s was characterised by debates 
between political elites who subscribed to a “Euro-Atlanticist” view of international 
politics, and those who pursued a “Eurasianist” stance. Simply put, those subscribing to 
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Euro-Atlanticism were largely pro-Western, and viewed Islam as a major threat to 
Russian security. Euro-Atlanticists perceived Russian identity as closely tied to the West, 
and considered the Islamic regions to Russia’s south as distinct and apart from “Western”, 
“civilised” Russia. On the other hand, Eurasianists viewed Russia as a unique entity that 
did not require “partnership” or “subservience” within the Western international order. 
Instead, Russia should act independently, and attempt to develop stronger relations with 
other states such as India, China, and Iran as a means to counter-balance Western power. 
Furthermore, Eurasianists believed Russia was in a unique position to develop 
constructive relations with the Islamic world, to which it had been tied for centuries. The 
proponents of Euro-Atlanticism had been ascendant throughout much of Yeltin’s 
presidency. Sharing similar views to their counterparts in Washington, these Euro-
Atlanticist Russian policy elites viewed Iran not as a partner but as a threat to Russia’s 
security.35 The dominance of this belief, and the view that Russia’s best interests were 
served by integrating within the Western dominated political order, led Russia to keep 
Iran largely at arm’s length. Iran was not a viable political partner, it was instead a threat 
to regional stability, and an obstacle on Russia’s path to achieving legitimacy in the eyes 
of the West.36 
2.4 The Russian-Iranian-American Triangle 
Although segments of Russia’s political elite hitched their wagon to the idea that their 
state’s future lied in close cooperation with the United States and the West, the realities 
of the unipolar system, in particular the dominance of the United States as opposed to 
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Russian weakness, eventually dispelled these misguided ideas. It became clear that 
Russian hopes of a close partnership with the United States could not take place without 
Russian subservience to Western economic, political, and cultural interests and 
demands. 37  This was evident in a series of US policies and agendas that directly 
undermined Russian political interests, such as the effort to expand NATO and the 
Partnership for Peace program into the domains of the former Soviet Union, the support 
and partnership the United States gave to fundamentalist Muslim states supporting violent 
insurgencies within Russia’s borders38, and the sustained efforts of the United States to 
encourage Turkey to become a major player within Central Asia at the expense of not 
only Iran, but also Russia. All of these policies created deep resentment and 
disillusionment in Russia towards the United States, where there was a growing belief 
that Yeltsin’s foreign policy had become too centred upon the West.39 
In response to Yeltsin’s early dalliance with the West, Iran acted in a largely cautious and 
restrained manner towards its northern neighbour. Mired in international isolation and 
economic malaise, Iran needed Russia, and it did not want to alienate Moscow, nor see 
the full breakdown of relations between the two states, notwithstanding the fact that 
Russia was undertaking a number of actions that were harmful to Iran’s strategic interests. 
Furthermore, despite a number of opportunities to pursue its own interests and undermine 
Russia’s long-standing influence in the Central Asian region, Iran’s early regional 
policies were largely “Russo-centric”, in the sense that no foreign policies were made in 
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Central Asia or in the former Soviet space more generally without taking into 
consideration the possible reactions and views of Russia.40 
This Russo-centrism in Iranian foreign policy was a symbol of Iran’s vulnerability, and a 
clear Iranian acknowledgement of Russia’s historical interests in the region, which 
limited the potential expansion of Iran’s interests in the scramble to influence Central 
Asia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. While the United States and its allies 
were making significant inroads into Central Asia, and in the process disregarding 
Russian sensitivities, Iran refused to fully pursue its interests in the region. Iranian policy 
planners feared that a strong attempt to increase their state’s influence in Central Asia 
would antagonise Russia’s political leadership, who could quite easily shut the door on 
cooperation, and undermine Iran’s broader attempts to break free from international 
isolation.41 Equally important to Iran was the need to ensure that Russia did not renege 
on the Soviet arms and technological agreements signed in 1989, which were critical to 
Iran’s national security, particularly in light of the presence of the US military on its 
southern doorstep. 
Iran’s relationship with Russia began to improve by 1995. Iran’s apparent “good 
behaviour” in Central Asia, coupled with continued US efforts to expand NATO into 
Russia’s “near abroad”, and a rising sense of Russian nationalism, led to strong calls 
within Russia to display greater independence in the international arena, and ignore US 
efforts to isolate Iran. Caving into such domestic demands, Yeltsin approved the sale of 
nuclear reactors to Iran, and was also reported to have assisted Iran with its missile 
program, despite vehement opposition from the United States. Furthermore, Russia 
allowed Iran to play a pivotal political role in some of Central Asia’s more intractable 
issues, such as the Tajik Civil War, where Iran and Russia jointly acted as peace brokers 
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between the Tajik government and opposition groups42, and in Afghanistan where both 
states supported anti-Taliban forces43. Furthermore, both states sought to work together 
on blocking American attempts to influence the development and supply of hydrocarbon 
resources within the Caspian Sea, and the efforts (supported by the United States) of the 
other Caspian littoral states to break historical Soviet-Iranian Caspian demarcation 
treaties.44 According to Belopolsky, “as the Russian–American relationship went into 
decline, Iran came to be used as an expression of Russian defiance in balancing American 
hegemony”.45 Increasingly Russia’s relations with Iran were a means to show the United 
States that Russia had the right to have relations with whomever it chose, and that it was 
not a “junior partner” within the United States’ newfound international order.46 
However, despite this cooperation and the warming of relations between Tehran and 
Moscow, Russia continued to display an inconsistent policy towards Iran throughout 
Yeltsin’s presidency. On a number of occasions Yeltsin and his government bowed to US 
political pressure and reneged on agreements signed with Tehran.47 For instance, Russia 
refused to sell Iran a series of gas centrifuges and other technologies for its nuclear 
program, and dragged its feet on the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. 
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Most galling for Iran however, was the decision by Russia to eventually renege on its 
joint position on territorial agreements in relation to the Caspian Sea. Since the fall of the 
Soviet Union, both Iran and Russia had worked jointly together to oppose efforts by 
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan to split the Caspian into exclusive sectors in 
line with international treaties governing seas and oceans.48 Iran and Russia’s position 
was that previous treaties signed between the Soviet Union and Iran49 should remain in 
force until a new agreement could be reached. Therefore, the resources of the Caspian, 
particularly its hydrocarbon resources, should not be exploited until a new territorial 
agreement was put in place. Furthermore, both Iran and Russia believed that any future 
agreement would also need to take into account the fact that the Caspian Sea was an inland 
lake, thus making it imperative upon all states to take a condominium approach to 
managing its resources.50 Such a position was vociferously opposed by the Kazakhs, 
Turkmen, and Azeris, who with the support of Washington disregarded Moscow and 
Tehran, and invited numerous Western companies to explore for and begin exploitation 
of the Caspian’s potentially large hydrocarbon reserves.51 As it became clear that Iran and 
Russia’s opposition had not stopped the other littoral states from exploiting the 
hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian, Moscow backflipped on its former shared position 
with Iran and abandoned its support for the condominium approach. In 1998, Russia 
signed a bilateral territorial agreement with Kazakhstan, and later, in 2002, a similar 
agreement was signed with Azerbaijan. The signing of these treaties effectively 
legitimised Azeri and Kazakh territorial claims, left Iran isolated on many of the territorial 
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disputes that continue to plague the Caspian to the present, and signalled a further 
weakening of its regional position.52 
Russia’s contradictory foreign policy towards Iran under Yeltsin looked set to enter a 
much more promising stage leading up to and following the inauguration of new President 
Vladimir Putin, in 2000. In Moscow there was even talk that Iran could possibly become 
a “strategic partner” to what was becoming an increasingly assertive Russia. 53  This 
confidence reached its apogee following Putin’s annulment of the 1995 Gore-
Chernomyrdin agreement, which would have restricted Russia from selling arms to Iran 
after 1999, and the much-anticipated signing of The Treaty on Foundations of Relations 
and Principles of Cooperation between the two states in 2001, following a state visit to 
Moscow by Iranian President Khatami. However, despite much promise, Russian policy 
towards Iran remained erratic.54 The lifting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement did not 
bring about greater arms sales to Iran, and the signing of the cooperation agreement 
between the two states did not inaugurate anything close to a “strategic partnership”. 
Instead, Russian-Iranian relations reached a new low. Russia continued to delay the 
construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, while consistently bowing to American 
demands to limit arms and nuclear dual-use technology sales to Iran. In Russia’s eyes a 
close relationship with Iran, and with it the continued supply of dual-use technologies, 
could eventually see Iran become a nuclear armed power, which had the potential to upset 
the regional political balance and threaten Russian security.55 Furthermore, while Russia 
indeed had its differences with the United States, it did not wish these differences—in 
particular those relating to Iran—to culminate in the development of a full-blown 
breakdown of relations with Washington. Instead, in the post-ideological political space, 
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Russia was more than willing to makes deals and agreements with the United States at 
the expense of Iran. Both Putin and Yeltsin followed a policy towards Iran that could be 
best described as “minimax”, whereby Russia would attempt to maximise its influence in 
Iran, while at the same time try to minimise the damage such ties were inflicting upon 
United States-Russian relations.56 
2.5 9/11 and the Rise of an Activist US Foreign Policy 
The striking imbalance of power, and the enormous capabilities that were at the United 
States disposal in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, allowed the United States 
to disregard established rules of international conduct, and ignore the wishes of allies and 
rivals alike.57 However, despite this opportunity to act with impunity, US foreign policy 
in the first decade of the post-Soviet period was largely restrained and status quo-driven. 
This behaviour led scholars to assert that the United States was a “reluctant” hegemon 
due to its general unwillingness to act in a revisionist or activist fashion.58 The United 
States displayed a clear aversion to acts of unilateralism and military interference in the 
internal affairs of other states—unless there was a direct threat to US national interests.59 
Furthermore, rather than striking out alone militarily, the United States sought to act in 
concert with other states, preferring the cloak of legitimacy offered by multilateralism 
and international organisations such as the United Nations and NATO. This conservative 
and “hands-off” strand of American foreign policy came to an abrupt end, however, 
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Under the presidency of 
George W. Bush (2001-2009), the United States was consumed with a new sense of 
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activism, which set in train a course of events that created considerable regional instability 
in the Middle East and Central Asia, and only further eroded Iran’s regional and 
international security situation. 
Following the Al Qaeda attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre, President 
George W. Bush declared that the United States was at war with the Al Qaeda terrorist 
organisation and its Afghan hosts, the Taliban.60 Despite the hostility that existed between 
Tehran and Washington, Iran’s political leadership offered to cooperate in US efforts to 
punish Al Qaeda and overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan. Iran had for many years 
vehemently opposed the Taliban, 61  and willingly provided the United States with 
intelligence on military targets, contact with key anti-Taliban commanders, sanctuary for 
distressed pilots, and access to Iranian territory for the transport of humanitarian aid. This 
cooperation extended into the post-invasion period, whereby Iran lent its significant 
political influence in Afghan domestic politics to ensure the successful establishment of 
Afghanistan’s first post-Taliban government, led by the American-backed Hamid Karzai. 
The United States and Iran, although seemingly strange bedfellows, had a shared interest 
in ensuring a stable post-Taliban political order in Afghanistan, and there was indeed 
great hope within Iran that this cooperation would lead to constructive relations with the 
United States on a broader international level.62 
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Hopes for rapprochement and further cooperation between Iran and the United States 
were not to be. Within the Bush administration were a number of influential figures who 
subscribed to a political ideology popularly known as “neo-conservatism”.63 Broadly 
speaking, neo-conservatives insisted that in the post-Soviet period, the United States had 
an undeniable opportunity to pursue a range of idealistic goals within international 
relations. The most prominent of these goals would be to bring democracy to authoritarian 
states, and change the political make-up of states and regions that were deemed 
threatening not only to American interests, but also to American ideals.64 The terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 provided the unfortunate pretext for neo-conservatives within the Bush 
administration to implement this vision, which had the impact of dramatically widening 
how the United States conceptualised its enemies and its interests. In the eyes of the neo-
conservatives, the “War on Terror” should not just stop at attempting to eliminate Al 
Qaeda and removing the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. US foreign policy should 
also be geared towards confronting, not only diplomatically but also militarily, states that 
were deemed to be supporting terrorists, and attempting to procure weapons of mass 
destruction. This view was clearly elucidated by President Bush in his 2002 State of the 
Union address, where he declared that the United States was engaged in an existential 
struggle with a so-called “Axis of Evil” that was led by, but not limited to, Iraq, North 
Korea, and Iran.65 This somewhat Manichean view on world politics was viewed with 
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shock in Tehran. 66  Iran’s outreach to the United States throughout its invasion of 
Afghanistan had come to naught. The quick victory over the Taliban, and the seemingly 
successful destruction of major elements of Al Qaeda, had given the United States 
considerable confidence, and limited its need to cooperate with “rogue states” such as 
Iran. 
The United States went about implementing its vision for a democratic and Western-
aligned international order with gusto. In 2003, the United States took its neo-
conservative vision to a new level, using shaky evidence to legitimate its invasion of Iraq, 
insisting that dictator Saddam Hussein was attempting to gain access to weapons of mass 
destruction, and that he was supporting a number of terrorist organisations, the most 
prominent of which was Al Qaeda. 67  The swift speed in which the United States 
overthrew the Hussein regime only further contributed to a growing sense of hubris and 
triumphalism among neo-conservatives, while heightening fears in Tehran that it was next 
on the US regime change “hit list”.68 Iranian fears towards US intentions were further 
justified in light of the fact that the Bush administration expanded its financial and 
material support to opposition groups within Iran, attempted to refer Iran to the United 
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Nations Security Council due to questions over its nuclear program, accused Iran of 
supporting Al Qaeda, and expanded its military presence and political influence to nearly 
every one of Iran’s neighbouring states—Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Pakistan, and 
Turkey—except for Turkmenistan and Armenia.69 
The threat of a US invasion and the increased penetration of American influence 
throughout Iran’s borders had an undeniable impact upon the Iranian government. 
However despite the Bush administration’s “Afghan betrayal”, Iranian President Khatami 
on a number of occasions continued to seek to engage in political dialogue with the United 
States in the hope that Iran could reach some form of “grand bargain”, and avoid military 
conflict over its nuclear program. 70  Such attempts were rebuffed by the Bush 
administration. As was declared by one prominent administration official, “we [Bush 
administration] don’t talk to evil”.71 Only 10 years after the fall of the Soviet Union, a 
whole new geopolitical environment was imposed upon Iran. Although Iran was pleased 
to see the back of the Baathist regime in Iraq, and the Taliban in Afghanistan, the arrival 
of an overwhelmingly large US military and political presence on its borders only further 
narrowed its regional options, and increased the feeling of complete strategic 
encirclement.72 
The effects of the newfound, muscular, US foreign policy was particularly apparent in 
Central Asia, where Iran had already grappled with a decade of American efforts to 
sideline it from regional developments. The United States increased its interests in Central 
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Asia substantially following 9/11. In support of its invasion and continuing military 
operations in Afghanistan, the United States signed a range of military agreements with 
the Central Asian republics, establishing military facilities in the Kyrgyz Republic and 
Uzbekistan.73 Furthermore, the United States provided significant amounts of military 
and economic aid to the region’s republics. US aid to Central Asia increased dramatically 
post-9/11; for instance in 2000 total US aid to the region sat at $178 million, however in 
2002 this figure rose to $476 million. Furthermore, the share of the total US aid that went 
to military and security funding for the Central Asian republics increased from around 5 
percent throughout the 1990s to more than 30 percent in 2007. Unsurprisingly, this 
increased political and military engagement of the United States was warmly welcomed 
by the Central Asian republics who sought to broaden their international relations, 
increase their own security through the de-Talibanisation of neighbouring Afghanistan, 
and gain economic benefits, while increasing their strategic weight and importance.74 
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US interest in Central Asia under the Bush administration was not only limited to military 
and logistical considerations. The United States strongly encouraged political and 
economic reform, which was viewed as “an integral part of the campaign toward victory 
in the War on Terror”. 75  Central Asian democratisation and market liberalisation 
dovetailed neatly with the Bush administration’s focus on tackling radical Islam and 
terrorism. As a majority Muslim region with weak state structures and fragile economies, 
Central Asia was viewed as an ideal breeding ground for the growth of Islamic extremism, 
which had to be cleansed through US strategic support and economic and political 
engagement.76 The United States not only had to rid Afghanistan and the wider region of 
extremists, it also had to eradicate “the underlying conditions” which fed the emergence 
of terror in the first place.77 As summed up by Rumer, the new US strategy in post-9/11 
Central Asia “made political and economic reform, along with support for good 
governance, a precondition of winning the War on Terror”.78 
This reform focus did, however, contradict the US regional security interests. More often 
than not the lofty ambitions of the United States for democratic and economic reform in 
the region took a back seat to security calculations, and led to confusion and disjuncture 
between US policy and actual behaviour. For instance in Uzbekistan, American officials 
would consistently commend the regime led by Karimov for its support in the “War on 
Terror”, but at the same time criticise the regime for its unwillingness to undertake 
democratic reforms and abide by international human rights standards. 79  These 
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contradictions had the effect of greatly undermining American policy in the region, and 
caused considerable misgivings among the region’s leaders. In essence, the regimes of 
Central Asia were willing to take American security assistance, but were reticent to accept 
the democratic and economic reforms that were apparently so cherished by the Bush 
administration.80 
2.6 Iran in Post-9/11 Central Asia 
With few friends in the international arena, and seemingly next on the US list of regime 
change candidates, Iran looked to increase its influence in Central Asia as a means to 
diversify its regional relations, ensure regime survival, and counter the increasingly 
muscular post-9/11 regional policies of the United States. 81  Iran’s caution, which 
characterised its approach to the region prior to 9/11, gave way to a much more proactive 
and expansive foreign policy agenda, and surprisingly—despite the increased presence of 
the United States in the region—directly following 9/11 Iran did improve its bilateral 
relations with the Central Asian republics. In particular, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
expanded their trade links with Iran, while extending and increasing oil and gas swap 
arrangements. Iran also maintained modest, yet improving, economic relations with 
Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan, which had been enhanced by a rapidly 
growing Iranian economy and the willingness of the Central Asian republics to diversify 
their relations.82  For instance, Iran undertook the development of a number of large 
infrastructure projects in Tajikistan, such as the Sangtuda-2 development. In Uzbekistan 
and the Kyrgyz Republic, Iran increased its trade and economic influence, and benefited 
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from the tense relations that began to develop between these two states and the United 
States over military-basing agreements and American democratisation efforts.83 
The improvement of Iran‘s relations with Central Asia, although largely driven by its 
desperate need to circumvent US containment efforts, can also be partly attributed to the 
willingness of the Central Asian republics to develop a multi-vector foreign policy stance 
in response to the changing political dynamics occurring within the region. The post-9/11 
period was characterised by growing rivalry and competition between outside powers, 
such as China, Russia, and India, who all attempted to increase their influence and counter 
American inroads made within Central Asia.84 The increased international attention given 
to the region was a political boon for the Central Asian republics, who all sought to 
diversify their relations and avoid over-reliance on any one extra-regional state actor.85 
Further benefiting Iran’s interactions with the Central Asian republics was the frequent 
political missteps taken by American policy planners. The US Central Asian strategy, 
which connected the problem of Islamic militancy with the lack of democratic 
development, and its active attempts to promote political and economic reforms, were 
highly unpopular with the region’s elites. The Central Asian republics on a number of 
occasions distanced themselves from the United States, or attempted to find alternative 
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partners who would not interfere in their domestic affairs.86 In such circumstances, Iran, 
despite its lack of economic capabilities and the impediments of sanctions, was only too 
willing to offer itself up as a “reliable” and non-intrusive alternative to the United States 
and other Western states.87 
2.7 Iran ‘Looks East’ to Russia and China 
In the years that followed 9/11, Iran did manage to improve its ties with the states of 
Central Asia. However, Iran’s hostile relations with the United States continued to impede 
it from fully integrating economically and politically with the region.88 Furthermore, the 
American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq had only increased the Islamic Republic’s 
regional isolation and vulnerability. Countering Washington’s containment efforts 
became an “objective for Tehran in its own right”, as Iranian policy planners sought to 
find new ways to frustrate the US agendas, and solidify and expand upon the modest gains 
made within the region.89 In particular, Iran’s leaders attempted to decrease their state’s 
susceptibility to US pressure by taking advantage of the increased international rivalry 
taking place within Central Asia. Key to this goal was not only improving its bilateral ties 
with the Central Asian republics, but also increasing its cooperation with China and 
Russia. Iranian policy planners believed that developing positive relations with these two 
major powers could allow Iran to circumvent growing American economic and political 
pressure, provide significant economic benefits, and could also eventually lead to the 
creation of a countervailing bloc of states, which would undermine and bring to an end 
American unipolarity.90 
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Since the early 1990s, Chinese and Russian elites had intermittently highlighted the vital 
need to develop a strategic partnership between their states, and also other regional states 
such as Iran, as a means to counter US power, and build a more “equitable” multipolar 
international system. 91 The idea of forming an international order with multiple centres 
of power, although popular and finding resonance within both Russia and China, did not 
come to fruition. Elites in both states were hamstrung by mutual suspicions and rivalries 
that had long existed between their states, and were unwilling to place at risk economic 
and political relations with the United States. The development of an outright anti-
American coalition would be too costly, and would not provide sufficient benefits in the 
post-Soviet international order.92 
However, the instigation of a large American military presence on both states’ borders 
led Moscow and Beijing to reassess the costs and benefits of creating such a 
countervailing bloc. Both states shared Iran’s feeling of encirclement, and viewed the 
presence of American military bases upon their weak strategic underbellies as a 
threatening and “systematic US challenge to their interests”.93 Furthermore, Russia and 
China were aware that the United States was not in the region only to remove the Taliban, 
American goals were much more expansive, and could lead to the Central Asian republics 
becoming enveloped within American economic, military, and political structures.94 In 
response, Russia and China banded together, and relentlessly attempted to delegitimise 
US regional policies, proclaiming that American policy was a direct threat to the region’s 
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stability, and in the process portrayed themselves as status quo-driven actors who were 
unwilling to interfere in the domestic politics of the region’s regimes. 95 In line with such 
a strategy, China and Russia claimed that US influence in the region was geared towards 
delegitimising Central Asia’s authoritarian regimes and supporting opposition groups, 
thus stimulating the growing unease felt by the region’s leaders towards US political 
agendas and reform efforts. 96  Furthermore, both states sought to wield a range of 
economic, diplomatic, and military levers to dissuade the republics from signing military 
agreements, or from offering or extending military-basing arrangements with the United 
States and its Western allies.97 
Another significant aspect of Russian and Chinese policy within Central Asia following 
9/11 was the utilisation of multilateral and regional institutions as a means to further 
entrench or expand their influence over the region’s republics.98 The most prominent of 
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these regional institutions was the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and its 
predecessor the “Shanghai Five”. 99  The SCO included Russia, China, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, all states which shared a range of 
security concerns relating to Islamic fundamentalism and ethnic separatism. The so-called 
“three evils”—extremism, terrorism, and separatism—were consistently at the top of the 
SCO’s agendas, but were also joined by other goals such as ensuring the territorial 
integrity of the region’s states, fostering good neighbourly relations, and encouraging 
common economic development irrespective of each state’s internal political 
arrangements.100 In the post-9/11 regional fallout the SCO, which had only been formally 
instituted in June 2001, looked highly likely to become a “hollow” and “discredited” 
organisation.101 
The Central Asian republics, enamoured of the potential economic and political benefits 
of aligning themselves with the United States, displayed a lukewarm attitude to the SCO, 
and towards Russia and China’s regional agendas more generally. 102  However the 
instability of 2005 that led to the bloody uprising in Andijan in Uzbekistan, and the “Tulip 
Revolution” which saw the overthrow of President Askar Akayev in the Kyrgyz Republic, 
only increased perceptions among Central Asian elites that the United States was 
meddling in their domestic affairs and supporting opposition groups. In the wake of these 
two crucial regional events, the United States stood opposed to the region’s leaders, firmly 
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supporting the so-called “revolutionaries” in the Kyrgyz Republic, and sharply rebuking 
Tashkent for its heavy-handed tactics towards protesters in Andijan. According to 
Torbakov, these two events, and the American reaction to them, were the primary factors 
in pushing the region more toward Moscow, as Washington’s reaction made it clear 
to Central Asia’s regimes that they would not be able to count on the United States 
for security assistance during potential emergencies. Furthermore, governments 
across the region, whether rightly or wrongly, [believed] the United States [was] 
supporting anti-government movements that these regimes see as coalitions 
between Islamist and pro-Western forces.103 
This American stance also had the added effect of increasing the attractiveness of the 
SCO among the Central Asian republics; Russia and China were only too happy to use 
this organisation as a vehicle to weaken American regional influence. 
The increased tension felt by the Central Asian leaders towards American reform efforts 
in the region, and the gradual turn towards the SCO, was on full display at its June 2005 
summit wherein SCO members made a joint statement requesting a timeline be provided 
for the pull-out of American military forces in the region. This not-so-subtle message that 
the warm regional embrace of the United States was officially over was further 
underscored by the Uzbek government’s cancellation of its military basing agreement 
with the United States in the months following that summit. Furthermore, the SCO 
declared in 2006 that not only was it committed to fighting the so-called “three evils”, it 
was also committed to discarding international “double standards”, settling disputes 
through “mutual understanding” and respecting the rights of all countries to “pursue 
particular models of development and formulate domestic and foreign policies 
independently and participate in international affairs on an equal basis”. 104  Such a 
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declaration was a clear slap to US regional ambitions, and was a major endorsement for 
Russia and China’s pursuit of a multilateral international political order. 
Iran also displayed considerable enthusiasm at the prospect of joining the SCO, and the 
potential the organisation offered to shield it from American containment efforts. In 2005, 
Iran, along with India, Pakistan, and Mongolia were given observer status, much to the 
delight of its political leadership. Under President Ahmadinejad, Iran used its observer 
status to rail against American influence in the region, and pushed for membership within 
the grouping on an almost annual basis, demonstrating the “urgency of Tehran’s desire to 
join an institutionalised alliance”, and assist it in further increasing its regional influence, 
while undermining American containment efforts. 105  Iran’s anti-US stance found a 
sympathetic audience, particularly in Moscow, and it seemed only a matter of time before 
Iran would be included in the SCO as a fully-fledged member.106 However, the similar 
patterns which had undermined Iran’s regional integration prior to 9/11 again raised their 
ugly heads. Russia, China, and most of the other SCO members 107  rejected Iran’s 
numerous efforts to join the SCO, stranding its dream of becoming further integrated 
within Central Asia’s political and security structures. Iran’s nuclear program and its 
hostile relationship with the United States were key sticking points. In 2013, Russian 
Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov declared in the most strident terms that the SCO members 
would not allow Iran into the organisation if this also meant defending it against the 
United States, a proposition which he labelled as “moronic”.108 Chinese elites were also 
ultimately opposed to Iran’s accession to the SCO. Beijing did not want the organisation 
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to be perceived as an anti-American bloc of states, and preferred to avoid stoking further 
conflict with the United States, which was overwhelmingly its most important trading 
partner.109 
2.8 Obama and Iran 
The setbacks the Bush administration faced in Central Asia coincided with numerous 
American policy and military failures in Iraq and in Afghanistan. In the final years of his 
presidency, Bush had overseen a weakening of US international prestige, a noticeable 
degradation of American power, and domestic economic weakening, which had placed 
the United States on the verge of financial collapse. 110  The Bush administration’s 
aggressive and overly-ambitious foreign policy brought into sharp relief the limits of 
American power, and the inability of the United States to fully meet its foreign policy 
goals. Recognising this, newly-elected American President Barack Obama (2009-present) 
sought to reorientate American foreign policy, placing a much smaller emphasis upon 
unilateralism, and using American military capabilities to bring about change in the 
international system. Obama favoured the status quo, and sought to avoid proselytising 
about the need to import liberal democracy to apparently backward regions such as 
Central Asia.111 Furthermore, Obama attempted to highlight a much more pragmatic, 
conciliatory, and cooperative international relations stance in the hope of avoiding 
conflict with major powers such as China and Russia, who had resisted some of Bush’s 
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more truculent agendas.112 In doing so, Obama hoped to find support from both of these 
states on seemingly intractable issues such as Iran’s nuclear program.113 
In respect to Iran, Obama promoted the vital need for dialogue between these two 
implacable foes, and consistently declared his determination to end the 30 years of 
hostility which existed between Tehran and Washington.114 Unlike his predecessor, who 
refused to “speak to evil”, Obama pledged to engage with Iran, and throughout the 
opening stages of his presidency he attempted to reach out to Iran and to engage in 
substantive dialogue.115 In particular, Obama sought to negotiate a cessation of Iran’s 
disputed nuclear program.116 However, within the Obama administration were a number 
of influential figures who opposed negotiating with Iran, in particular US Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton, who bristled at the idea of making concessions to, or engaging in 
dialogue with, Tehran. Furthermore, Obama’s overtures were considered disingenuous 
by Iran’s leadership, who noted that despite the rhetoric, his administration remained 
overwhelmingly committed to economic and political sanctions.117 Instead of renewed 
dialogue, Iran’s relations with the United States continued to be characterised by 
                                                 
 
112. See Brian Whitmore, "The 'Reset' at One Year: The View from Moscow," Radio Free Europe 
(February 5, 2010). 
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113 Obama’s attempts to gain support from China and Russia were met with mixed results. See Herb 
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114 John Limbert, "The Obama Administration " in The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy, 
ed. Robin B. Wright (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), 146-50. 
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acrimony. 118  Under pressure from key interest groups within his own country, and 
internationally by a number of states who had grown increasingly alarmed by Iranian 
President Ahmadinejad’s aggressive rhetoric towards Israel, Obama’s policies towards 
Iran quickly shifted from that of conciliation to confrontation, expanding its sanctions 
efforts, and declaring that all options—including military operations—were on the 
table.119 Although the United States had built up an impressive array of sanctions upon 
Iran since the 1980s, often such sanctions found little support internationally, even among 
the United States’ own allies in Europe and in Asia. In particular, European states often 
questioned the efficacy of sanctions, and were unwilling to hurt their own economic and 
political interests in Iran.120 However, under Obama, the United States was able to gain 
considerable international consensus and support for what became the most expansive set 
of sanctions ever imposed upon Iran. These sanctions included the tightening of 
restrictions on the ability for private firms and financial institutions to conduct business 
                                                 
 
118 Ahmadinejad’s blistering anti-Israeli rhetoric, and nationalistic hubris relating to Iran’s nuclear 
program caused great concern internationally, and within pro-Israeli elements of American domestic 
politics. Furthermore, key administration figures such as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton were reticent to 
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hardening of the US stance towards Iran grew following the 2009 Iranian election crackdown on the so-
called ‘Green Movement’, and Iran’s apparent influence over non-state actors during the Arab Spring. See 
Louis Charbonneau, "In New York, Defiant Ahmadinejad Says Israel Will Be "Eliminated," Reuters 
(September 24, 2012). http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/24/us-un-assembly-ahmadinejad-
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Foreign Affairs 5(2012): 1-3. 
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Israel’s sovereign right to make its own decisions about what is required to meet its security needs. I have 
said that when it comes to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, I will take no options off the 
table, and I mean what I say.” See Barak Ravid, "Obama: All Options Remain on the Table to Prevent a 
Nuclear Iran," Haaretz, March 4, 2012. 
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with Iran, sanctions upon Iran’s oil sector, and further freezes upon Iran’s foreign 
assets.121 
In the face of these challenges, Iran leaned heavily upon Russia and China, hoping that 
both states could undermine and limit the impact of these sanctions. While Russia 
attempted to oppose sanctions and weaken and dilute UN resolutions relating to Iran’s 
nuclear program, it also generally went along with the United States and its Western 
allies; Russia would vacillate between supporting and opposing sanctions in an attempt 
to gain concessions from the West over other interests of greater concern, often using the 
“Iran issue” as a pawn in larger geopolitical games.122 As noted by Katz, Russia’s actions 
were “designed to convey to Tehran that Moscow can protect Iran from the West if Tehran 
cooperates with Russia—but also that Russia can side with the West against Iran, if 
Tehran does not cooperate with it”.123 In a similar fashion, China engaged in a delicate 
balancing act between maintaining its relations with the United States, while continuing 
to pursue its economic interests in Iran. China in effect took a “middle ground approach”, 
opposing unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States while insisting that Iran 
comply with the rules and obligations of international organisations such as the IAEA.124 
In essence, both states opposed any form of military action against Iran, however, neither 
state was ever willing to fully stand up for Iran in the international arena, and in the 
process jeopardise more important economic and political relations involving the United 
States. 
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Russia and China’s inability, and at times unwillingness, to oppose sanctions upon Iran, 
and the growing international consensus that Iran had to be punished for its apparent 
intransigence in relation to its nuclear program, placed Tehran in a diabolical position, 
and only further isolated it from regional and international affairs. The increased sanctions 
had a crippling impact upon an already weakened Iranian economy. By May 2013, Iranian 
oil exports had fallen to only 700,000 barrels per day, compared to an average 2.2 million 
barrels per day in 2011. In January 2013, Iran’s oil minister declared that sanctions were 
costing Iran between $4 billion and $8 billion per month in lost export revenues. This loss 
of revenue, and Iran’s inability to access international finance and banking systems, 
caused Iran’s currency, the Rial, to lose almost two-thirds of its value, creating massive 
hardship within Iran.125 The debilitating impact of sanctions on Iran’s economy was 
acknowledged by President Ahmadinejad, who declared in 2012 that the cumulative 
weight of unilateral American and international sanctions amounted to “the heaviest 
economic onslaught on a nation in history…every day all our banking and trade activities 
and our agreements are being monitored and blocked”.126 
By the end of Ahmadinejad’s presidential term in 2013, Iran’s foreign policy in Central 
Asia was also suffering under the weight of sanctions. The attempts to isolate Iran from 
Central Asia continued in earnest under the Obama administration, which was made clear 
in 2012 by Assistant Secretary of State for Central and South Asia Robert Blake. When 
asked about Iran’s potential to integrate economically with the region, Blake declared: 
Let me just say that consistent with America’s sanctions on Iran, the United States 
is encouraging all of the countries of the region to avoid trade and other transactions 
with the government of Iran in order to pressure Iran to engage with the 
                                                 
 
125 For further details see Anthony H. Cordesman, Bradley Bosserman, and Sam Khazai, "U.S. And 
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international community about its concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. We 
believe there are some very good alternatives.127 
Apart from these continued efforts to isolate Iran from Central Asia, the region did not 
constitute an important enough market for Iranian goods, and could never make up the 
shortfall in trade with countries that had once imported Iran’s oil. Although nearly all of 
the Central Asian republics openly declared their opposition to military action against 
Iran,128 and remained committed to undertaking trade with Iran, nonetheless all were 
forced to reassess aspects of their relations with Tehran. For instance, Turkmenistan 
cancelled a contract offered to an Iranian company to construct a railway line to 
Kazakhstan worth almost $700 million in the face of what Turkmen President, 
Gurbanguli Berdymukhamedov, cited as “Iranian economic problems”.129 Furthermore, 
Iran, touting its ability to circumvent sanctions, signed a number of cooperation 
agreements with countries such as Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, proposing the construction 
of large-scale infrastructure projects, which at the time of writing are still not beyond the 
planning stages due to Iran’s inability to access key investment funds.130 The Central 
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Asian republics believed that it was imperative for Iran to improve its relations with the 
United States, which would ultimately improve their economic prospects and lessen 
regional tensions.131 Unfortunately under the presidency of Ahmadinejad such prospects 
were remote, and Iran remained an isolated state unable to fully reach its political and 
economic potential within a region where it should have had a larger economic, cultural, 
and political presence. 
2.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the regional and international constraints which have 
consistently held Iran back from fully participating economically, politically, and 
culturally within Central Asia. Iran’s resistance to the current international order, in 
particular its unwillingness and inability to engage in a “normal” relationship with the 
United States, has had a damaging impact upon Iran’s national interests, and has 
undermined its ability to fully benefit from its geographical and political position within 
the region. In effect, Iran’s relations with the United States have filtered down and 
affected almost every aspect of Iran’s interactions and relations with Central Asia. 
Although the Central Asian republics have had political and economic relations with Iran 
since the end of the Cold War, these relations have been largely circumscribed by the 
regional and international isolation imposed on Iran by the United States. Furthermore, 
the behaviour of key regional states Russia and China has also further undermined Iran’s 
foreign policy agendas, and led Iran to be consistently sidelined from regional economic 
and political institutions. The ambition of Iranian political elites for their state to become 
a vital link “between east and west” has, despite more than 20 years of relations with the 
Central Asian republics, remained a pipe dream. Instead of an economic and political 
lynchpin in Central Asia, Iran has instead overwhelmingly been used as a pawn by both 
its regional “allies” and rivals alike.
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Chapter Three: The Historical Context of Iranian-Tajik Relations 
A popular narrative that has developed among Iranian and Tajik political elites throughout 
the post-Soviet period is the notion that Iran and Tajikistan are tied together by the deep 
bonds of a mutual culture, history, and language spanning thousands of years. Such 
narratives and themes have formed a significant presence in Iran’s foreign policy 
approach, and in the process have been used to legitimate many of Iran’s political, cultural, 
and economic initiatives in post-Soviet Tajikistan. While such narratives have indeed 
become popular, particularly in the inter-state political discourse carried out between 
Iranian and Tajik governing elites, rarely have these so-called deep historical and cultural 
bonds been placed under the strain of critical analysis. 
This chapter seeks to take a nuanced view towards this historical narrative, and instead 
contends that relations between Iranians and Tajiks prior to 1991 were largely 
characterised by long periods of disjuncture, apathy, and distrust on both a societal and 
political level. In forwarding this position, this chapter will outline the historical, political, 
and cultural inter-linkages between Iran and Tajikistan, beginning with the shared 
foundational myth of a unified Iranian civilisation, which concluded with the fall of the 
Samanid dynasty. The chapter will then move onto Iran’s very limited societal, cultural, 
and political interactions with the people and land now known as the Tajiks and Tajikistan 
throughout the rules of the Turkic dynasties, the Russians, and the Soviets.1 This chapter 
will highlight that the Iranian-Tajik state and societal relationship is very much a new 
phenomenon, which has its roots more in the political exigencies of the past 30 years 
rather than in the depths of a 1000-year historical past.  
 
                                                 
 
1 This chapter’s discussion of historical relations between Iranians and Tajiks during the Middle Ages 
and the Russian colonial era focuses considerably upon the Emirate of Bukhara, where the majority of 
Tajiks resided. It is acknowledged, however, that Tajiks lived all over Central Asia, including in the 
Khanates of Khokand and Khiva, as well as independent principalities in the Pamir mountains.  
103 
 
 
3.1 Iran’s Medieval Links to Tajikistan and Central Asia 
Iran’s political and cultural links with Central Asia encompasses a long and complex 
history, which stokes a fervent sense of nationalist pride among Iranians to the present 
day. It is generally agreed among scholars that Iranians constituted Central Asia’s first 
sedentary inhabitants, speaking eastern variations of the Iranian language group.2 Early 
Iranian peoples developed primitive forms of state organisation revolving around oases 
and irrigated areas, with the establishment of cities at key intersections of trade. The 
establishment of these cities gradually took place throughout the sixth century B.C.E., 
mostly in the southern rim of Central Asia—or Transoxiana—eventually leading to the 
foundation of some of the world’s most powerful medieval empires.3 Within Central Asia, 
the Iranian Achaemenid (550-331 B.C.E.), Arsacid (247 B.C.E. - 224 C.E.), and 
Sassanian (224-641 C.E.) empires ruled over vast swathes of land and peoples. However, 
Iran’s political rule and cultural influence in Central Asia declined dramatically following 
the waves of nomadic Turkic and Mongol tribes and confederations that entered the 
region from the northern steppes beginning in the sixth century.  
These heterogeneous Turkic and Mongol cultural and political entities dominated the 
region’s political history without exception until the late nineteenth century.4 However, 
Iranian culture survived and was in many respects reinvigorated by the Muslim Arab 
invasions of the seventh century.5 The Muslim Arab invasions introduced an Iranian 
literary and linguistic renaissance, particularly within Transoxiana. It was in this region 
that the modern Iranian language developed in the form of Farsi-e Dari, and superseded 
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3 Shirin Akiner, Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union (London: Kegan Paul, 1983), 293. 
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older Iranian languages and eastern vernaculars. 6  This process of Iranian cultural 
ascendency was aided by the fact that Iranians took over the administration and 
governorship of the new provinces placed under Arab control, and over time much of the 
populace of the region we now know as Tajikistan adopted Farsi-e Dari.7 Tajiks trace 
their origins to the pre-Islamic eastern Iranian-speaking populations, who had converted 
to Islam and adopted the Western Iranian idiom of Persian following the Arab conquests 
of the seventh century.8  
Iranian cultural and linguistic dominance within the territories of modern Tajikistan was 
solidified in the ninth century, during the rule of the Samanid dynasty (819-999 C.E.). 
The Samanids owed their allegiance to the Abbasid caliph located in Baghdad, and from 
their capital, Bukhara, the Samanids established a strong centralised state over the lands 
of Tajikistan and the surrounding region. The Samanids oversaw the flourishing of art, 
culture, and science, and the continuation and extension of Iranian linguistic and cultural 
influence in the Central Asian region following the introduction of Islam.9 The Samanid 
dynasty ended with their defeat at the hands of the Karakhanids, a Turkic tribal 
confederacy, in 999C.E. This defeat re-instigated Turkic political ascendency, and 
weakened the Iranian ethnic element in Transoxiania and Central Asia.10 The process of 
Turkicisation reached its zenith with the Uzbek Turks, who entered the region from the 
Kipchak Steppe in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, and dominated 
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Transoxiana until the encroachment into the region of the Tsarist Russian Empire 
beginning in the nineteenth century.11 
The modern importance of Samanid rule is clear in the sense that many Tajiks view this 
comparatively short period of history as Tajikistan’s golden age, and the beginning of 
Tajik “nationhood”. The Samanids are seen not only as the Tajik nation’s golden age, but 
also, according to contemporary Tajik historians, as the pinnacle of greater Islamic 
civilisation. As set out by Horák, according to Tajik academicians, the Samanids are “the 
source of all the cultural acquisitions of early modern Europe. In addition, in its time this 
state was regarded as the strongest on earth. In contemporary Tajik historiography the 
empire of the Samanids appears also as a model of governance—as an effective, well-
ordered, and simple state structure. Thus, the destruction of the Samanid state by the 
Turko-Mongols meant the destruction of the “most advanced culture of Turanian (Aryan) 
civilization.”12 A number of popular historians, and even Tajikistan’s President Emomali 
Rahmon, openly postulate the idea that the Samanid dynasty constitutes the first Tajik 
state.13 Just as the Samanid period is Tajikistan’s golden age, in a similar manner Iranians 
also view the Samanids through a nationalist prism, considering this dynasty to be 
saviours of Persian culture and literature, and more importantly as strong opponents of 
Arab rule and overlordship. 14  However, these nationalist and thoroughly modern 
characterisations brush over what is a complicated history, and the Samanids should 
neither be treated as the progenitors of the Tajik nation, or an example of Iranian cultural 
superiority over the “inferior” Turks. Rather, this period should be considered as the last 
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period of Iranian cultural, political and social dominance in Central Asia, and one in 
which the growing symbiosis and unity of Islamic and Iranian culture took place.15  
3.2 The Rule of the Turks 
Following the fall of the Samanids in the tenth century until Tsarist Russia’s entrance into 
the region in the nineteenth century, a series of Turkic dynasties ruled over much of the 
current borders of present-day Tajikistan and wider Central Asia. Iranian cultural 
influence remained and carried on in the form of a sedentary Sunni Islamic, urban-based, 
strata of merchants, artisans, and tradesmen who continued to speak the Persian language 
and retained their ancient cultural mores despite the incursion of Turkic nomadic groups. 
Rather than keeping an ethnically and culturally direct connection to the region’s long 
history of Iranian rule that ended with the Samanids, these sedentary Central Asian 
Iranians gradually mixed with their Turkic neighbours who also adopted the Persian 
language, Islamic values, and sedentary way of life. It is these Central Asian Persian-
speakers that we contemporarily refer to as the Tajiks. Whilst it is the case that this 
sedentary Iranian population assimilated a plethora of Turkic nomadic groups and entities, 
particularly in eastern Bukhara where there were large populations of Iranians, the 
admixture of populations and social groups was not just a one-way process, and the 
complex interactions between these two peoples makes it extraordinarily difficult to draw 
neat lines between Turkic and Iranian cultures within Central Asia. Furthermore, if 
viewing Central Asia as a whole, the consistent and large influx and dominance of Turkic 
nomads into what were the sedentary domains of Iranian peoples did shift the political, 
ethnic, and linguistic composition of Central Asia in a decidedly Turkic fashion, which 
both minimised and hybridised the influence of Iranian culture to differing extents.16  
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Of the plethora of Turkic tribes and confederacies that ruled over Central Asia, the Uzbeks 
were among the most dominant. Uzbek khans and later emirs established their centre of 
power in the lands of Bukhara and Transoxiana,17 the historical centres of Iranian political 
culture in the Central Asian region. Uzbek rule throughout the sixteenth to early twentieth 
century is considered by a number of scholars to be a period characterised by economic 
backwardness, cultural conservatism, and political despotism.18 According to Becker, 
nineteenth century Bukhara was a classic example of traditional or pre-modern societies, 
with the Emirate’s “economic, social, and political systems, their technology, and the 
intellectual attitudes of their rulers showed no qualitative change from the tenth 
century”.19 Although Bukhara was economically and politically backward when placed 
into comparative perspective with its Islamic neighbours of the time, the Persian empire 
and the Ottoman empire, Bukhara did symbolise the ethnic and religious heterogeneity 
and dynamism of the Central Asian region.20 The ruling Uzbeks were joined by large 
populations of Turkmen, and Tajiks,21 as well as smaller populations of Jews, Kyrgyz, 
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period. The first were the Sheibanids (1500-1598 C.E., descendants of the Mongol Khans. According to 
Ilkhamov, the origin of the ethnonym Uzbek “probably originates from the name of Uzbek-khan (1312-
1340 C.E., the ninth Overlord of Djuchi House (Chengiz-Khan’s elder son)”. See Alisher Ilkhamov, 
"Archaeology of Uzbek Identity," Central Asian Survey 23, no. 3 (2004): 291. The Sheibanids oversaw the 
assimilation and merger of a number of Turkic and Mongol tribal groups and were eventually succeeded 
by the Astarkhanid dynasty (1598-1740 C.E.). In 1740, Nadir Shah (1736-1747 C.E.) founder of the Persian 
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Hindus, and Arabs, as well as significant numbers of Shi’ite Iranian slaves who were 
brought to Bukhara from Iran’s eastern regions, and who played a major role in Bukharan 
armies and in Bukhara’s civil administration.22 The Persian-speaking Tajiks were integral 
to the commercial functioning of Bukhara, and made up a large majority of Bukhara’s 
sedentary population of artisans, merchants, and peasants.23  While most Tajiks were 
adherents of Sunni Islam, there were also major populations of eastern Iranian-speaking 
Shi’ite Ismailis in the mountainous regions to the east of Bukhara, who largely retained 
their autonomy and independence from the Turkic-dominated steppes and urban 
centres.24  
Despite the overlordship of the Turkic Uzbeks, Iranian culture and language was a 
pervasive influence within the sedentary rungs of domestic Bukharan society that also 
carried over into the realm of the ruling elite, where Uzbek rulers patronised and promoted 
Iranian culture, and conducted the everyday tasks of governance in the Persian 
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Routledge, 2006), 62. 
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language.25 While retaining their nomadic roots and forms of identification, the Uzbek 
elites sought to hold onto much of the Iranian administrative and bureaucratic practices 
emanating from the region’s ancient history of Iranian rule. While many of the originally 
nomadic Uzbeks became semi-sedentary or sedentary, and adopted Perso-Islamic cultural 
mores and lifestyles, Manz contends that the politically active and upper echelons of 
Uzbek society “had an interest in preserving a separate identity and in maintaining the 
tribal affiliation which secured them a place within the ruling stratum”, with these groups 
forming the basis of the Uzbek military and ruling classes.26 Uzbeks who did adopt 
sedentary lifestyles of the Persian-speaking urban populations were often identified as 
Sarts.27 
The etymology of the term Sart has incited considerable controversy within academia. 
For instance, according to Subtelny,  
When the nomadic Uzbeks came into Central Asia from the Kipchak Steppe in the 
late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the term Uzbek gained currency 
alongside the older nomadic self-designation “Turk”, which was now reserved for 
the pre-Uzbek Turkic tribes, some of whom already made the transition to semi-
sedentarism and even sendentarism. The Uzbeks who were nomads, clearly 
distinguished between themselves and their sedentary subject population whom 
they usually referred to as Sart (also Tajik). Like Tat and Tajik, it too became a 
                                                 
 
25 Seyed Ali Mortazavian, "National Identity Crisis: The Impact of Common Language and Script on 
Reconstruction of National Identity," Amu Darya: The Iranian Journal of Central Asian Studies 1, no. 1 
(1996): 96. 
26 Beatrice F. Manz (ed.), “Historical Background,” in Central Asia in Historical Perspective, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1994), 11 
27 See V. Bartold, cited in C.E. Bosworth, Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol IX (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), 66-
68. Illkhamov neatly sums up the at times confusing and heterogeneous definitions of ‘Sarts’ declaring that 
the label and category Sarts was a ‘social’ rather than ‘ethnic’ category’ and that in “some cases those 
former Dashti-Kipchak Uzbeks and Chaghatay Turks and Turko-Mongols who switched to a settled life-
style and lost their nomadic identity are classified as ‘Sarts.’ In other instances, they are seen as Turkified 
Tajiks. In any case, the notion ‘Sart’ combines both ethnic and class attributes. Sarts are, as a rule, urban 
inhabitants engaged in craftsmanship, trade and in middle level administrative and educational activity. The 
percentage of clergy, supervisors of cults and law enforcement officials is also relatively high among them”. 
See Ilkhamov, “Archaeology of Uzbek identity,” 303-304.  
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derogatory term, even acquiring a contemptuous popular etymology: “yellow dog” 
(sart it).28 
Going even further, noted Soviet historian Bartold, believes that Sart was often used 
interchangeably with the term Tajik prior to the entrance of the Uzbeks into Transoxiana. 
Because Muslim Iranian-speaking populations of the Central Asian region lived a mainly 
sedentary lifestyle, nomadic Mongol-Turkic tribes would refer to all sedentary 
populations as Sarts, no matter their language or ethnicity. Following the entrance of the 
Uzbeks into Transoxiana in the sixteenth century, Sart became synonymous with the label 
Tajik, referring to Persian-speaking sedentary populations, and sat in sharp 
contradistinction, to the term Uzbek, which referred to the Turkic-speaking nomadic and 
semi-nomadic populations. The long, drawn-out process of cultural inter-mingling and 
co-habitation which occurred between Uzbeks and other sedentary populations, in 
particular the Persian-speaking Tajik and Iranian populations, led to what Bartold 
considers a “general trend toward Turkicisation of the indigenous Iranian populations”. 
Furthermore, Bartold goes on to declare that this dynamic process of population 
admixture had by the nineteenth century led to the identification of Sart shifting from 
being synonymous with Tajik to only referring to Turkic-speaking or bilingual town 
dwellers of Uzbek and Turkic origin. A Tajik by this time was reserved only for Persian-
speakers.29 However it is Illkhamov who neatly sums up the at times confusing and 
heterogeneous definitions of Sarts, declaring that the label was a “social” rather than 
“ethnic” category, and that in  
some cases those former Dashti-Kipchak Uzbeks and Chaghatay Turks and Turko–
Mongols who switched to a settled lifestyle and lost their nomadic identity are 
classified as Sarts. In other instances, they are seen as Turkified Tajiks. In any case, 
the notion Sart combines both ethnic and class attributes. Sarts [were], as a rule, 
urban inhabitants engaged in craftsmanship, trade, and in middle level 
                                                 
 
28 Subtelny, "The Symbiosis of Turk and Tajik," 49. 
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administrative and educational activity. The percentage of clergy, supervisors of 
cults and law enforcement officials is also relatively high among them.30  
Although there were significant political, cultural and linguistic commonalities and, as 
noted above, admixture, that existed between the populations of Persia and Bukhara in 
the centuries that followed the fall of the Samanid dynasty, the Shi’ite-Sunni sectarian 
divide, instigated by the adoption of Shi’ism as Iran’s state religion by the Safavids in 
1502 C.E., contributed to deep hostility and the absence of fruitful and productive ties 
between the populations and governments of Bukhara and Iran. Sectarian rivalry, distrust, 
and conflict characterised ties between Bukhara and Iran from the sixteenth to the 
nineteenth century, with sectarian-fuelled atrocities, massacres, and plunder committed 
by both sides throughout this period.31 Furthermore, intermittent invasions by Turkmen 
nomads and Uzbek warlords wreaked havoc upon Iran’s north-eastern borderlands, and 
placed significant pressure and hardship upon Iran’s sedentary populations, particularly 
in Khorasan.  
It is estimated that tens of thousands of Shi’ite Iranian slaves were carried off and sold 
into slave markets throughout Bukhara32, a practice that was legally justified by the 
Bukharan Sunni lawyers who proclaimed that the Shi’ite Iranians were infidels and 
                                                 
 
30 Ilkhamov, "Archaeology of Uzbek Identity," 303-04. 
31 See Jonathan L. Lee, The "Ancient Supremacy": Bukhara, Afghanistan and the Battle for Balkh, 1731-
1901, vol. 15 (Brill, 1996). Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and 
Revolution in Central Asia (University of California Press, 1988). 
32 It was reported by Baron Von Meyendorff, who had been sent by the Russian Tsarist government to 
Bukhara to secure the release of Russian slaves in 1820, that there were between 25-40,000 Persian slaves 
within the Bukharan Emirate alone of an estimated population of 2.5 million people,. The remainder of the 
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(Paris, 1826). Further to this estimate, and quoting a Persian emissary, English traveller Mary Holdsworth 
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of Bukhara, Kokand and Khiva (Oxford: St. Antony’s College, 1959), 21–2. 
112 
 
 
apostates.33 According to Germanov, Bukharans—both Tajik and Uzbek alike—regarded 
Shi’ite Iranians as “unpleasant and contemptible people. It was considered disgraceful in 
Bukhara to have any links with the Persians…The society despised the Persians and they 
were like pariahs.”34 Burton further contends that this hatred for the “heretical” Shi’ite 
Iranians was at such a level that the Sunni Bukharans: 
That went to Iran brought their friends pieces of underwear or skeins of cotton 
dipped in Iranian blood as souvenirs. If they had to stay for any length of time on 
business they were even known to have committed suicide on their return, because 
they felt thoroughly unclean as a result of their visit. But just as Sunni theologians 
(‘ulama) would order them to “kill and destroy…those who gave up the Sunni 
doctrine, accepted the abominable Shi’a rite and reviled the three Caliphs”, the 
Iranian populace would make a point of cursing the revered Caliph ‘Umar loudly 
in the presence of visitors from the khanate, in order to provoke them into a fight.35  
At various times hatred and violence towards Shi’ite Iranian populations within Bukhara 
spiralled out of control, particularly in the early twentieth century when Iranians began to 
gain real influence over the ruling emirs, and control over the governing organs of the 
weak Bukharan state.36 The ascendency of the Iranians during this period enraged the 
                                                 
 
33  According to Hopkins: “The minority status of slavers’ victims was as much a reflection of 
opportunity as of a developed attitude to target religious outsiders. While there was a sophisticated body of 
Islamic jurisprudence regarding the treatment and sectarian identity of slaves, the dissonance between 
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Century,” Modern Asian Studies 42, Iss. 4, (2008), 645 
34 Valery A. Germanov, “Shiite-Sunnite Conflict of 1910 in the Bukhara Khanate,” Oriente Moderno, 
Nuova serie, 87, no. 1, (2007): 122. 
35 Audrey Burton, The Bukharans – A Dynastic, Diplomatic and Commercial History, 1550-1702, (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 14 
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erupted over the appointment of Persians to administrative positions within the Bukharan government. It is 
believed that many were killed in this conflict, and 315 were wounded. In another sectarian conflict, which 
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citizens of Bukhara, and contributed to significant internal violence and social 
dislocation.37 News of repression against Shi’ites in Bukhara, and the brutal invasions 
conducted by Turkmen nomads and Uzbek warlords upon Iran’s north-eastern 
borderlands, often incited Iranian authorities to retaliate against their eastern neighbours, 
feeding a vicious cycle of revenge and violence, which did not completely end until the 
consolidation of Tsarist Russian rule in Central Asia in the twentieth century.38  
These bloody and ruthless interactions contributed to the popularisation of the Iranian 
image of Central Asia not as a domain of past glories, but rather as a land of barbarity and 
incivility, an image that was in many respects shared by the Bukharans who saw Iran as 
a land of religious heresy and villainy. 39  Violent hostilities and mutual xenophobia 
contributed to a decline in trade flows, which had already been heavily impacted 
following the opening of sea routes that linked Europe with East Asia, and opened the 
age of European imperialism in the late fifteenth century, eventually ending the economic 
importance of the so-called “Silk Roads”.40 Although it is difficult to ascertain the impact 
on trade of violence and poor relations between the populations of Bukhara and Iran, trade 
did continue to take place, however this trade was likely to have been on a smaller scale 
and was frequently interrupted by wars and conflict between Bukhara and Iran.41  
The biggest impact of the sectarian hostilities which plagued relations between Bukhara 
and Iran was in the field of cultural exchange. In effect a “confrontation line” had been 
drawn between these two societies, which hampered social and cultural interchange and 
contributed to each side excluding more and more of the other’s literary, visual, and other 
                                                 
 
37 Ibid., 123. 
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cultural works, thus having a detrimental impact on the cultural and social development 
of not only Central Asia, but also the eastern provinces of Iran proper. Rulers in both 
societies saw their respective Islamic sects as a means to assert legitimacy and to ensure 
social harmony within their territories at the expense of their bilateral relations and 
economic, social, and cultural contacts.42  Modern notions of nationalism and ethnic 
solidarity, and older forms of social organisation such as common linguistic bonds, played 
very little role in shaping friendly relations between Tajiks and Iranians during the 300-
year rule of the Uzbek dynasts. Rather, sectarian solidarity and societal function took 
precedence over other forms of communal identification, at least on an inter-societal level, 
hampering Iran’s interactions and contributing to the creation of a religious frontier which 
effectively separated Iran from Central Asia in general, and the Tajiks in particular.43  
3.3 Tsarist Russian Control of Central Asia 
Intermittent slave raids and inter-societal conflict between Iran and Bukhara were of very 
little importance to Iran’s rulers when compared to the danger posed by Russian imperial 
expansion beginning in the late eighteenth century. Moving southwards into 
Transcaucasia and through Iran’s north-western approaches, Tsarist Russia became a 
border state and a source of significant Iranian fears, which arguably were only put to rest 
with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.44  
The colonial encroachment unfolded rapidly in Central Asia, with Tsarist Russia placing 
vast swathes of territory under its control. 45  Although Bukhara retained nominal 
independence in the years following its defeat at the hands of Tsarist forces in 1868, its 
ruling emirs found it increasingly difficult to control even their own domestic affairs 
                                                 
 
42 Ibid. 
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45 Aryeh Yodfat, The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran, (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 1. 
115 
 
 
against the power of Russia. In the years leading up to the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, 
Bukhara was a Tsarist Russian protectorate, with its ruling emirs having little control over 
external affairs and foreign policy. 46  In effect, Iran’s dealings with the peoples and 
territories of Central Asia—at least on a governmental level—from this point onwards 
would overwhelmingly be shaped by the strategic and economic interests of Russian 
policy planners based in St. Petersburg and later Moscow.47 
This shift and the ultimate breakdown of Iran’s already tenuous relations with Central 
Asia were exacerbated by its weakened position throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. Forced to sign a string of embarrassing and lopsided treaties, not only 
Russia but also with a number of other European powers—most notably Great Britain—
it became clear that Iran under its Qajar rulers (1785-1925) was a spent force on the brink 
of collapse. A number of European governments exacted special privileges from Iran 
under the so-called “Regime of Capitulations”, which included consular jurisdiction, 
extraterritoriality, and the right to own property, effectively undermining Iran’s 
sovereignty and freedom of political action within its own borders. As a site of imperial 
intrigue and competition, the British and Russians “openly and unapologetically” vied for 
control over Iran’s territories and riches. The inability of Iranian rulers to control their 
own internal affairs, and Iran’s complete helplessness in the face of the European imperial 
onslaught, was on display in 1907, when the British and Russians signed a formal 
agreement which would divide Iran into Russian and British spheres of influence. As 
noted by Parker, the “resulting spheres of influence in the north and south of Iran, Russian 
and British respectively, were in effect zones of imperial occupation”.48 Both Russia and 
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Great Britain consistently attempted to exercise control over the weak, incompetent, and 
corrupt Iranian government. Under such trying circumstances Iranian rulers showed an 
almost complete lack of interest in, or ability to shape, events emanating across their 
eastern borders, viewing Russia’s imperial advance and the solidification of Russian rule 
in Central Asia as a minor issue in comparison to more pressing issues facing Iran during 
this chaotic period of Iranian history.49 
3.4 Pan-Turkism  
Iran’s lack of cultural and political influence within Central Asia was further exacerbated 
by the immense social and political changes which were taking place in the region 
throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Bukhara and the Central Asian 
territories under Russian control were buffeted by a rising sense of Pan-Turkic national 
consciousness and increased claims for political and cultural reform from the region’s 
intelligentsia. This process was encouraged by the large number of Tatar Tsarist 
administrators and interpreters, who had boosted the use of the Chaghatay Turkic 
language in everyday government communication, and had encouraged the use of the 
Turkic language in schools and other Central Asian cultural and social institutions at the 
expense of the Persian language.50 The presence and influence of Tatars involved in the 
administration of Central Asia was by no means the only factor behind the rising tide of 
Pan-Turkic self-awareness. Other influences not indigenous to the Central Asian region 
were also making their presence felt. In particular, the shock and humiliation felt by 
Muslim populations throughout the world in the face of European conquest and 
colonisation had according to Bergne: 
[S]timulated a wave of soul searching amongst the intelligentsia of those countries 
most affected. Muslim thinkers tried to analyse the reasons for the weakness and 
lack of development of those governments whether Moghul, Ottoman, Egyptian, or 
North African, which had been defeated by British, French, or in the Caucasus and 
                                                 
 
49 Ibid. 
50 Bergne, The Birth of Tajikistan, 16. 
117 
 
 
Central Asia, Russian arms, or, like Iran had remained independent but fallen victim 
to Western influence and manipulation.51  
It was in this atmosphere that many Central Asian thinkers turned to the weakened but 
still powerful Sunni Ottoman empire and the Pan-Turkic ideas that flowed from this 
empire as a source of inspiration for their reforms, not the perennially weak Persian 
empire under the rule of the Qajar Shahs.  
Turkic intellectuals sought to apply principals of modern education within Russian-
controlled areas of Central Asia, and in the politically and culturally conservative 
territories still under the rule of the emir of Bukhara. These intellectuals promoted an 
educational reform movement known as Usul-e Jadid, or “new principles”. A Tatar writer, 
Ismail Gaspirali, stood at the forefront of this movement, promoting the need for a 
simplified Turkic language to be introduced which would be understandable to all Turkic 
peoples based on a version of Ottoman Turkish written in the Arabic script.52 Furthermore, 
Gaspirali advocated new methods of teaching in schools to replace the memorisation of 
the Koran and the Shariat, which had formed the backbone of the region’s Islamic 
educational system.53 The Jadid movement had a major impact in Central Asia, where 
Tajiks and other Persian-speakers increasingly absorbed the Pan-Turkic ideas this new 
movement espoused. The Pan-Turkic movement and the Turkic language reforms 
encouraged by the Jadids were deemed progressive and modern in contrast to that of 
Persian, the de-facto official language of Bukhara, which embodied the feudal, traditional, 
and despotic roots the Jadids sought to challenge.54 The characterisation of the Persian 
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language and culture as a despotic link to Central Asia’s feudal past effectively relegated 
the Persian-speaking Tajiks to a politically inferior position, and further alienated Iranian 
culture during the early twentieth century.55 Pan-Turkic groups and political movements 
sought to encourage Tajiks to give up their language and culture, furthermore an anti-
Iranian subtext often adjoined the Pan-Turkic discourse, which looked on with animosity 
at the complicated symbiosis which had occurred between Turkic and Iranian peoples 
throughout Central Asia’s long history of civilisation.56 In the Pan-Turkic discourse, the 
Tajiks of Central Asia were in fact Turkic peoples who had been forced to adopt the 
Persian language by the region’s rulers, and were not ethnically different from the wider 
Turkic-speaking population. In the words of the Pan-Turkists,  
The Uzbek, Kazakh and Kyrgyz people inhabiting Turkistan are not separate 
nationalities; they all belong to one great Turkic nation. As for the Tajiks, they 
basically originate from the Turks and became Tajik only as a result of Iranian 
influence. This is why the Tajiks are Turks.57 
Interestingly many Tajik and other Persian-speaking intellectuals agreed with such 
characterisations and enthusiastically wrapped themselves in this progressive new 
movement, seeking to distance themselves and their culture from its historical Iranian 
roots.58  
3.5 The Beginnings of Soviet Rule 
In 1916, Central Asians had participated in mass uprisings in response to the Russian 
colonial authorities’ attempts to conscript Central Asians into wartime auxiliary 
                                                 
 
55 Ibid,17; Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform, Jadidism in Central Asia (Berkeley 
University of California Press, 1998), 208. 
56 Ibid., 210. 
57 Safarov, G, Kolonial’naya revolyutsiya (opyt Turkestana) [The Colonial Revolution (The Turkestan 
Experiment)]. Moscow (1921), 110. Cited in G. Asharov, “Intellectual and Political Ferment,” History of 
Civilisations of Central Asia, Volume VI, Towards the contemporary period: from the mid-nineteenth to 
the end of the twentieth century, (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2005), 202. 
58 For further discussion, see Bergne, The Birth of Tajikistan, 17. 
119 
 
 
services.59 This uprising and the violence it fed were only a prelude to the wider instability 
the Central Asian region faced following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. The revolution 
led to years of civil war, famine, and hardship for the region’s populations, and the 
complete reorganisation of Central Asian political and cultural life.60 The replacement of 
Tsarist imperial rule in Central Asia with that of the Soviets was both a complicated and 
drawn-out process, leading to the extinguishment of the Russian Governorate-General of 
Turkestan in 1918, and both the Khanate of Khiva and the Emirate of Bukhara in 1920, 
and to the creation of Soviet Socialist Republics based on ethno-linguistic lines.61  
The rise of communism often mixed uneasily with the Pan-Turkic nationalist ideas which 
had flourished in Central Asia in previous decades. For instance in 1920, Central Asian 
elites created a new Communist Party of Turkestan whose main aim “was the unification 
of all the Turkic peoples of Central Asia in a new communist but Turkic state”.62 The 
fiery and somewhat contradictory mix of Pan-Turkic nationalism and communist 
ideology further marginalised the Tajik language and culture, with Tajiks in the Turkestan 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic not even initially recognised as an indigenous 
people, despite their large population numbers in the regions of Samarkand, Khojent, 
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Isfara, and Konibodom.63 In the new, communist, Bukhara, Tajiks fared no better, even 
though they formed the majority of the population.64 On the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of Bukhara in 1920, Turkic was declared the official language of the republic, 
and a systematic and conscious effort was made by the local authorities to minimise and 
downgrade the influence of Iranian and Tajik language and culture. 65  Speaking the 
Persian language was punished by fines, and anti-Tajik and Iranian activities became the 
order of the day. According to Bergne, “under this sort of pressure, combined with the 
influence of Jadid reformists, many Tajiks fell in line and went along with the programme 
of Turkicisation”.66 
3.6 The Creation of Tajikistan 
In 1924, Soviet authorities made the decision to carry out a national delimitation of 
Central Asia, creating a number of Soviet republics based upon the region’s major ethno-
linguistic groups. 67  The delimitation process took place with great speed, with the 
political and cultural trajectory of the Central Asian region redrawn in radical and at times 
unforeseen ways. 68  The patchwork of political units which included the People’s 
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Republics of Khorezm and Bukhara were transformed into Soviet Socialist Republics, 
and together with the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic were divided into 
newly-conceived federal entities. Kazakh and Kyrgyz populated areas continued to be a 
part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (SFSR), but were provided 
autonomous and later full union status (1936). The Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) of 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were also formed, and Tajik-populated areas were given 
autonomous but subordinate political status within the Uzbek SSR as the Tajik 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR). The Tajik ASSR inherited parts of the 
Samarkand, Fergana, eastern Bukhara, and Pamir regions.69 
The inception of the Tajik ASSR in 1924 had however quickly exposed the weakened 
political position of the Tajiks in relation to the Uzbeks following the national 
delimitation process. The Tajik ASSR was allocated mountainous, economically 
marginal, and sparsely-populated regions, which had been devastated by the impacts of 
the long-running civil war between the communists and the Basmachi.70 Furthermore, 
large populations of Tajiks were left outside the Tajik ASSR’s borders, with the two 
traditional centres of Tajik economic and cultural life, Bukhara and Samarkand, falling 
under the purview of the Uzbek SSR.71 Although it was difficult for the Soviet authorities 
to build equitable boundaries between Tajiks and Uzbeks, due in no small part to the 
admixture of populations, and the complex structures of identities which had developed 
over a period of centuries. It was the sheer inability and unwillingness of the Tajik 
intelligentsia to adequately advocate on behalf of their “co-ethnics” which was the major 
factor in shaping the inequitable position in which the Tajiks found themselves following 
the delimitation process.72 As noted by Masov, Stalin himself had remarked to Bobojan 
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Ghafurov, the First Secretary of the Tajik Communist Party, that it was indeed the ethnic 
Tajiks who had done the most to block the establishment of a separate Tajik union 
republic, and a number of the Soviet authorities involved in the delimitation process were 
astounded by the Tajiks’ unwillingness to insist on the expansion of Tajik territorial and 
cultural claims.73 However this unwillingness should not be viewed as being brought 
about by Tajik naivety, sheer political impotence, or the popular Tajik claim of Uzbek 
skulduggery and under-handedness. Instead, as convincingly argued by Haugen, the Tajik 
intelligentsia accepted the delimitation in 1924 due to the fact that they felt a stronger 
sense of identity with the urban populations of Uzbeks rather than with the so-called 
“mountain Tajiks” of eastern Bukhara. Thus, Abdulrahim Khojibaev and Chinar Imamov, 
Tajik members of the delimitation committee (both of whom in later years became 
staunch Tajik nationalists), had agreed wholeheartedly with the delimitation process, and 
the prospect that a majority of Tajiks would be left within the Uzbek SSR’s borders. 
According to Khojibaev, the urban Tajiks of Bukhara and Turkestan were “both 
economically and otherwise very closely connected with the Uzbeks, and this is the 
reason why they must remain as a part of the Uzbek republic”. Imamov agreed with such 
an analysis, declaring that urban Tajiks not only had strong economic links with the 
Uzbeks but also a shared culture, thus it was best that urban Tajiks remained within the 
borders of the Uzbek SSR and outside of the purview of the Tajik ASSR.74  
In the years following the national territorial delimitation process, tension between Uzbek 
and Tajik elites grew in intensity, with Tajik self-awareness increasingly taking shape in 
response to perceived cultural and political injustices dealt at the hands of the Uzbek-
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dominated governing elite.75 Tajiks who did find themselves within Uzbek borders were, 
according to Roy, 
the object of a discreet but persistent policy of Uzbekistisation. This was launched 
by F. Khojayev76 in 1924 and was based on a notion employed in Russification: 
since the Uzbeks were at a more advanced stage of development (they were already 
officially a nation in 1924 whereas Tajikistan was only an autonomous republic), it 
was seen as progressive to declare oneself an Uzbek when one was Tajik.77 
Uzbek elites were often unwilling to grant the Tajiks their cultural rights, and were 
negligent in fulfilling the obligations of providing economic development to the Tajik 
ASSR agreed upon with Soviet authorities during the delimitation process.78 According 
to Bergne, there was “ample evidence that the Uzbek party and government was 
siphoning off for its own use funds and credits sent from Moscow which were expressly 
earmarked for Tajikistan”.79 Soviet authorities in Moscow grew increasingly frustrated 
with this behaviour, and alarmed by the Pan-Turkic nationalist aspirations of the Uzbek 
SSR’s leaders.80 The central Soviet authorities desire to undercut and minimise Uzbek 
hegemony within Central Asia, and the growing sense of alienation among Tajiks, played 
major roles in influencing the Soviet decision to confer full union status upon Tajikistan 
in 1929, and led to the re-drawing of Tajikistan’s and Uzbekistan’s borders through the 
inclusion of the city of Khojand and its surrounding district into the newly-formed Tajik 
SSR. 81 Although Tajik elites were pleased with this decision, the unwillingness of 
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Moscow to award Tajikistan the ancient centres of shared Tajik and Iranian civilisation, 
Samarkand and Bukhara, was a hammer blow to Tajik nationalist aspirations, and 
remained a controversial issue throughout the Soviet period and beyond.82  
3.7 Tajikistan – A Model ‘Soviet-Iranian’ State 
The need to curtail Uzbek ambitions and temper Tajik anger at real and imagined Uzbek 
malfeasance were not the only factors behind Moscow’s decision to grant Tajikistan full 
union status. Another major political factor is also thought to have related to the shifting 
political dynamics taking place outside of the Soviet Union at the time. In particular, 
events occurring in bordering Afghanistan, which had been rocked by growing public 
discontent with the Amanullah, the King of Afghanistan, 83  who had been a Soviet 
sympathiser of sorts, and the rise to power of the staunchly nationalist and anti-communist 
Reza Shah in Iran, increased the attractiveness of establishing a “Soviet model Iranian 
state” in Central Asia.84 The export of communism beyond the Soviet Union’s borders 
was a key objective of Stalin, and a “prerequisite to the definitive triumph of socialism”.85 
Tajikistan’s location at the crossroads of Iran, Afghanistan, and British India therefore 
imbued it with considerable strategic and ideological importance to Soviet authorities in 
the 1920s.86 Furthermore, Soviet authorities hoped that the common Persian language and 
culture of Tajikistan, Iran, and parts of Afghanistan and northwest India would eventually 
become a key platform through which communist ideologies could spread and take root 
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within the east. In line with such a strategic rationale, Roy contends that “nationalities 
were created as a function of the principal of the dual bridgehead, the idea being to favour 
ethnic groups which might serve as a bridgehead to enable the USSR to extend beyond 
its frontiers, and inversely, to break up those which might function as bridgeheads for 
another power”. 87  Such notions were made clear by Stalin during the official 
proclamation of the Tajik ASSR in 1925, where the emphasis on the role Tajikistan could 
play outside of the Soviet Union was consistently alluded to: 
Greetings to Tajikistan, the new soviet working people's republic at the gates of 
Hindustan. I ardently wish all the working people of Tajikistan success in 
converting their republic into a model republic of the Eastern countries. The Tajiks 
have a rich history; their great organizing and political abilities of the past are no 
secret to anyone. Workers of Tajikistan! Advance the culture of your land, develop 
its economy, assist the toilers of the city and the village, rally around you the best 
sons of the fatherland. Show the whole East that it is you, vigorously holding in 
your hands the banners of liberation, who are the most worthy heirs of your 
ancestors.88 
In the years following this speech, Tajikistan’s economic development, and political 
progress were used as a means to legitimise the Soviet system within Tajik domestic 
politics, and applied internationally to highlight the disadvantages faced by Iranians and 
other Persian-speaking populations under their “backward” monarchical and bourgeois 
systems.89  
3.8 Pahlavi Iran and Soviet Tajikistan 
Rather than attempting to build inter-societal ties between the newly-formed Tajikistan 
and Iran, Soviet authorities instead used the real and imagined linguistic and cultural 
commonalities which existed between these two societies to politically undermine Iran 
throughout the twentieth century. Such efforts on an unofficial level included pro-Soviet 
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Persian radio broadcasts beamed into Iran and the distribution of communist literature, 
and on an official level, the facilitation of a range of cultural, political, and social 
exchanges between Iran and Tajikistan’s intelligentsia which were developed as a means 
to spread communist and revolutionary messages and to highlight the superiority of the 
Soviet system to Iran’s population. The Soviets even went as far to shelter Iranian 
dissidents and anti-monarchy figures within Tajikistan’s borders. 90  However, while 
Soviet propaganda efforts were extensive and at times acted as a major irritant to Iranian 
political authorities, inter-state interactions both on an inter-societal and now at an “inter-
state” level between Iran and Soviet Tajikistan were indeed minor and almost non-
existent throughout the rule of the Pahlavi dynasty. Although the Tajik intelligentsia took 
a greater interest in their Iranian roots, and embraced a range of Iranian symbols, histories, 
and myths, which were interpreted in a nationalistic and decidedly Tajik fashion,91 Iranian 
political elites continued to have very little interest in events occurring among their 
Persian-speaking brethren within the Soviet Union. 
 A number of factors, both domestic and international, explain the lack of interest among 
Iran’s political elites towards the Persian-speaking populations of Tajikistan throughout 
the Pahlavi rule, the most prominent of which lay in Iran’s inability to interact freely and 
fully with the Tajik SSR in a direct and “normal” state-to-state manner. The strongly 
centralised Soviet political system did not allow any form of independent foreign policy 
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for its subject republics. All interactions with states outside of the Soviet Union occurred 
through, and at the behest of, central authorities in Moscow. This effectively placed 
Tajikistan out of the reach of Iranian policy planners, who in any event displayed very 
little interest in the small, and somewhat peripheral, population of Persian-speaking 
Tajiks in Central Asia. Although this was generally the case, Tajikistan—as the locale of 
“past Iranian glories”—did occasionally emerge within Iranian public discourse, with 
evidence that members of the Iranian majlis had at various times called for the return of 
Caucasian and Central Asian territories lost to Tsarist Russia, however no serious claims 
were ever made in the international arena to return these lands. In any event, concerns 
and international challenges much larger than grandiose visions of re-forming the borders 
of Greater Iran focused the minds of Iranian elites throughout the Pahlavi dynasty, and 
minimised Iran’s interests in Tajikistan and the wider Central Asian region. 92 
Furthermore, Iran’s often tense relationship with the Soviet Union throughout the rule of 
both Reza Shah, and Muhammad Reza Shah placed considerable obstacles in front of 
Iran’s interests in, or relations with, the peripheral Central Asian regions under Soviet 
central control.  
Under Reza Shah for instance, Iran’s relations with the Soviet Union were characterised 
by larger and much more pressing issues, such as Iran’s efforts to remove the series of 
unjust agreements signed between Iran and Tsarist Russia, and to prevent consistent 
Soviet meddling in Iran’s domestic affairs. The Soviets were key supporters of Iranian 
communist opponents, and were considered by a number of scholars as instrumental in 
the creation of the anti-monarchical Tudeh party.93 The material and ideological support 
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provided by the Soviets for communist movements in Iran was the cause of significant 
domestic instability and turmoil, and led to direct challenges to Iran’s ruling monarchy 
on a number of occasions.94 The Soviet-instigated domestic challenges faced by Reza 
Shah carried over to the international arena, where he had to carefully balance the 
demands and interests of Soviet authorities. Although Reza Shah made noteworthy gains 
in restoring Iranian independence following the humiliation it had suffered at the hands 
of European powers during the rule of the Qajars, he was ultimately unsuccessful. In 1941 
the Soviet Union and Great Britain overthrew his rule and occupied Iran for five years, 
ostensibly as punishment for his pro-German stance and unwillingness to allow the Allies 
to use Iranian railway networks to resupply the Soviet Union.95  
Following Reza Khan’s exile from the country, the occupying forces installed his more 
pliable son, Muhammad Reza to the Iranian throne. Throughout his reign, Muhammad 
Reza engaged in a tense and at times toxic relationship with Soviet authorities in Moscow. 
Whilst often proclaiming an independent and staunchly nationalist stance on international 
relations, Muhammad Reza Shah was heavily dependent upon, and deeply beholden to, 
the interests and influence of the United States, the Soviet Union’s Cold War adversary. 
Throughout his reign, the United States had great influence over Iran’s economic, 
political, cultural, and social affairs. This influence, according to Saikal, 
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implied a narrowing of the Iranian regime’s policy options to a pro-Western, mainly 
pro-American stance in its domestic and foreign policy. Thus the regime, both 
officially and unofficially, tied Iran’s national development and foreign policy 
objectives to the interests of the West, which ensured Iran’s “dependence 
relationship” with the United States. In this relationship, Washington acted as a 
“Patron Power” preserving the Shah’s regime and influencing the direction and the 
content of its policies in line with western regional and international interests.96  
The entrenchment of Iran within the “Western camp” was solidified by Iran’s entrance 
into the pro-Western Baghdad Pact, or the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1955, 
and the signing of a bilateral military agreement with the United States in 1959. Iran’s 
ties with the Soviet Union remained icy for almost 20 years, with the beginnings of a thaw 
in relations only taking place in 1962, when the Iranian government announced that it 
would not allow the stationing of foreign missiles on its soil, a move which was looked 
upon favourably by Soviet authorities in Moscow.97  
The tentative beginnings of rapprochement between Iran and the Soviet Union brought to 
an end a number of the Soviet radio and press propaganda efforts, many of which had 
emanated across Iran’s Central Asian and Caucasian borders. Furthermore the Soviet 
Union declared its support for the Shah’s land reforms, and sought to rein in the anti-
government actions of the Tudeh party.98 Although Iran remained closely allied to the 
United States, Iran did accept a number of low interest loans, and technical, economic, 
and military assistance from the Soviet Union, and in 1967 signed a series of long-term 
agreements with the Soviet Union to export Iranian oil and natural gas to bordering Soviet 
Republics Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.99 The warming of ties between Iran and the 
Soviet Union had finally opened up small but important opportunities for Iran to interact 
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with Soviet Central Asia, a region that had ostensibly been sealed off from Iran for 
centuries. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Iranian authorities discussed a number 
of projects, which would economically link Soviet Central Asia to Iran, and Iranian 
officials often visited Tajikistan and the other Soviet Central Asian Republics on official 
and unofficial business.100  
Although there was an increase in links between Iran and Tajikistan throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s, such links were largely restricted to the upper rungs of both societies’ 
intelligentsia, and usually revolved around discussions and exchanges in the fields of art 
and culture. Furthermore, while these cultural ties were important, the sense among Tajiks 
that they had a shared history and culture with Iran had been considerably weakened 
throughout the Sovietisation process. From the moment Tajikistan was conferred 
republican status within the USSR, Tajik academicians sought to reinterpret and create 
their own national culture, which although built upon symbols, myths, and histories 
familiar to Iranians, were however interpreted by Tajikistan’s elite in a nationalistic and 
decidedly Tajik fashion. From the changing of the alphabet from Arabic to Cyrillic by 
Soviet authorities, to Bobojon Ghafurov’s101 staunchly nationalistic attempts to claim 
much of Iran’s history solely for Tajikistan, Tajiks began to strongly and at times 
fervently view themselves not in terms of a greater Iranian civilisation, but rather in much 
narrower national terms, which had a major impact on weakening cultural links between 
Tajikistan and Iran throughout Soviet rule, but also had the effect of strengthening a Tajik 
national “self”.102 
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Apart from these cultural links and developments, which occurred throughout the Pahlavi 
dynasty, Iranian authorities throughout the 1960s and 1970s discussed a number of 
projects which would economically link Soviet Central Asia to Iran. According to Taheri, 
“one proposal envisaged the construction of a railway line connecting Central Asia to the 
Gulf of Oman via Afghanistan and the Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchistan”.103 
These plans, if they had come to fruition, would have eventually led to greater interaction 
at least on an economic level between Iran, Tajikistan, and the other Soviet Central Asian 
republics, however this plan was never enacted. Tajikistan remained isolated from the 
Iranian government, which had throughout the twentieth century been hamstrung by 
domestic concerns, had consistently implemented a deeply Western compromised foreign 
policy agenda, and had almost obsessively attempted to establish Iran as a “great power” 
in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regions.104 In these circumstances Tajikistan and 
the wider Soviet Central Asian region came a distant second in Iran’s regional foreign 
policy interests and agendas. Great changes however were only around the corner, and 
with the eventual fall of Muhammad Reza Shah, and the promulgation of the Islamic 
Republic in 1979, Iranian policy planners took a newfound interest in the Muslim 
populations of Central Asia, which would usher in the beginning of greater Iranian 
interest and influence in Tajikistan.  
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3.9 The Islamic Republic and Soviet Tajikistan 
The rise to power of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the promulgation of the Islamic 
Republic in 1979, drastically shifted Iran’s broad foreign policy stance within the 
international political system. Almost overnight Iran went from being a close Western 
ally to an international “pariah” that sought to institute a new global Islamic order which 
would not only Islamise Iranian state and society, but also challenge the global political 
status quo, which was presumed to have erroneously placed the temporal above the 
spiritual, and had “oppressed” the world’s Muslim peoples for hundreds of years.105 Iran’s 
unique spiritual vision ushered in the beginnings of Iranian attempts to “export the 
revolution”, a process which destabilised its “un-Islamic” regional neighbours, and was 
considered deeply unnerving and abhorrent to both the United States and the Soviet 
Union.106 The establishment of the Islamic Republic was particularly challenging to the 
Soviet Union, who initially praised the “crash of absolutism” and sought to establish good 
ties with Tehran’s new revolutionary government.107 However, the Islamic Republic’s 
hostility towards atheistic communism, and to the Soviet’s rule of Muslim populations 
within Central Asia and the Caucasus, dashed Soviet hopes that it could establish 
cooperative ties with Iran’s new government in the years immediately following the 
revolution. Moreover, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, its support for Iraq during the 
Iran-Iraq War, and its implication in the support of separatist and leftist groups in Iran 
acted as vital sustenance to the constant stream of Iranian vitriol which spewed forth at 
the Soviet Union, a state considered to be “no less satanic” than its Cold War rival, the 
United States. In the early years of the revolution the new Islamic regime became a thorn 
in the side of the Soviet Union’s regional agendas, and quickly presented itself as a 
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challenge to Soviet ideological power in Muslim Central Asia. Iran’s post-revolutionary 
political elites viewed the Central Asian region as fertile ground in their efforts to export 
the Islamic Revolution beyond Iran’s borders, and although Soviet authorities had 
consistently declared that Islam was dead in the Soviet Union and no longer constituted 
a living ideological force,108 a growing sense of Islamic self-awareness and practice had 
increasingly taken shape among Soviet Muslims throughout the 1970s.109 In response to 
these domestic developments within the Soviet Union, Iran’s revolutionary government 
quickly set out to harness and use the growing Islamic sentiments of Central Asian 
Muslims to directly challenge “Soviet atheism”, and spread its own unique brand of 
political Islam across its northern and eastern borders. 
One of Iran’s first post-revolutionary foreign policy endeavours was the establishment of 
a special committee which would attempt to “revive the message of Islam in the USSR”, 
and from the spring of 1979, the Iranians began to beam Islamic programs and propaganda 
within the Soviet Union’s borders. 110  According to Taheri, “each week Iranian 
transmitters broadcast a total of 200 hours of programmes in Azeri, Uzbek, Turkmen, and 
Tajik (Dari) to the USSR”.111 The majority of these programs dealt with long-forgotten 
struggles of Muslims against the Russian expansion into the Caucasus and Central Asia 
in the nineteenth century, and sought to “assist” Soviet Muslims in the rediscovery of 
their Islamic roots. While it is difficult to ascertain the impact these programs had on local 
                                                 
 
108 Voll, “Central Asia,” 64. 
109 For examples and elaboration, see Alexander Bennigsen, “Unrest in the World of Islam,” Third 
World Quarterly 10, no.2, (1988): 770-786; Yaacov Ro'i, Islam in the Soviet Union: From the Second 
World War to Gorbachev (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). 
110 In August 1980, the Iranian Foreign Ministry made a number of demands to Soviet officials, which 
included the closing of the Soviet consulates in Rasht and Esfahan, the reduction of Soviet embassy staff 
in Tehran, and the transfer of Iran’s consulate in Leningrad to Dushanbe. "Iranian Statement on Talks with 
USSR: Closure of Consulates " The British Broadcasting Corporation, 1980; Taheri, Crescent in a Red 
Sky, 186. 
111 Ibid. 
134 
 
 
Muslim populations in the Caucasus and Central Asia, 112  Soviet authorities were 
concerned enough to publicly condemn the growing embrace of Islamic “backwardness” 
in Muslim majority regions, and displayed considerable hostility towards Iran’s outward 
attempt to stoke “Islamic agitation” within the Soviet Union’s borders.113 
Throughout the 1980s, Tajikistan became a prime target for Iran’s propaganda and 
proselytising efforts. Despite the fact that the majority of Tajiks followed the Sunni sect 
of Islam, and Tajik society had been thoroughly secularised after more than 50 years of 
Soviet rule, Iranian political elites believed that the shared language and culture of Tajik 
and Iranian society would assist in increasing Iran’s influence in this largely forgotten 
region.114 Following the revolution, Iranian governing figures made consistent attempts 
to visit Tajikistan, efforts that were knocked back by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Iran’s intense focus upon Tajikistan as a site of spiritual infiltration was 
confirmed in 1982, when Iran sought Soviet permission to open a consulate in 
Dushanbe115, a request that in the words of Parker “went all the way to the top before 
being nixed by the party Politburo”, who were well aware that Iran’s motivations in 
establishing a consulate were based on ideological and religious reasons, not diplomatic 
ones. 116  Iran’s efforts in proselytising and spreading its revolutionary message in 
Tajikistan and Central Asia—while notable—encountered significant difficulties due in 
no small part to the Iran’s economic weakness stemming from its international isolation, 
and its continuing war with Iraq. Furthermore, throughout the early 1980s the KGB and 
other Soviet security apparatuses had generally minimised the impact of Iran’s influence 
in Tajikistan. In an interview conducted by Parker with former member of the Politburo 
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and Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Aleksandr Yakovlev, it was 
claimed that Soviet intelligence had kept a close eye upon Iran’s efforts to influence 
Islamist groups in the region, and although, “the [Soviet security] services discovered 
some instances of such activities but not what appeared to be a serious, coordinated effort 
directed from Iran”, and individual cases of Islamist groups operating in Tajikistan were 
largely local initiatives, extremely disorganised, and very few in number.117  
The ability of the Soviet central authorities to circumscribe Iran’s influence in Tajikistan 
was however considerably compromised following the imposition of domestic reforms, 
beginning in 1985, by Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Politburo. Under 
perestroika, Soviet central control over the union republics began to weaken, and 
provided Iran with important opportunities to influence the rapidly changing domestic 
circumstances which were taking place within Tajikistan and the wider Soviet Union. The 
political, economic, and social reforms instigated by Gorbachev throughout the late 1980s 
opened deep fissures in Soviet society, and saw the flourishing of a range of nationalist 
and Islamist opposition groups and movements in Tajikistan. Groups such as the Islamic 
Renaissance Party, Rastokhez (Revival), and a range of small rag-tag Islamist 
organisations increasingly challenged the ruling status quo, and sought greater national 
and religious rights in the gathering maelstrom that began to form in the years leading up 
to the collapse of the Soviet Union.118 Iran’s direct efforts in influencing these groups is 
not well documented, however it is clear that prominent figures within these organisations 
were inspired by some of Iran’s more incendiary revolutionary messages, and sought to 
cultivate greater political and ideological links with their Iranian brethren.119 Furthermore, 
a number of former Soviet political figures were aware of large levels of Iranian financial 
assistance entering Tajikistan beginning in 1988 and 1989, and while the exact destination 
of this funding is unknown, it would be naïve to believe that none of this funding went to 
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Soviet opposition movements. 120  While this may be the case, it seems that Iran’s 
influence in Tajikistan moving into the final years of the Soviet Union was largely 
restrained due in no small part to a growing awareness among the Iranian political elite 
that better links were needed with Moscow to break Iran free from its growing 
international isolation, and the diabolical economic situation it had found itself in after 
almost a decade of war.121  
Throughout the mid to late-1980s, pragmatists in the Iranian government sought to pursue 
closer ties with the Soviet Union, with Iranian-Soviet rapprochement solidified in 1989 
following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and the ending of the Iran-
Iraq War in 1988, significantly easing tension between the two states. Just prior to his 
death, Ayatollah Khomeini engaged in written correspondence with Gorbachev, and 
advised his successors to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Only three weeks 
following the death of Khomeini, Iran’s speaker of parliament and future president, Ali 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, made a historic visit to Moscow where a number of military, 
economic, and diplomatic protocols were signed. This visit led to the signing of a joint 
communique which called for “more contacts and exchanges between Iranian and Soviet 
religious leaders”.122 The signing of this communique was surprising, particularly in light 
of the Soviet’s past wariness of Iranian proselytising efforts in Central Asia.123 A number 
of former Soviet diplomats have asserted that Gorbachev, in providing Iran the all clear 
to increase its religious influence within the borders of the Soviet Union, was driven more 
by the distractions and other dilemmas facing the Soviet’s at that time, and a confident 
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belief within the Soviet leadership that Iran’s influence could be “controlled” and used to 
Soviet advantage.   
The encouraging openings given to Iran by the Soviets in Tajikistan were placed in 
jeopardy by the rapid unravelling of the Soviet Union in 1990-1991. While Iranian elites 
were excited by the prospects of filling the power vacuum left by the Soviets in Tajikistan, 
the very real prospect of instability and violence threatened Iran’s interests moving 
forward. Overwhelmingly, the more realistically-inclined Iranian elites did not welcome 
the weakening of the Soviet Union, and saw little to gain from the collapse of a once 
stable and newly-acquired political ally.124 In the final months of the Soviet Union, rather 
than attempting to rapidly expand its influence in Tajikistan, Iranian elites moved 
cautiously, not wishing to upset the new and friendly relationship they had developed 
with Moscow. In many respects Iranian political elites were over-cautious, and on a 
number of occasions were out-flanked by other states seeking to benefit from the chaotic 
events ensuing within Tajikistan and the wider post-Soviet political landscape. With the 
declaration of Tajik independence on September 9, 1991, Iranian political elites had to 
rapidly readjust their foreign policy stance going forward. A new dawn had finally arrived 
in Central Asia, and although there was excitement in the Tehran press and within the 
official media, who longingly looked east to the prospects of another “Greater Iran” being 
formed in the near future, Iran quickly found that the prospects of increasing its influence 
and developing friendly bonds with Tajikistan would be more difficult than ever imagined.  
3.10 Conclusion  
This chapter has outlined the historical context of Iranian-Tajik relations. It has argued 
that despite having a shared language and set of cultural mores, ties between the peoples 
of these two states has historically been characterised by a lack of interaction and 
engagement. The tyranny of distance, geography, the ebb and flow of empires, sectarian 
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differences, and the development of unique and exclusivist modern national and political 
cultures have all played a major role in separating Iranians from their “close cultural 
cousins”, the Tajiks. Nevertheless, the idea of a shared past is much more important than 
the actual reality, and rather than focus on the issues that separate their nations, Tajik and 
Iranian leaders have largely sought to build upon the myth of a common history and 
culture to frame and justify their modern political relations. However, the idea that 
Iranians and Tajiks are inseparable due to a so-called 1000-year shared history has often 
led to the glossing over of the real and very important points of political conflict and 
friction that has often taken place between the two countries in the post-Soviet era.  
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Chapter Four: Iran and Tajikistan 1991-1997 – Independence and War 
As Iranian officials put the finishing touches on the opening of what would become 
Tajikistan’s first foreign embassy in the capital of Dushanbe in January 1992, there was 
great hope and excitement about the future trajectory of relations between these two states. 
Although Tajikistan lacked the economic and political weight of other newly-independent 
Soviet Central Asian republics such as Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, Iranian foreign 
officials enthusiastically proposed a range of cultural, economic, and political programs 
that would reconnect Tajikistan with Iran after the 70-year so-called “disruption” of 
relations caused by Soviet rule.1 As aptly summed up by Djalili and Grare, although 
Tajikistan was geographically and politically “remote”, Iran was “very sensitive to 
everything to do with Tajikistan, because of the cultural, historic and above all linguistic 
affinities” that were perceived to have existed between these two societies.2 Within days 
of independence, the Tajik government was bombarded with a range of Iranian proposals 
including the establishment of Persian language schools and facilities, regular air links 
between Iranian cities and Dushanbe, the building of highways which would eventually 
connect Iran’s eastern provinces to Tajikistan, and the establishment of commercial deals 
with Iranian private enterprises seeking new markets and new opportunities. These efforts 
to “re-establish” ties between Iran and Tajikistan were, according to Iran’s Deputy 
Foreign Minister of the time Abbas Maleki, a “natural continuation” of the common 
history that existed between the two states.3 
However, such flowery public pronouncements overlooked Iran’s inability to fulfil most 
of these proposals, and more importantly glossed over the serious instability that wracked 
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Tajikistan in the months leading up to and following independence. Worsening economic 
conditions in Tajikistan, increased freedom of expression brought about by Soviet central 
reforms, and poor governance had contributed to a political environment whereby 
multiple groups and actors jockeyed for power over the Tajik state. This process 
eventually led to a spiral of protests, counter-protests, and political violence that 
eventually shattered the very fabric of Tajik society. 
This chapter seeks to analyse Iran’s early interactions with independent Tajikistan that 
clearly set out Iran’s actual policies and actions during the presidency of Ali Hashemi 
Rafsanjani (1989-1997). This chapter will focus its attention upon Iran’s foreign policy 
behaviour during the Tajik Civil War, and its interactions not only with the Tajik 
government and opposition, but also with the other prominent regional party to this 
conflict, Russia. In doing so, this chapter will provide context to the conflict that tore 
Tajikistan apart, necessarily outlining the key factors and actors involved in the Tajik 
Civil War, and examine Iran’s actions throughout this conflict and the drawn-out peace 
process which sought to bring an end to the terrible violence that gripped Tajikistan 
between 1992 and 1997.4 
4.1 Background to Conflict in Tajikistan 
The series of reforms instigated by Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-
1980s had an interminably negative impact upon Tajikistan, contributing to economic 
decline, the weakening of political authority, and most disturbingly lifting the lid on 
seething local rivalries, which up to that point had remained subsumed under the edifice 
of Soviet political control. While Gorbachev’s reform drive did open the space for the 
creation of a range of opposition groups and reform movements who sought to challenge 
a communist regime that was unwilling to loosen its grip on political power; these 
opposition groups—the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), La’li Badakhson (Ruby of 
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Badakhshan), Rastokhez (Revival) and the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT)—rather 
than being broad-based in their popular support were often little more than vehicles for 
smaller sub-national local and regional groupings vying for political control over the 
levers of the Tajik state. These opposition groups pursued varied political interests and 
ideologies. This ranged from the IRP’s emphasis upon the revival of Islam in Tajik public 
and personal life, the pro-Western democratic inclination of the DPT, Rastokhez’s 
national revivalist platform, 5  to La’li Badakshon’s attempts to forward the political 
interests of the Pamiri ethnic minority. However running on these political platforms 
meant all of the groups gained their support from narrow segments of Tajik society. For 
instance, the DPT and Rastokhez were supported by the urban-based intelligentsia that 
had been marginalised from the organs of Communist political power, whereas the IRP 
gained most of its support from the regional areas of Gharm and the Gorno Badakhshan 
Autonomous Oblast (GBAO). The reason for this support for the IRP in these two regions 
was due in no small part to the IRP’s anti-communist platform, which won favour from 
the peoples of two regions that had largely been left out of the Communist power structure, 
among other factors. 6 
From its very foundation Tajikistan was defined by local and regional loyalties, a direct 
and unfortunate product of Soviet political and administrative machinations.7 Throughout 
most of the period of Soviet rule in Tajikistan, the northern region of Khojand had almost 
single-handedly controlled the top political positions of the Communist Party of 
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Tajikistan (CPT).8  This system of Khojandi dominance was solidified in the 1970s, 
whereby individuals from the southern Kulob district were brought into the leadership 
fold, thus extending the base of support for the CPT beyond the northern regions.9 The 
Khojandis had in many respects created a system that resembled an “Indian caste 
pyramid”, which could be maintained as long as the Soviet system of governance 
remained stable.10 With the breakdown of Soviet rule, those outside of the Khujandi-
Kulobi political alliance had found in the organisational frameworks of the burgeoning 
opposition political groups a warm incubator for their decades-long political, social, and 
economic grievances. 
These grievances, which had increasingly reared their head throughout the late 1980s, 
had by 1991 become a serious threat to the rule of the CPT in Tajikistan. According to 
Nourzhanov and Bleuer:  
[L]ocal elites in Leninobod, Hisor, Kulob, and also to a certain extent in 
Qurghonteppa, worked to maintain their positions in the face of the perestroika 
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bureaucratic reforms. On the other side, regional elites from the Pamirs and Gharm 
(including Gharmis in Dushanbe and Qurghonteppa Province) increasingly began 
to use the political parties and Gorbachev’s reforms as a vehicle to make political 
gains…Soon region of origin became associated with support for, or opposition to, 
the perestroika reforms—both in the bureaucracy in Dushanbe and in the rural areas 
where local elites (for example, collective farm bosses and provincial/district 
leaders) had much to gain or lose from the reforms. 11  
Similar to dynamics taking place in other parts of the USSR, in Tajikistan under the 
leadership of the Tajik Communist First Party Secretary, Qahhor Mahkamov, there was 
a strong unwillingness to instigate Gorbachev’s reform agenda.12 Frustration among the 
opposition groups towards the political status quo turned to rage following Mahkamov’s 
decision to side with Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) hardliners during the 
failed putsch attempt in Moscow in August 1991. Mass demonstrations, largely made up 
of IRP and DPT supporters, were held in Dushanbe demanding Mahkamov’s resignation 
and the banning of the CPT.13 With the failure of the coup attempt in Moscow, and 
mounting protests in Dushanbe, Mahkamov’s position became untenable and he resigned 
on August 23, 1991. The resignation of the republic’s president and the leader of the CPT 
did not placate the opposition, who continued to call for the banning of the CPT, while 
also demanding the legalisation of the IRP, who had remained a banned political group 
in Tajikistan. On August 31, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan elected Qadriddin 
Aslonov to serve as the interim President of Tajikistan.14 The election by the Supreme 
Soviet of Aslonov did not however quell dissent on the streets of Dushanbe, and he, too, 
was forced from office.15 The Supreme Soviet then appointed Rahmon Nabiev, a former 
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First Secretary of the Tajik SSR, to the position of interim president, and chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet.16 
Rather than bringing about calm, the appointment of Nabiev triggered only further 
protests and instability in Dushanbe, and thousands of protesters remained on the streets 
of Dushanbe throughout October, 1991.17 In an attempt to quieten dissent and reduce 
political tensions, Nabiev stood down as the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, lifted the 
state of emergency, postponed the planned presidential election from October 27 to 
November 25, suspended the CPT for two months to allow an investigation into its 
involvement in the August Putsch attempt, and overturned the ban on the formation of 
religious parties, thus allowing the IRP18 to involve itself in the upcoming presidential 
election. These measures taken by Nabiev raised considerable excitement among the 
opposition, who rallied behind the presidential candidacy of Pamiri cinematographer 
Davlat Khudonazarov.19 Nabiev, however, had “managed to rally the majority of the 
northern ‘clans’ around him”, with substantial support for his election coming from his 
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Khojandi brethren and Kulobi allies. This regional support, along with the perception that 
Nabiev represented a “steady and familiar hand” due to his former position as First 
Secretary of the Tajik SSR, propelled Nabiev to victory over Khudonazarov.20 
With the election of Nabiev it was hoped that finally some semblance of stability had 
arrived in Tajikistan. Nabiev had, however, inherited a system of government that stood 
on shaky foundations, and a society that was already deeply fractured. Under Nabiev’s 
leadership, Tajikistan would in only a few short months quickly descend into a level of 
violence and anarchy that would create deep shock throughout the wider region. 
4.2 Iran and the Election of Nabiev 
The convoluted process leading up to the formation of Tajikistan’s first democratically-
elected government under the leadership of “former” communist Nabiev placed Iran in a 
difficult position. As the so-called representative of “Muslims worldwide”, prominent 
members of Iran’s government no doubt would have felt an obligation to support 
Tajikistan’s opposition groups, in particular the IRP, in their attempts to take control of 
the Tajik state against the “repressive” and “atheistic” communist regime represented by 
the Khojandi-Kulobi regional bloc. Throughout 1991, the IRP was front and centre of the 
political developments taking place on the ground in Tajikistan, and were considered to 
be the largest political grouping after the DPT in Tajikistan with more than 30,000 
members.21 The IRP campaigned for “national independence, free elections and a multi-
party democracy, a “decent life” for all citizens regardless of religion or ethnicity, and 
education of the people in Islamic principles”.22 Most important, however, was the IRP’s 
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emphasis on establishing an Islamic state within Tajikistan. According to Nourzhanov 
and Bleuer, the formation of an “Islamic Republic of Tajikistan” in the calculations of the 
IRP would be achieved “through an election victory and then a referendum; however, this 
desired end-state was modified when the IRP realised that this goal was not supported by 
many people in Tajikistan”.23 This lack of support was no surprise considering that Tajik 
Muslims had largely been separated from the rest of the Islamic world for decades, and 
as summed up by Mesbahi, Tajiks had experienced 
intense anti-Islamic state propaganda and socialization, which [had] resulted in the 
general ignorance of the public about Islam, either in its orthodox forms, or the 
politicized “Iranian” version.24  
With this factor in mind, the IRP’s goal of establishing an Islamic state, as was 
consistently stated by its leadership, would come about through gradual rather than 
revolutionary means, and the IRP’s political actions throughout 1991 were 
overwhelmingly cautious, and fell largely within the limited political bounds offered by 
their communist opponents.25 
This caution and the IRP’s consistent declarations that it would heed the democratic 
process unfolding within Tajikistan did not quell suspicions that the organisation was, 
among other things, a Trojan horse for Iranian ideological machinations. These suspicions 
came despite the IRP’s leader Muhammad Sharif Himmatzoda making clear that fears of 
Tajikistan following in the footsteps of Iran were “ridiculous”, adding that: “Although 
Iranians and [Tajiks] come from the same Persian roots and have many cultural 
similarities, Iranians are mainly Shi’ite Muslims, while [Tajiks] are Sunni Muslims.”26 
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Furthermore, Himmatzoda went on to note that it would take at least “70 years” for an 
Islamic state to develop in Tajikistan, and such a process would have to take place 
gradually, adding further:  
There will be a time when Islam will be the state religion and there is no harm in it 
… Islam will not be imposed on others. Jews and Christians will be allowed to 
worship freely. Now many in the West and here also are afraid of fundamentalism 
because fundamentalists are identified as extremists and terrorists. But it really isn't 
so. Fundamentalism is the return to the roots of Islam.27  
Nevertheless, Western and Soviet news media outlets had a field day, likening the IRP’s 
agendas with the revolutionary events that occurred in Iran only a decade earlier, drawing 
parallels which were not only flimsy but at times utterly absurd. Some examples of the 
misinformed stories that were proliferating in the worldwide news media included that 
Tajikistan would become the next state to follow in Iran’s footsteps on the road to an 
“Islamic Revolution”, and that a belt of Islamic fundamentalist states was about to arise 
throughout the Asian continent, filling the void left by communism. According to a 
number of these articles, Tajiks had a stark choice to make, between either the red flags 
of communism or the green flag of Islamic fundamentalism. 28  Iran was indeed 
sympathetic to the views of the IRP, however Iran actively pursued good relations with 
all of the opposition political groups in Tajikistan, whether they were communists, Tajik 
nationalists, or Islamists.29 In the months leading up to independence and the election of 
Nabiev, it was unclear who would end up prevailing in the numerous political conflicts 
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that were taking place in Tajikistan, and Iran was pragmatic and prudent enough not to 
“go all the way” with any one Tajik political grouping. While Iran did have an indirect 
influence on the IRP, through its own Revolution, and a number of influential figures 
within the IRP had adopted Khomeini-like anti-Western and Perso-Islamic nationalist 
discourse in their statements and rhetoric, Iran and its Islamic Revolution did not provide 
the IRP with its ideological framework, nor did it serve as the main source for its 
support.30 Instead, Iran and its revolution acted as inspiration, and had a “demonstration 
effect” upon the IRP in their attempt to challenge the Tajik political status quo. Rather 
than Shi’ite Iran’s somewhat religiously unorthodox revolutionary influence, it was the 
Sunni ideological influences emanating over the southern border from war-torn 
Afghanistan, and from the wider Sunni Islamic world, that were the main ideological 
wellspring for the IRP. This was confirmed by a former Iranian diplomatic official, who 
estimated that at independence, the IRP would have been lucky to have received support 
from 10 to 15 percent of the Tajik population, and it would have been “irrational” for Iran 
to sacrifice its emerging political and economic interests for a group that had such a minor 
backing. The official went on to declare that the majority of Tajikistan’s population, and 
indeed prominent members of the opposition political parties at the time, held strong 
sympathies towards Iran, therefore it was only correct for Iran to cultivate relationships 
and contacts with all political groups no matter their ideological standpoint.31  
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Despite sympathies for the defeated opposition, Iranian officials did not waste any time 
in ensuring the development of cordial relations with the unreconstructed communist 
leader of Tajikistan. On only the first day of his presidency Nabiev received Iranian 
Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati and a multi-ministerial delegation of Iranian 
officials who were midway through a six-country, 10-day visit to the Soviet Union. Iran’s 
official news service, Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, enthusiastically described 
Velayati’s visit to Dushanbe as a successful one that had culminated in the signing of a 
number of cooperation agreements in the areas of politics, education, trade, science, 
transport, and culture. Velayati also visited “sites of cultural significance”, such as the 
statues of Ferdowsi and Avicenna, and for good propagandist measure a local mosque 
where “Islamic slogans” were shouted and no doubt the good feelings towards Iran’s 
revolution could be heard32 However while Tajikistan had claimed its independence in 
September of 1991, and Velayati waxed lyrical about the future prospects of Tajik-Iranian 
relations, Iran still had not recognised the country’s sovereignty. During his visit to 
Tajikistan, Velayati was pressed by journalists about when Iran would officially recognise 
the independence of Tajikistan and the other Soviet successor republics in Central Asia. 
In response, Velayati advised:  
Our [Iran’s] position is clear. We went to these republics through the Moscow gate. 
The Islamic Republic does not intend to take advantage of the existing sensitive 
circumstances in the Soviet Union. We, as a neighbor of the Soviet Union, wish to 
see that their situations return to normal as soon as possible. We respect whatever 
the people of that country as a whole desire, and the republics [of Central Asia] in 
particular. But we have no intention of provoking or speeding up anything….We 
do not intend to dictate anything. We do not intend to contribute toward the further 
deterioration of the situation.33  
                                                 
 
32 "Iranian Foreign Minister, Delegation Arrive," Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First 
Program Network December 3, 1991 [FBIS-SOV-91-232, Daily Report. Soviet Union, December 3, 1991] 
83-84; and "Cooperation Declaration Signed," Dushanbe Radio Dushanbe Network December 2, 1991 
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33  "Velayati on Visit to Soviet Republics," IRIB Television First Program Network December 8, 
1991[Daily Report. Near East & South Asia, FBIS-NES-91-236, December 9, 1991] 67. 
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Velayati continued on to note that while Iran wished to recognise the independence of the 
Soviet successor republics, Iran “was waiting for the legal stages of independence to take 
place”; in other words, when such independence was accepted and approved by 
Moscow.34 Interestingly, in the eyes of Iran’s leadership, if Tajikistan and the other 
successor republics decided to stay in union with Russia, or separate and form their own 
republics, it was of indeed no consequence to Tehran. This was made clear by Rafsanjani 
when he stated: 
We are not upset about the collapse of Marxism at all. As to the future of the Soviet 
Union, what is important is the will of the people…If they decide for all the republics 
to live together; we will be content and be a good neighbor for them…. If the people 
want to be independent and live in separate republics, again we are ready to cooperate 
with all of them. It makes not much difference for us.35 
In somewhat simplistic terms, Iran did not want to “jump the gun” and recognise the 
independence of states such as Tajikistan without ensuring that Russia itself acquiesced 
to such demands for independence.36 
Iran’s caution was due to the fact that Rafsanjani viewed maintaining friendly relations 
with Russia as the ultimate priority when dealing with Tajikistan and Central Asia, a view 
that was confirmed by a former Iranian Foreign Ministry official who noted that 
Tajikistan and the wider Central Asian region was “Russia’s backyard…Iran moved in a 
way as not to disturb Russia”, adding that there was a genuine fear, particularly within 
the Iranian Foreign Ministry, towards actions that could “spoil” what had to that point 
been a massive improvement in relations between the two states since Rafsanjani’s state 
visit to Moscow in 1989.37 Further adding to this was a former senior minister of the 
                                                 
 
34 "Velayati on Recognizing Soviet Republics," Tehran IRIB Television Second Program Network 
December 19, 1991 [FBIS-NES-91-245, December 20, 1991] 39-41. 
35 Patrick E. Tyler, "Iran Is Cautious on Soviet Muslims," New York Times September 19, 1991. 
36 Smolansky, "Turkish and Iranian Policies in Central Asia," 285-86. 
37 Former Iranian foreign ministry official, Recorded interview with author, Tehran, April 28, 2013.  
151 
 
 
Iranian Foreign Ministry who stated that: “Worrying about Russia’s regional interests did 
hurt Iran particularly in the case of not supporting our Muslim brothers in conflicts such 
as in Chechnya and Tajikistan…it hurts but if you look at the long-term benefits to Iran 
and strategic interests I think it was correct that Iran was looking to Moscow rather than 
focusing on issues such as Chechnya, Dagestan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Tajikistan.”38 
This so-called “Russian factor” would be a central element in shaping Iran’s foreign 
agendas and interests in Tajikistan throughout Rafsanjani’s presidency.39 
The underlying cause of this pre-occupation with ensuring friendly, if not correct 
diplomatic relations with Russia was the diabolical economic and political circumstances 
Iran found itself in following the cessation of the Iran-Iraq War in 1989. Iran’s economy 
was in a horrific state, and required considerable technical assistance and investment, 
furthermore the Iranian military was in dire need of rearmament after eight years of fierce 
combat and international arms embargos. Also feeding into Iranian calculations was the 
prospect of increased US regional encroachment. The Soviet Union was seen as a 
potential counterweight to American domination, and the agreements signed between 
Moscow and Tehran were viewed enthusiastically among the Iranian political elite as a 
first step on the road towards a “strategic partnership” between Iran and its giant, albeit 
rapidly-weakening northern neighbour, which could counteract American strategic 
encirclement and blunt the Central Asian inroads of the US and its close ally, Turkey.40 
Therefore on the eve of the Soviet Union’s collapse, Moscow became a key source of 
weapons for Iran’s military, a critical technology provider in a number of different fields, 
a partner in Iran’s domestic economic redevelopment, and a potential strategic ally.41 
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39 Mesbahi, "Iran and Tajikistan," 128. 
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Only a month after Velayati’s visit to Dushanbe, the Soviet Union had taken its last gasp 
of breath and collapsed. With this development Iran scurried to immediately recognise 
Tajik independence.42 The inauguration of Iran’s new embassy on January 9, 1992 on the 
newly re-named “Tehran Street”43 was immediately followed up by a concerted Iranian 
effort to increase its economic and cultural influence within Tajikistan’s borders, both 
officially and “unofficially”. Deputy Foreign Minister Maleki and Ambassador 
Mojtahed-Shabestari spearheaded Iran’s attempts to convince Tajik officials to switch 
from the Cyrillic alphabet script to the Arabic script in the hope of improving societal ties 
between the two “brotherly states”.44 This was backed by Iran’s provision of educational 
materials, which would assist Tajiks in the learning of the Arabic alphabet.45 A former 
                                                 
 
conducting an assertive and politically risky foreign policy in the peripheral Central Asian state of 
Tajikistan was not something that appealed to either Iran’s political elite, or the public in general, and was 
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43 Originally Gorky Street. 
44 Tajiks had long taken pride in their Persian cultural roots and linguistic heritage, a pride which the 
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45 "Iran's Maleki on Expansion of Relations." Furthermore, according to Atkin, “a member of the Iranian 
delegation also stated that his country planned to open a bookstore, to be called al-Hoda (the path to 
salvation) to sell Iranian works on literature, history, and culture”. As of 2013, this store was still in 
operation in the centre of Dushanbe, close to the Presidential administration building, See Muriel Atkin, 
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senior official, reminiscing on this exciting period of relations, gave a clear indication of 
Iran’s initial economic and cultural priorities in Tajikistan: 
Really at that time I was responsible for this region and I did not [involve myself in 
questions of] ideology or political Islam or any of these issues, we [Iran’s Foreign 
Ministry] wanted to help them in the areas of culture, and economy…[and we] tried 
to assist in promoting Tajikistan’s membership to the United Nations. The first time 
the Tajik representative came to Tehran [I went with their delegation to the] UN 
[United Nations], then to ICRO [Islamic Culture and Relations Organisation] and 
also to the ECO [Economic Cooperation Organisation]. I also sought to assist Tajik 
officials in the areas of aviation, tax collection, customs procedures, exports, 
imports, insurance, and banking [–]these are the sort of issues that Iran [initially 
sought to provide assistance] to Tajikistan with.46 
However, Iran’s emphasis on economic and cultural cooperation was driven by much 
more than the kind actions of a “brotherly” and “kindred” state genuinely interested in 
the wellbeing of its close cultural cousins. Rather, Iran’s actions were borne out of the 
strong geopolitical concerns of the Iranian political elite. In particular, there was a genuine 
fear that if Iran did not move quickly to secure its interests in Tajikistan and the wider 
Central Asian region, that it would be left behind in the scramble to influence the region’s 
political and economic trajectory. 
Iran’s major international rival, the United States, directly, and through its proxy, Turkey, 
had made a strong effort from the outset of the collapse of the Soviet Union to marginalise 
and preclude Iran’s participation in regional developments. Turkey’s role, with the 
backing of the United States and its NATO partners, is described by Rashid, wherein: 
“The West pushed Turkey to play a modernizing and moderate role in Central Asia.”47 
After a meeting in Washington on 13 February 1992, President George Bush and Turkish 
Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel pledged to expand aid and other help to Central Asia. 
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46 Former Minister. Recorded interview with author. 
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Bush pointed to Turkey as the model of a democratic, secular state which could be 
emulated by Central Asia. According to Rashid, “US companies were pushed by the US 
government to find Turkish partners with whom to do business in Central Asia”, and “US 
diplomats encouraged Central Asian politicians and bureaucrats to travel to Turkey to see 
a modern country at work”.48 Iranian fears regarding these efforts were apparent in an 
interview conducted with Iranian Ambassador to Tajikistan, Mojtahed-Shabestari, in 
early 1992. When asked by the interviewer about the increased engagement undertaken 
by the United States and Turkey in the region, Mojtahed-Shabestari bristled: 
Because they [the United States] cannot expand their activities in Iran and 
Afghanistan, the Americans are concentrating their activities here [Tajikistan]. 
Turkey has begun extensive cultural and economic cooperation with the Muslim-
inhabited Central Asian republics. Even though its activities in Tajikistan are not as 
extensive as in the other republics, they have increased recently and are expected 
to be further increased when the Turkish prime minister visits Dushanbe.49 
Mojtahed-Shabestari went on to declare that the United States and “other countries” 
(presumably Turkey) were trying to “drive a wedge” between Tajiks and their culture and 
religion. It was therefore up to Iran to preclude this from occurring, and “fortunately” 
since the Iranian embassy had opened 
various cultural exchanges have been expedited…It would be appropriate to 
increase our budget for these exchanges. We should emphasize increasing the signal 
of the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, so that the thirsty people 
of Tajikistan can have access to them and can avoid the channels alien to their true 
Tajik culture.50  
This small-scale, “soft-power” rivalry between Iran and Turkey, and by extension the 
United States in Tajikistan, was at the same time occurring on a broader, much larger 
scale with both states seeking to woo the new Central Asian republics with the possibility 
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of increased economic, cultural, and political ties. For instance, while Turkey busily set 
about forging the Black Sea Economic Organisation, Iran set up its own rival 
organisations such as the Caspian Sea Organisation, and also the much smaller, 
Association of Persian Languages.51 Even within organisations where Iran and Turkey 
had displayed a history of collaboration (albeit on paper), such as within the Economic 
Cooperation Organisation (ECO), there was a rapid shift from cooperation to one of 
rivalry and cheap political point scoring, with both the Turks and Iranians only too willing 
to undercut each other’s regional agendas..52 
Iran’s enthusiasm to instigate close cultural and economic relations with Tajikistan—
although encountering obstacles in the form of rival American and Turkish regional 
ambitions—was reciprocated by Nabiev, who welcomed Iranian political support and 
consistently declared that Iran would be the first country he would visit as independent 
Tajikistan’s first president.53 Nabiev’s positive stance towards Iran came despite pressure 
from the United States, who viewed the prospect of close Iranian-Tajik cooperation in 
cautious terms. During his visit to Dushanbe in February 1992, former US Secretary of 
State James Baker sought to gain a number of assurances from Tajikistan, and declared 
that the United States would not establish diplomatic relations with Dushanbe unless a 
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commitment was made to the Conference on Security and Cooperation’s (CSCE)54 key 
principles of 
[O]pen, democratic elections; human rights, including minority rights; free 
emigration; accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; accession to 
international conventions relating to weapons of mass destruction; strict export 
controls; a defensive military; and a free-market economy, with an agreement to 
pay a fair share of the financial commitments of the former Soviet Union.55 
Nabiev, it seems, was only too willing to tell the US Secretary of State exactly what he 
wanted to hear, and over the course of a two-hour meeting with Baker, Nabiev attempted 
to ingratiate himself and his country to his American visitor, ballyhooing the strategic 
importance and economic potential of a country and region of which Baker seemed to 
have very little knowledge before this visit. 56  Nabiev wished to attract American 
investment and transform Tajikistan into a “market-based economy”, while also seeking 
to assure the US that it would clamp down and forbid the transfer of Soviet inherited 
nuclear expertise. After this blatant attempt at flattery Nabiev, coyly raised the prospect 
of Iranian-Tajik cooperation, and that Iran had recently shown “a lot of interest in 
Tajikistan”. According to Baker’s memoirs, he recoiled at Nabiev’s statement on Iran and 
loudly insisted to Nabiev that 
the Iranian regime seeks to exploit its revolution… “one doesn’t need a crystal ball” 
to see why Iran might be interested in Tajikistan. “If asked for my advice on dealing 
with Iran,” I said bluntly, “I’d respond with two words: be careful”. 57 
Unfortunately for Baker, Nabiev didn’t ask for his advice, and simply nodded in assumed 
agreement and moved on to other matters. 
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Although Nabiev displayed an interest in developing ties with Iran, and consistently 
declared his admiration of Iran’s political, cultural, and economic development, the depth 
of his interest in establishing relations with Iran should not be overstated.58 As can be 
seen in the above exchange with US Secretary of State Baker, Nabiev was a cagey and 
pragmatic political actor who knew that on the international front, Iran could be a useful 
bargaining chip in any interaction with the US, and domestically he could marginalise his 
rivals by playing this same “Iran card”. This was due to the fact that Iran was viewed in 
mostly favourable terms within Tajik domestic society, particularly among nationalists 
who sought stronger cultural links with their Iranian “big-brother”, and with Islamists 
inspired by Iran’s Islamic Revolution.59 More importantly, however, Nabiev’s attempts 
to court Iran never came at the expense of Tajikistan’s broader regional ties. Nabiev was 
adamant that Tajikistan needed to develop good relations with all of its regional 
neighbours, pursuing a non-aligned policy, which would strengthen Tajikistan’s 
independence and allow it room for manoeuvre on the international stage. This was made 
abundantly clear by Nabiev when he declared in early 1992 that Tajik foreign policy 
would be based on “nonalignment and membership of no blocs. Our policy is one of open 
doors to the world. We will adhere to a policy of friendship and good-neighbourliness 
with all who share these principles.”60 Unfortunately for Nabiev the ability to craft such 
a sober external policy was exceedingly difficult in the early months of 1992, and his 
mishandling of Tajikistan’s internal political situation only further drove Tajikistan onto 
the path of war.61 
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Throughout the opening months of 1992, the Nabiev government began legal proceedings 
against a number of members of the DPT, Rastokhez, and the IRP, and also passed 
through new laws which would restrict press freedom and public assembly. These moves 
only added to the already extraordinary tension that existed between Tajikistan’s regional 
and political groupings. This marginalisation of the opposition reached its crescendo in 
March 1992, when Nabiev’s government arrested and sentenced a number of prominent 
opposition figures on at times ludicrous charges.62  In response opposition protesters 
began to mobilise in Shahidon Square, many of whom were bussed into the capital from 
outlying regions.63 The IRP quickly became the most prominent of opposition groups in 
Shahidon Square, due in no small part to the IRPs ability to call on an extensive network 
of supporters throughout rural areas and “mobilise support through mullahs at mosques 
and collective farms”.64 
Taking a maximalist position, the opposition voiced a number of demands, ranging from 
the dismissal of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Safarali Kenjaev—whose sacking of 
the ethnic Pamiri Interior Ministry chief Mamadayoz Navjuvanov led to the first major 
anti-Government demonstrations—and the adoption of a new constitution, to the far-
fetched call for Nabiev to resign.65 Unwilling to cave into what were a somewhat extreme 
set of demands, Nabiev and his government unfortunately only added further fuel to the 
opposition’s fire, organising their own pro-government, “anti-Islamist” (read anti-Gharmi, 
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and Pamiri) demonstration in Ozodi Square, made up predominately of Kulobis.66 Both 
demonstrations continued to grow in size and disorder.67 As the stand-off dragged on 
throughout March, Nabiev became increasingly impotent, and the opposition received a 
major shot in the arm with Tajikistan’s spiritual leader and the highest official Islamic 
clerical representative, Qozikalon Akbar Turajonzoda, and six Sufi leaders offering their 
support for the opposition.68 
The legitimation of the opposition by Tajikistan’s religious elite created deep unease 
within the Nabiev government, who granted the opposition a number of concessions and 
caved into many of their demands, which finally brought an end to the opposition 
protests.69 However these steps to bring about a peaceful solution to the political gridlock 
afflicting Tajikistan had the inverse effect, with pro-government supporters now 
demanding the rescindment of the concessions made to the opposition. Reassured by the 
scale of the pro-government protests taking place in Ozodi Square, and believing they 
had the upper hand over the opposition, the Nabiev government appointed the key actor 
in this ongoing drama, Kenjaev, to chair the State Security Committee (the KGB’s 
successor). Kenjaev only a week earlier had resigned as chairman of the Supreme Soviet, 
thus fulfilling a key opposition demand. The ill-conceived appointment of Kenjaev led to 
the resumption of opposition protests in Shahidon Square, which were now larger and 
more intense than at any period during March and April of 1992. By the end of April as 
many as 100,000 people were on the streets of Dushanbe, with the two opposing 
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demonstrations joined by a third protest of almost 7,000 university students and Dushanbe 
residents in Ayni Square, calling for the cessation of the first two demonstrations.70 
Throughout April, 1992 there was a rapid militarisation on all sides, with the proliferation 
of private armies and militias centring on key regime and opposition strongmen, adding 
another dangerous dimension to Tajikistan’s political stalemate. Nabiev himself was 
complicit in this alarming development, creating his own “national guard” which would 
report directly to him, largely made up of an estimated 400 to 3,000 mainly Kulobi 
demonstrators in Ozodi Square, equipped with small arms appropriated from military 
supply depots.71  On May 5, violent conflict erupted with several people killed at a 
roadblock outside of Dushanbe. It was not long before shootings, pitched battles, and 
killings took place in the centre of Dushanbe. During the night the opposition, better 
organised than Nabiev’s rag-tag, so-called national guard, took over the presidential 
palace, the state television building, Dushanbe’s central railway station, and blocked all 
main thoroughfares into the capital. Chaos ensued as Soviet deputies were taken hostage, 
government ministers fled the city, and the president took refuge in the Supreme Soviet 
building, protected by the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS) 201st Motorised 
Rifle Division (MRD). In this confusion soldiers, police officers, and internal security 
members took sides with many joining the opposition, bringing their weapons with 
them.72 
Russian military officers of the 201st MRD, shocked by the scale of violence taking place, 
attempted to negotiate a truce between the opposing forces, threatening the arrest of 
leaders of both sides if an agreement could not be reached.73 On May 7, a preliminary 
                                                 
 
70 Ibid., 301. 
71 It is estimated that more than 1,700 Kalashnikov rifles were handed to the demonstrators of Ozodi 
Square. See Khaidarov and Inomov, Tajikistan: Tragedy and Anguish of the Nation, 35; Akiner, Tajikistan: 
Disintegration or Reconciliation?, 37. 
72 Nourzhanov and Bleuer, Tajikistan: A Political and Social History, 307. 
73 Ibid., 308. 
161 
 
 
agreement for a coalition Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) was struck with 
all the main government and opposition leaders signing the deal. It included the 
dissolution of Nabiev’s national guards, the removal of road and infrastructure blockades, 
the halting of investigations of opposition figures, and most importantly the breaking up 
and ending of all demonstrations. On May 11, Nabiev’s earlier accession to the 
preliminary accord went even further, whereby he agreed to give eight of the 24 executive 
cabinet positions to the opposition. Although only a third of the cabinet seats were gifted 
to the opposition, the seats that were given represented what was a significant tilt towards 
opposition control over the organs of central power, with the opposition assuming 
authority over the state’s security apparatuses, and a number of its decision-making 
bodies. It was clear that Nabiev and his Khojandi-Kulobi backers had lost out to the 
opposition 74 , and the Ozodi Square demonstrators made a hasty retreat (with their 
weapons) out of Dushanbe, with many heading to Kulob.75 Using Nabiev as a figurehead, 
the opposition quickly set about purging the government of pro-incumbent officials, 
filling the vacuum left by what was largely a Khojandi and Kulobi-dominated government 
with Gharmis and Pamiris, a process which again highlighted the regional basis of the 
Tajik conflict, despite the ideological pretensions of the opposition group’s leaders, 
democrat and Islamist alike.76 
Despite the formation of a government of national “reconciliation”, Tajikistan continued 
to be gripped by heavy fighting between the opposing political and regional factions. 
Almost overnight a Tajik’s region of origin became “a matter of life or death as militias 
and even neighbours began to kill based on a person’s origin”.77 Shockingly, an unnamed 
                                                 
 
74 Kuzmin believed that the deal was not a power-sharing agreement but instead constituted the ‘fall of 
the Nabiev regime’. See A.I. Kuzmin, "Tajikistan: The Causes and Lessons of the Civil War," in Central 
Asia: Political and Economic Challenges in the Post-Soviet Era, ed. Alexei Vassiliev (London: Saqi Books, 
2001), 189. 
75 Ibid., 89. 
76 Nourzhanov and Bleuer, Tajikistan: A Political and Social History, 311. 
77 Ibid., 323.  
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combatant highlighted the immense cruelty of the conflict, declaring that there were “no 
rules” and that “the wounded were not spared, and prisoners were not taken”.78 Although 
nominally headed up by Nabiev—a Khojandi—the GNR was in many respects a Pamiri-
Gharmi politico-regional cabal, and was rejected by the majority of the inhabitants of the 
Hisor, Khojand, and Kulob regions who continued to support the former 
Communist/regionalist status quo. The inhabitants of these regions, in particular those in 
Kulob, had in the preceding months thrown their hefty support behind the incumbent 
government, and were only too willing to take up arms against their former neighbours 
and co-nationals. Both sides began to engage in “population cleansings”, which included 
the sickening wholesale murder and displacement of minority regional groups.79 By June 
1992, Dushanbe was little more than a glorified refugee camp, housing tens of thousands 
of refugees, mainly Gharmis fleeing from Kulob and Qurghonteppa.80 While the GNR 
controlled Dushanbe and the regions of the GBAO and Gharm, the concept of central 
control had virtually collapsed and the government had become largely irrelevant. Instead 
it was the barrel of the gun, and the capabilities of regional warlords, that was the order 
of the day. The uneasy power-sharing agreement that existed throughout 1992 was a farce, 
with not only fighting among the former opposition and the incumbent members, but also 
within the opposition itself.81 Instead of attempting to reconcile and work together on 
their differences, the hastily cobbled together coalition government used their positions 
of power to further enable their supporters to wreak havoc throughout the country. 
                                                 
 
78 Quoted in Kuzmin, "Tajikistan: The Causes and Lessons of the Civil War," 190. 
79 In a very short period of time whole regions and districts became ‘homogenised’. Gharmis were 
expelled from Kulob, and Kulobis were driven from Gharm. In areas such as Qurghonteppa, where there 
was no clear regional majority, internecine warfare took place between Gharmis, Kulobis, and ethnic 
Uzbeks. Refugees streamed out of this district returning to their home regions, Afghanistan, or the capital. 
See Nourzhanov and Bleuer, Tajikistan: A Political and Social History, 325-26. 
80 Parker, Persian Dreams, 67. 
81  Although the so-called Tajik ‘opposition’ gained control over the Tajik government, they will 
continue to be referred to as the opposition. Those groups who continued to support the Communist status 
quo will be referred to as the pro-incumbents. 
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President Nabiev ruled in name only, and by September of 1992 he had resigned and was 
forced from office at gunpoint. 82  Following Nabiev’s capitulation, Akbarsho 
Iskandarov—an ethnic Pamiri—stood in as acting president, instigating efforts to broker 
a ceasefire with the rival Kulobi-Khojandi regional bloc. However, the Kulobis and 
Khojandis had very little appetite for negotiations, as they rapidly sought to reel back the 
gains of the opposition, with Iskandarov promptly resigning on November 10.83 Fighting 
under the banner of the Popular Front, the Khojandis and Kulobis had by December 1992 
overrun Dushanbe, ousting the opposition forces in an attempt to reimpose the pre-GNR 
status quo.84 Dushanbe quickly descended into an orgy of violence, with the Popular 
Front seeking retribution, committing wholesale violence upon the Gharmi and Pamiri 
populations who had remained in the city.85 Following the capitulation of Dushanbe, a 
little-known former Kholkoz director, Emomali Rahmon86 (then Rahmonov) from the 
                                                 
 
82 Holed up and besieged by his opponents at Dushanbe’s airport, Nabiev was forced to resign under 
duress by criminal elements, known as the “youth of Dushanbe”. Under the guidance of the leaders of the 
IRP and DPT, this group of young hoodlums held Nabiev hostage at gunpoint. In such circumstances it is 
easy to understand why Nabiev signed a hastily cobbled-together “statement of resignation”. Kuzmin, 
"Tajikistan: The Causes and Lessons of the Civil War," 190. 
83 Following the resignation of Iskandarov and his government, the 26th Session of the Supreme Soviet 
was held in the city of Khojand, far from the fighting taking place around the capital and the south of the 
country. Among other decisions made, the session elected Emomali Rahmon as the chair of the legislature 
and the head of state. None of the ministers involved in the GNR agreement were given ministerships, 
instead every ministry would be headed by Kulobis or Khojandis. See Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Why Did 
Nationalism Fail in Tajikistan?," Europe-Asia Studies 48, no. 7 (1996): 1113. 
84 The Popular Front was made up largely of Kulobis and was led by a noted criminal, Sangak Safarov. 
The group had strong support from Khojand and was heavily backed by Uzbekistan (with Russia, who had 
grown increasingly tired of the conflict, supported Uzbekistan’s position on the Popular Front) who 
provided heavy weaponry, aviation support, and even regular army units to assist the Popular Front, making 
short work of the opposition’s rag-tag forces. By the spring of 1993 the pro-incumbent forces, spearheaded 
by the Popular Front, controlled 90 percent of Tajikistan’s territory. See Nourzhanov and Bleuer, 
Tajikistan: A Political and Social History, 328; Kuzmin, "Tajikistan: The Causes and Lessons of the Civil 
War," 191. 
85 Nourzhanov and Bleuer, Tajikistan: A Political and Social History, 328. 
86 Rahmon, a client of the warlord Sangak Safarov, had risen fast in the preceding months, promoted 
from a sovkhoz chairman to the Kulob chairmanship—a post he held for only a month before being thrust 
into the most powerful position in Tajikistan. Although initially seen as a weak and malleable leader who 
was nothing more than Safarov’s puppet, Rahmon managed to outwit his allies and enemies alike and 
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district of Kulob was installed as chairman of the Supreme Soviet—a position which in 
effect made him the de-facto leader of Tajikistan. Rahmon, with the support of Kulobi 
warlords and external backers Russia and Uzbekistan, quickly set about consolidating 
power, marginalising enemies and allies alike, and extending central control beyond 
Dushanbe’s city limits; a slow, violent and messy process, which culminated in a low-
level, yet extremely cruel conflict that continued until 1997.87 
4.3 Iran’s Role in the Violent Events of 1992 
The violence of 1992 is arguably one of the most controversial and divisive periods of 
Iran’s early involvement in post-Soviet Tajikistan. A number of authors88 have asserted 
to varying degrees that Iran was in fact a key force behind the outbreak of the civil war 
in Tajikistan in May 1992. On the other hand there is a “remarkable consensus”89 of 
authors and observers90 who hold that Iran either could not, or did not, play an active role 
in the terrible events of 1992. This split within the literature is also borne out in the 
author’s personal interviews and discussions that took place in Dushanbe and Tehran in 
2013, where a number of key actors and observers who had first-hand experience of the 
Tajik Civil War displayed a highly divergent, yet entrenched set of positions on Iran’s 
involvement in the events that led to the civil war. Although this is the case and the biases 
                                                 
 
remains president of Tajikistan to the time of writing. Akbarzadeh, "Why Did Nationalism Fail in 
Tajikistan?," 1113. 
87 Low-level conflict continued to take place from the end of 1992, until the signing of the 1997 peace 
accords in the remote mountainous areas of Gharm and Tavildara, and in the Afghan border regions of 
Kulob and Qurghonteppa. See. Nourzhanov and Bleuer, Tajikistan: A Political and Social History, 329. 
88 Parker, Persian Dreams, 69; Rashid, Resurgence of Central Asia, 181; Kuzmin, "Tajikistan: The 
Causes and Lessons of the Civil War," 175-219; Khaidarov and Inomov, Tajikistan: Tragedy and Anguish 
of the Nation, 17. 
89 Sergei Gretsky, "Civil War in Tajikistan and Its International Repercussions," Critique: Journal for 
Critical Studies of the Middle East Spring, no. 6 (1995): 17. 
90 See for example, Roy, The Civil War; Hunter, "Iran's Pragmatic Regional Policy, 133-47; Atkin, 
"Iran, Russia and Tajikistan's Civil War," 361-76; Mesbahi, "Iran and Central Asia: Paradigm and Policy"; 
"Tajikistan, Iran, and the International Politics of the ‘Islamic Factor’, 141-58; Akiner, Tajikistan: 
Disintegration or Reconciliation? 
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of those interviewed must be accounted for, a clear picture of Iranian involvement in 
Tajikistan throughout 1992 does emerge from the existing literature, and is supplemented 
by the aforementioned interviews. 
In the early months of 1992, Iran did not play a direct role in the instigation of protests 
that eventually spiralled into violent conflict and ripped Tajikistan apart for more than 
five years, despite the often loud, albeit sporadic, views to the contrary.91 The impetus for 
these protests and the concomitant violence was solely derived from the domestic local 
and political dynamics as described above, and cannot and should not be placed at the 
feet of any external party, whether that be Iran, Russia, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, or 
Pakistan. Iran did however seek to surreptitiously increase its influence and make political 
gains during the chaos unfolding on the streets of Dushanbe that began in March 1992, 
as did all the other aforementioned external parties. This influence, like most of Iran’s 
foreign policies was reactive, opportunistic, and multifaceted. 
On an official level, Iran’s embassy in Dushanbe repeatedly insisted that negotiations 
needed to take place between the opposition factions throughout the March cycle of 
protests. The spectre of violent conflict between the opposing forces had been so 
concerning to Tehran that—according to a former Iranian diplomatic official—President 
Rafsanjani, made a personal phone call to Nabiev pleading with him to negotiate with the 
opposition in full and open terms, and attempted to relay to Nabiev the threat that conflict 
in Tajikistan posed not only to the Tajik people, but also the whole region. Rafsanjani 
even offered his own services in mediating between the two parties—an offer that was 
                                                 
 
91 For example, the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, James Woolsey, during a US 
Senate Intelligence Committee Hearing in January 1994, stated that: “Terrorism remains a central tool for 
Iran’s leaders in seeking to accomplish these objectives, and Iranian support for Hizballah and other such 
groups from Algeria to Tajikistan has not abated.” Effectively Woolsey linked Iran’s so-called 
ideologically-driven approach taken in the Middle East context to its policies in Tajikistan. See US Select 
Committee of Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Risks to the United States and Its 
Interests Abroad, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1994), 8. 
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firmly rejected.92 This offer was again repeated by Rafsanjani during Nabiev’s visit to 
Tehran in June 1992, however Nabiev continued to reject Iran’s offers of mediation. 
Nabiev’s June 1992 visit to Iran is often cited as a key example of Iran’s close ties with 
Tajikistan’s government during this period of upheaval. However, the opposition had 
been very critical of Nabiev’s foreign policy, particularly of his efforts to build ties with 
Iran, which they felt did not go far enough, and it appears that Nabiev’s June visit to 
Iran—that took place while fighting continued to rage in his country—was used as a 
means to silence the criticism of his opposition partners. However, this effort backfired, 
with his opposition partners unwilling to join him on the trip to Iran, which only further 
isolated Nabiev and gave off the obvious impression that he was politically isolated and 
lacked coalition support as president of the republic. Furthermore, despite the fact that a 
range of agreements in the fields of trade, banking, finance, culture, and science were 
signed, and that Iran pledged to provide Tajikistan with $50 million in aid, Nabiev was 
lame-duck president who oversaw a country that lacked central control, and a leader who 
had very little ability to fully wield the benefits of independence. His visit should be 
viewed in such light, and its significance should not be over-exaggerated.93  In fact, 
Nabiev came to grow extremely suspicious of Iran, whom he believed was heavily 
supporting his political rivals, a suspicion which he confirmed following his ouster in 
September 1992.94 
                                                 
 
92  Former Iranian Diplomat. Personal communication with author. 
93 Mesbahi, "Iran and Tajikistan," 130; Khaidarov and Inomov, Tajikistan: Tragedy and Anguish of the 
Nation, 27. In an interview, Nabiev expressed his displeasure at those movements and individuals who “did 
not want to improve the situation” in Tajikistan, and “for reasons unknown” did not take part in the trip to 
Iran. See "Nabiyev Interviewed on Iran, Pakistan Trips," 75-76; Maqsudal Hasan Nuri, "Tajikistan in the 
1990s," Spotlight on Regional Affairs XV, no. 9 (1996): 14. 
94 When asked how strong the opposition’s military position was in Dushanbe by a journalist, Nabiev 
bristled: “You know perfectly well that they are getting help from Afghanistan and Iran.” "Ex-President 
Nabiyev on Situation in Republic," Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta November 3, 1992 [FBIS-SOV-92-214, 
Daily Report. Central Eurasia, November 4, 1992] 61. 
167 
 
 
For its part, Iran was clearly apprehensive regarding Tajikistan’s domestic situation, and 
its consistent calls for mediation pointed to the fact that there was awareness in Tehran 
that the GNR status quo, with Nabiev at the helm, could not and would not hold for long. 
However, while calling for mediation, Iran was also playing a double game, ensuring that 
it was in a strong position to benefit from the possibility that Nabiev would be ousted. 
Iran felt its political interests could be best served by supporting an opposition whose 
groups made no secret of their admiration for Iran, and throughout early 1992 Iran 
attempted to further cultivate its ties and “unofficial” relations with the opposition groups, 
a fact that is confirmed by a number of sources, particularly Russians and Tajiks who 
were on the ground in Dushanbe at this time. One of the most prominent of these sources 
was Safarali Kenjaev, who asserted that the Iranian embassy funnelled almost 1.5 million 
roubles to Turajonzoda alone from July to November 1992. Although this is not a large 
sum, due to the poor exchange rate for the rouble at the time, Kenjaev believed that Iranian 
funds were sufficient enough to allow opposition leaders to purchase weapons and other 
inventory. 95  According to Russian Foreign Ministry officials, Iran had provided 
                                                 
 
95  See Safarali Kenjaev, Perevorot V Tadzhikistane [Upheaval in Tajikistan] vol. 1 (Dushanbe: 
Dushanbinkiy Polifgrafkombinat, 1996), cited in Parker, Persian Dreams, 71. Kuzmin, quoting the Novoe 
Vremya weekly, claimed that in only 50 days Iran had spent up to $10 million in supporting the protests in 
Shahidon Square. See Kuzmin, "Tajikistan: The Causes and Lessons of the Civil War," 188. Adding to 
these Russian accounts is that of former Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamishin, who 
declared that: “At the beginning of the turmoil the Iranians were quite active: they were the first to open 
the embassy and their diplomats were seen handing out cash to Tajiks. Tehran surely had nothing against 
planting an obedient government in Dushanbe.” See Anatoly Adamishin, "Tajikistan: Lessons of 
Reconciliation," Russia in Global Affairs, (October 7, 2012). http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Tajikistan-
Lessons-of-Reconciliation-15695, accessed February 11, 2015. Aside from these Russian views an 
interesting eyewitness account is given by Rashid who claims: “In October [1992] when the entire foreign 
diplomatic corps from six countries resident in Dushanbe numbered around 20 diplomats, the Iranian 
mission alone comprised 21 official diplomats and some 50 unofficial diplomats.…At Dushanbe’s central 
mosque, teachers at the new madrassa built by Qazi [Turajonzoda] proudly claimed that the building has 
been built with Iranian funds, that their salaries were paid by Teheran.” However, Rashid goes on to note 
that Iran was pursuing a “broad-based policy” supporting not just one group or actor, but all sides in the 
knowledge “no one party had either the mandate or the military clout to assert itself across the country”. 
See Rashid, Resurgence of Central Asia, 180-81. 
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significant funding to the opposition groups in Shahidon Square96 in March 1992, and on 
a number of occasions Russian intelligence services had caught Iranian agents “red-
handed” seeking to assist the opposition protest groups through the provision of aid and 
other funds.97 This support should not be considered far-fetched, and is confirmed by a 
former Iranian Foreign Ministry official who advised the author that Iran did indeed 
provide food and provisions to the opposition protests. However in conceding this, he 
also pointed out that Iran also provided similar support to groups that were generally pro-
incumbent in their political outlook.98 However, a former advisor to President Rahmon 
went even further than most observers, claiming that Iran’s support for the opposition 
while Nabiev was in power throughout 1992 went well beyond aid in the form of food 
and basic provisions. Instead the advisor declared that: 
[N]obody acknowledges that the war started with the initiative of Iran. The essence 
of this is that after the collapse of the Soviet Union the Iranian politicians attempted 
to win the influence over our religious leaders and create in Tajikistan a state similar 
to the Iranian model. Therefore they were provided with the religious literature and 
weaponry. This helped our opposition to gain power, and relying on Iran, to create 
in and outside of Tajikistan armed formations. This led to the civil war.99 
                                                 
 
96 Iranian support of these protests was placed into sharp relief by the fact that many of the protesters 
were chanting proto-Iranian slogans, and holding placards that included terms such as “Death to America” 
[Marg ba Amriko] and other pro-Iranian revolutionary slogans. Although symbolic, according to a number 
of authors and observers these actions were little more than “haphazard and reactive sloganism” that was 
grassroots in nature, rather than inspired by outsiders. See Mesbahi, "Iran and Tajikistan," 121. This was 
also considered to be the case by a prominent Tajik scholar who believed that the slogans and actions of 
the protests in Shahidon Square reflected “confusion” among the protesters rather than strong support for 
an Iranian-like revolution. Independent Historian. Recorded interview with author, Dushanbe, May 31, 
2013. 
97 In Parker’s interviews with Russian Foreign Ministry officials there were a number of claims that 
Iran had provided significant funds to the opposition and when caught, the Russian government would take 
the evidence directly to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, “which of course denied any wrongdoing”. See 
Parker, Persian Dreams, 74. 
98 The official gave the example of Iran providing aid to Kulobis who had been starving due to an 
opposition blockade of their region in 1992. Former Iranian foreign ministry official. Recorded interview 
with author.  
99 Former Presidential Advisor, Recorded interview with author, Dushanbe, June 4, 2013. 
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This view was consistently rebuffed by Iranian officials interviewed, with a former 
diplomatic official strongly denying such suggestions as baseless and “sheer 
nonsense”.100 
Although there is the possibility that despite the public pronouncements of Iranian 
officials such as Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmoud Va’ezi, who denied that Iran 
supplied weapons to the opposition, Iran did in fact do so.101 However, confirming this is 
almost impossible, and if Iran was providing weapons it was unlikely to have been to the 
extent that is claimed by elites in Moscow, and would have been limited at best.102 Iran 
had neither the capacity nor the inclination to provide so much support, and many of the 
weapons the opposition seem to have acquired were from the same military stores as those 
used by the pro-government forces, with many former soldiers and interior officials 
defecting to the opposition in the early months of 1992. Furthermore, a stream of weapons 
and other equipment from bordering war-torn Afghanistan would have been much easier 
for the Tajik opposition to obtain. 
Adding further difficulties in understanding Iran’s actual support of the opposition 
throughout 1992 is the fact that even within Iran’s government itself there were divergent 
interests and forces at play when it came to Tajikistan. In the author’s discussions with 
the former Iranian Foreign Ministry official, an interesting anecdote relating to the 
complexity and dual tracks of Iran’s foreign policy was made. According to this official, 
Iran’s Foreign Ministry placed its support behind all opposition elements, whether they 
were nationalist, democratic, or Islamist, however at the same time Iran’s Ministry of 
                                                 
 
100  Former Iranian Diplomat. Personal communication with author. 
101 According to Va’ezi, a number of Tajik political groups asked Iran to ship weapons, however Iran 
refused the request. "Iran Refuses to Ship Arms to Tajik Political Groups," Moscow ITAR-TASS October 
28, 1992 [FBIS-SOV-92-211, Daily Report. Central Eurasia, October 30, 1992] 11. 
102 For instance, despite having “no reliable sources on the ground” former Russian Foreign Minister, 
Andrey Kozyrev claimed that the “chorus of accusations” flowing from “every” Central Asian leader had 
persuaded him that Iranian money and weapons were flowing to the opposition in Tajikistan. Quoted in 
Parker, Persian Dreams, 84. 
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Information (The Ministry of Intelligence and National Security - MOIS) was also 
providing its own backing and support solely to the Islamist elements of the opposition 
in the hope they would eventually gain power over the secular, democratic, and nationalist 
opposition elements. In the words of the foreign ministry official: 
The divergent policies of the Ministry of Information and the Foreign Ministry did 
not cause a split [or conflict] between the ministries—we all wanted to keep the 
opposition government in power against the former Communists [following the 
GNR agreement], however there was a preference, particularly within the Ministry 
of Information for the IRP leaders to have a bigger role in the provisional 
government [GNR], nevertheless this support was mainly financial and did not 
despite the accusations of the West include the supply of weapons.103 
These comments only further illustrate the complex and multifaceted nature of Iran’s 
foreign policies, and the fact that Iran did not even have a coherent approach towards the 
opposition itself, let alone Tajikistan more broadly. 
On the question of Iran’s support of Islamism and the IRP in Tajikistan, it is clear that 
Iran’s elites were aware of the possibilities of expanding their Islamic revolutionary 
influence in Tajikistan, and as noted above there were elements within the MOIS who 
wanted the IRP to take a greater role in Tajik political life. However, the idea that Iran 
supported the IRP purely due to ideological considerations should be debunked. Iranian 
elites were well aware of the ideological fissures that existed between their Shi’a Islamic 
Revolution and the Sunni-inspired ideology of the IRP, and that the IRP was basically a 
Gharm-based regional faction using religion as an ideological shield for its own narrow 
material and regional interests.104 Iran’s support for the IRP was based not on the fact that 
it was the most ideological, but rather because it was the strongest of the opposition 
groups, with the best chance of succeeding in the conflict among the opposition and pro-
incumbent forces. If anything, Iran’s support for the IRP throughout 1992 was undeniably 
                                                 
 
103 Former Iranian foreign ministry official. Recorded interview with author. 
104 For a history of why the IRP found most of its support within the Gharm district see Mullojonov, 
"The Islamic Clergy in Tajikistan since the End of the Soviet Period," 221-268. 
171 
 
 
sober and pragmatic, and punctuated by a healthy dose of political scepticism. As 
highlighted by Mesbahi, Iran’s “overall policy” towards the opposition and in particular 
its apparent support of the IRP could be “characterised as sceptical optimism, reflecting 
scepticism in practice and substance and optimism in the realm of possibilities”.105 
Mesbahi goes on further to declare that between May and October 1992, Iran could have 
“easily exploited” the IRP’s wish to establish an Islamic state. However, Iran’s support 
of the IRP was “hesitant if not passive” and this hesitation was a reflection of Iran’s 
awareness that the “clash in Tajikistan, as elsewhere in Central Asia, while couched in 
ideological terms, reflected tribal, regional, and ethnic differences, rather than an 
immediate receptivity to an Islamic alternative.”106 In the bluntest of terms, a former 
Iranian statesman with significant first-hand diplomatic experience in Tajikistan and 
Central Asia summed up the Tajik Civil War as follows: “That war in Tajikistan was a 
village conflict! It had nothing to do with Islam!” The official went on to declare that 
although there were “of course Muslim forces” involved in the conflict, overall the Tajik 
Civil War had nothing to do with any “Communism versus Islam dynamic”.107 It seems 
as 1992 wore on this view became the ascendant one in Tehran, and as the pro-incumbent 
forces began to reconsolidate their power Iran was unwilling to back the IRP’s somewhat 
flimsy Islamist agendas to the extent it required to truly rule Tajikistan. This view is 
highlighted by noted expert Roy, who states that Iran’s relationship with the IRP was 
based on a double misunderstanding. According to Roy, “the IRP was never ready to enter 
the fold of the Iranian revolution or to become a tool of Iran’s regional strategy. On the 
other hand, Iran’s support for the IRP was limited by its wish not to antagonise either 
Russia or the Turkic republics. For Iran, Tajikistan was a figure in a far broader 
picture.”108 
                                                 
 
105 Mesbahi, "Iran and Tajikistan," 126. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Former Iranian Ambassador. Personal communication with author. 
108 Roy, The Foreign Policy, 15. 
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In sum, throughout the period of heaviest fighting and political upheaval of 1992, Iran 
was neither the omnipresent force of ill behind every opposition deed, nor was it an 
innocent and completely neutral actor that many of its leaders claim. The truth it seems 
is somewhere in between. In similar respects to most other contexts and circumstances 
when analysing Iran, its actions should neither be overstated, nor understated. However, 
after extensive discussions with both Iranian and Tajik observers, it can be concluded that 
Iran did provide financial assistance to a limited extent to the opposition, namely those 
linked to the IRP. But Iran’s support for a so-called Islamic revolution in Tajikistan was 
half-hearted at best. Iran was not driven by ideological concerns. Instead its leaders 
supported the groups that would best forward Iran’s political and strategic interests, which 
just happened to be the IRP. Indeed it could be argued that if Rastokhez, a pro-Iranian 
cultural organisation, was as well organised as the IRP, Iran would have thrown the 
weight of its support behind it.  
Further, the claim that Iran was directly providing weapons to the opposition is one that 
cannot be substantiated, and is a moot point nonetheless due to the fact that the opposition 
could have used Iranian financial assistance to buy weapons smuggled from Afghanistan 
anyway. Iran’s support should not be overstated, and cannot be considered to have been 
at a level to have drastically changed the events and outcomes of 1992 in Tajikistan, 
processes which were almost entirely indigenous in nature. It is also just as unlikely that 
Iran was simply acting in a charitable manner, providing food and blankets to the 
“oppressed” opposition groups and their supporters.109 Accepting such a view would be 
naïve in the extreme. Without a doubt, in the early months of 1992 Iran wanted the 
                                                 
 
109  Khaidarov and Inomov are particularly scathing in their assessment of Iran’s support of the 
opposition. According to their account, Iran paid for “independent” Tajik journalists to travel to Iran and 
also provided stipends, while all supporters who protested in Shahidon Square were paid for by Iran. 
Furthermore, “Iranian businessmen “tried to win over public opinion to their side. They often established 
contacts with representatives of anti-government parties and movements.…According to witnesses [Iran’s] 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary associated with representatives of the opposition, 
employees of the kaziat [Akbar Turajonzoda] more often than he did with the employees of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan.” Khaidarov and Inomov, Tajikistan: Tragedy and Anguish of the Nation, 26.  
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opposition to defeat the pro-incumbent opposition forces, and—as noted by one former 
Tajik government official—Iran’s support of the opposition was sufficient enough to 
provide it “with the oxygen to survive and carry out its activities”110 and despite the 
denials of Iranian officials, some credence should at least be given to such views. 
4.4 Iran, the ‘Defeat’ of the Opposition, and Rahmon 
The Popular Front’s victory over the opposition in late 1992, with the support of Russia 
and Uzbekistan, instigated deep soul-searching in Tehran.111 It was apparent that not 
enough material support or ideological guidance was given to the opposition, and it seems 
that Iran was never really willing (or capable) of providing the support the opposition 
required. Instead, when the opposition needed Iran the most, it wasn’t there. Had Iran 
been willing or able to provide adequate support to the opposition, a new regime under 
Rahmon, and a posse of Kulobi warlords deeply hostile towards Iran, may not have firmly 
entrenched themselves in Dushanbe, and pushed the opposition out of Tajikistan into a 
northern Afghanistan exile. 
Iranian leaders were fully aware that by the end of 1992 there was no chance of the 
opposition taking control of the Tajik state, particularly in the face of Russia112 and 
Uzbekistan’s military support of the Popular Front, which included the supply and use of 
heavy military equipment by Uzbekistan, and the eventual deployment of Russian troops 
upon Tajikistan’s Afghan border; a move which only further stifled the opposition’s 
ability to challenge the Tajik government. Iran felt that Moscow in particular had too 
                                                 
 
110 In particular, Iran’s alleged support of the IRP was seen as a major factor in its eventual dominant 
role in the opposition. Tajik International Relations Scholar, Recorded interview with author, Dushanbe, 
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readily taken the military route in dealing with the conflict in Tajikistan, and its patronage 
of the Popular Front would only further contribute to the destabilisation of Tajikistan, and 
that a political solution would eventually be required to end the conflict.113 Furthermore, 
Iran was unimpressed with the role of Uzbekistan, who under leader Islam Karimov had 
made a number of inflammatory statements against Iran, which were viewed in Tehran 
as nothing more than an oleaginous attempt by Uzbekistan to ingratiate itself with the US 
and further isolate Iran from the region.114 
In response to the growing influence of Russia and Uzbekistan in Tajikistan, Iran on a 
number of occasions in late 1992 and early 1993 offered its services in attempting to 
resolve the conflict in Tajikistan, suggesting a joint Russian-Iranian peace initiative which 
was rejected outright by both Rahmon and the Boris Yeltsin-led Russian government, 
who viewed the conflict as good as over “except for the shouting”, and strongly criticised 
Tehran for its foolhardy embrace of an opposition that they believed had been soundly 
defeated on the battlefield.115 In these circumstances, Iran knew that it was critical to keep 
the opposition afloat if it was to maintain any semblance of influence in Tajikistan moving 
forward, and was “the only way of convincing the Dushanbe regime and its regional 
supporters to take the opposition seriously”.116 This support would engender a difficult 
balancing act for Tehran. For instance, if Iran provided too much support to the opposition, 
or openly and aggressively undermined Tajikistan’s new regime, its substantive links with 
Moscow—which had already been placed in jeopardy in the preceding months by Iran’s 
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support of the opposition—could be permanently damaged, thus impacting Iran’s broader 
regional position. Furthermore, if Iran did not provide enough support to the opposition, 
it would be pilloried at home, and have its legitimacy as the centre for worldwide Islamic 
activism increasingly questioned, something that had already occurred with the radical 
Iranian press attacking Rafsanjani and the foreign ministry’s117 “mishandling” of the 
situation in Tajikistan. This political dilemma only further highlighted Iran’s caution, 
adaptability, and the flexibility it had displayed from the outset of Tajikistan’s 
independence and slide into civil war. 
The opposition at the end of 1992 was in tatters. The democrats, and those of a secular or 
nationalist bent, had scattered themselves throughout Tajikistan and the wider region, 
with their leaders taking sanctuary in both Tehran and Moscow.118 The IRP had lived to 
fight another day, setting up its main camp in the northern Afghanistan town of Taloqan, 
with its leaders either taking sanctuary under the watchful eye of the Afghan mujahedeen 
or in Tehran, where they were provided with accommodation and financial support by the 
Islamic Republic.119 From this low point, the IRP sought to regroup and rearm itself, and 
with a number of other smaller political groupings formed a united front, the Movement 
for Islamic Revival in Tajikistan (MIRT), which would coordinate the Islamist’s military 
and political initiatives.120 This newly-formed group was led by former IRP ruling council 
member Sayed Abdullo Nuri, while Tajikistan’s former official clerical chief (qozikalon), 
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Akbar Turajonzoda, was named first deputy of the organisation.121 Iran did support the 
MIRT, but this support was not enough to please MIRT leaders who openly criticised 
Iran’s lack of assistance, and instead received the majority of their backing—particularly 
in the form of weaponry—from their Afghan Tajik brethren and the Afghan mujahedeen. 
According to Akiner, this support from different factions within chaotic Afghanistan was 
substantial, and the MIRT’s links with Afghan warlord, Ahmad Shah Massoud, were 
particularly strong. 122 More importantly, low-level northern Afghan field commanders 
often acted independently of their Afghan superiors in assisting the MIRT who, funded 
by the trade in narcotics, were able to continue to take the fight up to the Russians and 
the Tajik government.123 
By the middle of 1993 the MIRT had effectively regrouped, and launched numerous raids 
across the Afghan border into Tajikistan, frustrating Moscow and thus forcing it to send 
more troops into Tajikistan, leading to public fears that Russia could potentially find itself 
mired in “another Afghanistan”. According to Nourzhanov, by July 1993 the opposition 
had an estimated 8,000 combatants in northern Afghanistan, and 2,000 in Tajikistan 
proper, and those based in Afghanistan had confronted the 16,000 Russian border guards 
in more than 400 cross-border combat engagements in 1993 alone.124 These frustratingly 
frequent cross-border raids by the opposition, who adopted guerrilla tactics not dissimilar 
to those used by the Afghan mujahedeen during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, 
put paid to the suggestion by Kremlin officials that the Tajik Civil War had effectively 
ended with the Popular Front’s takeover of Dushanbe, further highlighting the crucial 
need for a political solution to the ongoing conflict. However, the real turning point in 
shifting Moscow’s attitude to the circumstances on the ground in Tajikistan was the razing 
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of a Russian-manned border post by Tajik opposition militants, reinforced by Afghan 
mujahedeen in July 1993, which led to the death of 22 Russian Border Guards and three 
soldiers from the 201st MRD.125 
The razing of Border Post No. 12 provoked fury in Moscow, and a realisation that Iran 
and Russia needed to work together in bringing the two rival Tajik sides to the negotiating 
table.126 However, even if this event had not occurred, it was apparent that a military 
stalemate had taken shape between the government and the opposition. The opposition 
was strong enough not avoid defeat by the government of Rahmon, who despite forming 
an army of almost 11,000 men—backed by 5,500 loyal supporters of the Interior Ministry 
and the presence of Russians in the south—could not dislodge the opposition. On the flip 
side of the coin, the opposition’s military strength was not sufficient enough to project 
power into the northern regions and the capital. In these circumstances, Iran again pushed 
Russia to embrace a political solution to the conflict. In the words of Nourzhanov, Russia 
had two options: 
Either to become directly involved in the intra-Tajik conflict and face the prospect 
of Afghanistan Mk II, or to foster stability by political means while maintaining a 
strong military presence in this strategically important part of the world.127 
With domestic pressure at home, and an unwillingness to overcommit itself, Moscow 
decided on the latter option, restricting its troops to border-protection operations and 
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peacekeeping, while attempting to seek a political solution to the ongoing conflict. Iran 
was only too happy to assist in such political endeavours, but insisted that its interests and 
importance within Tajikistan had to be “acknowledged” by Russia.128 Russia was well 
aware that Iran’s influence could be used to bring the opposition to heel, and was willing 
to acquiesce to Iran’s somewhat vain political demands. Reflecting on this period of 
Iranian-Russian relations, a former Iranian diplomatic official believes Russia was 
unwilling to accept that Iran was a “player” in Tajikistan, and unfortunately carried an 
old “Soviet mindset”, which delayed peace talks from eventually taking place. 
Furthermore, according to the official, Russia did not want to give Iran “a slice of the 
cake” and it “should have understood from the beginning” that Iran was an integral and 
indefatigable component of Tajikistan’s political landscape and culture, and by the middle 
of 1993 this “fact” had finally been acknowledged by the Kremlin, thus paving the way 
for the first of what would be a long series of negotiations between the Tajik government 
and the opposition to take place.129 
4.5 Brokering a Peace in Tajikistan 
As 1993 drew to a close and Russia grappled with how to best cope with what seemed to 
be a never-ending cycle of violence on the Tajik-Afghan border, Iran continued its 
attempts to become a central player in any future political settlement of the Tajik conflict, 
while also attempting to maintain “generally normal relations with the regime in 
Dushanbe—again underlining Tehran’s desire and objective of convincing all other actors 
of its prominent role in Tajikistan”.130 On both fronts, Iran encountered difficulties. As 
Russia became increasingly convinced of the vital need for a political solution to the 
conflict, it assumed the lead role in designing the framework for peace negotiations 
between the two opposing sides in the Tajik conflict, thus undermining Iran’s attempt to 
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become the “central player” in Tajikistan. Furthermore, Iran’s relationship with the Tajik 
government under Rahmon was cold at best, and in no respects could it be considered 
“normal”. While Iran continued to sponsor and fund cultural and educational initiatives, 
the distribution of humanitarian aid, and made a number of positive statements, and 
expressions of goodwill towards Tajikistan,131  in practice Iran sought to deliberately 
avoid close ties with the government in Dushanbe, while increasingly becoming the 
political patron of the opposition. A major example of this was Rafsanjani’s much-
publicised visit to Central Asia in October 1993. During this trip he visited all of the 
Central Asian republics, except Tajikistan, a gesture which observers believed was aimed 
at undermining the legitimacy of Rahmon’s government, while supporting the 
opposition.132 For its part, under Rahmon the Tajik government viewed Iran suspiciously 
and turned ever more closely towards Uzbekistan and Russia for its political support and 
guidance. 
Following the massacre of Border Post No. 12, Russian and Iranian officials engaged in 
frequent talks with their respective clients in the opposition and in the Tajik government, 
consistently pointing out that the civil war could not be solved through military means, 
and that a political solution would be required sooner, rather than later.133 This was a 
difficult process for both the Russians and the Iranians alike, with both sides having to 
deal with increasingly truculent and unwilling actors within both the opposition and the 
Tajik government. Rahmon’s government in particular was unwilling to negotiate with 
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the opposition, causing considerable frustration in Moscow. For instance, in May 1993 
Rahmon made his views towards the opposition very clear stating:  
It is a fact that in its [the opposition’s] composition there are professional murderers, 
cut-throats, aggressors, and thieves who plunder their own people and can hardly 
be called democrats…It is not worth sitting down at the negotiating table with the 
opposition leaders because they should have been answerable to the law of the 
people for what they had done against their people. 134  
Although these discussions were important, the key turning point of 1993 was the visit of 
the director of the Russian Intelligence Services, Yevgenii Primakov, to Kabul and 
Tehran in July and August 1993 as Yeltsin’s special envoy to the Tajik crisis.135 Meeting 
with MIRT chief Nuri in Kabul, Primakov was given a number of encouraging signs 
relating to the opposition’s willingness to negotiate. Although the talks with Nuri had 
been “extremely frank”, Primakov felt positive that Nuri wanted an end to the conflict, 
and would be open to negotiations with Rahmon.136 Nuri further stated that he would 
attempt to calm down the attacks that were taking place on the border. According to 
Primakov, Nuri had given a firm indication of the opposition’s eventual negotiating 
position, wherein “it was possible to agree on the approximate proportions of 
representation of the opposition and the Dushanbe leadership in the organs of power—30 
percent to 70. Rahmonov supported this ratio”.137 
                                                 
 
134 "Head of State Rakhmanov Grants Interview," Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network 
May 30, 1993 [ FBIS-SOV-93-104, Daily Report. Central Eurasia, June 2, 1993] 72-77. High-level 
discussions took place throughout 1993 between Iranian and Russian officials regarding Tajikistan, with 
Yeltsin and Rafsanjani speaking at length via telephone about the vital need to bring stability to Tajikistan. 
See Atkin, "Iran, Russia and Tajikistan's Civil War." Also see "Primakov's Visit, Talks Assessed as 'Very 
Positive'," Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran August 2, 1993 [FBIS-NES-93-147, Daily Report. 
Near East & South Asia] August 3, 1993, 43-44. 
135 For a full discussion of Primakov’s visits, see Evgeniĭ Maksimovich Primakov, Russian Crossroads: 
Toward the New Millennium (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). 
136 Ibid., 116. 
137 Ibid., 117. Parker also deals substantially with Primakov’s visit, see Parker, Persian Dreams, 96. 
181 
 
 
Following on from this promising meeting in Kabul, Primakov moved onto Tehran, where 
high-level discussions were held with President Rafsanjani, Foreign Minister Velayati, 
and Deputy Foreign Minister Va’ezi, where he sought to enlist Iran’s further support for 
Russian-initiated Tajik peace negotiations. 138  Primakov’s meetings in Tehran were 
overwhelmingly positive, with Primakov noting that Iran was happy to coordinate its 
policies with Russia as a means “to get out of isolation and take part in positive processes 
on the international arena”.139 Following on from Primakov’s meeting with the Iranian 
leadership in August 1993, Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamishin 
made a trip to Tehran in March 1994, where Iranian officials facilitated a meeting with 
the deputy of the MIRT, Turajonzoda, and other members of the opposition.140 This 
meeting between Adamishin and Turajonzoda would finally pave the way for the first of 
the UN-led peace talks between the opposition and the Tajik government in April 1994 
in Moscow, with representatives of Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan acting as observers.141 
While officials in Tehran expressed a willingness to assist Moscow throughout the second 
half of 1993, and had facilitated some of Russia’s more important meetings with 
opposition figures, there was a feeling,—expressed directly to Primakov by Va’ezi during 
his visit to Tehran in August of 1993—that Iran was being “elbowed out” of the attempts 
to bring peace to Tajikistan.142 Indeed it was the case that following the Border Post No.12 
massacre that Russia had taken the initiative in attempting to broker peace talks in 
Tajikistan, and Iran, who had from early 1992 called for a peaceful solution to the Tajik 
political crisis, had been quickly relegated to a supporting role. This complaint that Iran 
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was being elbowed out of the prospective peace process was one that was echoed in Iran’s 
press at the time,143 and throughout the interviews conducted by the author with Iranian 
officials who were involved in trying to broker a peace agreement between the opposition 
and the Tajik government. In many respects, these officials felt that Iran’s “crucial role” 
in bringing the opposition to the eventual negotiating table with the Tajik government had 
been consistently overlooked and under-acknowledged, and that Russia had taken most 
of the credit for the eventual success of the peace negotiations. While this affirms the 
churlish behaviour that is never too far from Iran’s often at times loud political hubris and 
rhetoric, the complaint is not without justification. 
Russia’s role in the political horse-trading of 1993 has been widely acknowledged and 
outlined within the literature, 144  however Iran’s critical role in encouraging and 
facilitating the eventual establishment of peace negotiations throughout this same period 
has largely escaped attention. Iranian officials based in Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Iran 
applied significant pressure upon opposition figures to negotiate and compromise with 
the Rahmon government,145 and without Iran’s support it could be argued that it would 
have been unlikely that Primakov could have received an audience with Nuri, a meeting 
he said was arranged using “foreign intelligence tactics”, or for that matter, Adamishin’s 
meeting with Turajonzoda in Tehran in March 1994.146 Iran’s links with the opposition, 
in particular those who had fled to Iran from Tajikistan, were, as confirmed by a former 
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Iranian diplomatic official, a “positive thing” for the peace process. The official believed 
this was so because “Iran did not want the war to go on”, and having close ties with the 
opposition “gave us leverage on them and we were able to pressure, encourage, and 
persuade them to come together” with the Tajik government.147 Even current and former 
members of Rahmon’s government, who at times during the author’s interviews betrayed 
a negative bias towards Iran, looked favourably upon its role in bringing the opposition 
to the negotiating table. The former advisor to Rahmon, who painted a vivid picture of 
Iran’s early and in his view misguided support to the opposition, was one of many who 
spoke of Iran’s peace efforts in glowing terms: 
I say that Iran started the war and so on, but when the peace process started, Iran 
played a positive role…. I was a member of state commission on negotiations with 
the opposition. So I participated in the peace process… [I am therefore a witness 
to] Iran’s positive support for the peace process. The former head of Iran, President 
Rafsanjani, as well as Foreign Minister Velayati, and others, they all [made 
contributions which led to the government of Tajikistan] having closer relations 
with the opposition.148 
Adding further to these comments was that of one of Tajikistan’s most prominent 
government officials. In an interview with the author, the official was effusive in his 
praise of Iran:  
Several rounds of negotiations and meetings took place in Iran. [Iran paid for the] 
hospitality, the expenditures…. Hosting the delegations of the government and the 
opposition…creating the necessary conditions costs a lot of money….It was not all 
about official negotiations. There were various meetings, consultations; even at the 
highest level…Iran played a direct part in creating the conditions for the 
negotiations. They were also mediators; they met with the government and the 
representatives of the opposition at the level of Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Va’ezi, 
and at the level of Foreign Minister, Mr Velayati, at the level of the highest 
government officials of Iran.… So, this is how they took part in the process…they 
took part directly. The Iranians were very active….Iran participated directly and 
actively in the peace process. This should be acknowledged.149 
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While Russia was never willing to allow Iran to play a lead role in shaping Tajikistan’s 
political future, Russian officials were well aware that without Iran’s support, reining in 
the opposition would have been considerably more difficult. 
4.6 The Beginning of Peace Negotiations  
After a number of fitful starts, on April 5, 1994 the first of what would be nine rounds of 
peace negotiations over three years took place between the opposition150 and the Tajik 
government in Moscow. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully analyse 
what were highly complex negotiations between the opposition and the Tajik 
government,151 this first round of talks in Moscow laid the groundwork for a solution to 
the Tajik Civil War, and grouped all contentious issues under three broad categories: the 
need for a ceasefire and disarmament, the return of refugees and internally displaced 
peoples, and the possibility of constitutional amendments and creation of a new political 
system with both sides sharing power.152 The Moscow peace talks were successful in 
clearly setting out both side’s concerns, and most substantially it was apparent at that 
early stage of the talks that both the positions of the opposition and the Rahmon 
government were not incompatible, in the sense that “both argued in favour of a 
democratic secular state with a socially-orientated market economy, friendly ties with 
Russia and Islamic neighbours, and an ‘open door’ policy vis-à-vis foreign investors”.153 
However despite these compatibilities a swift resolution to this dispute could not be found, 
and it would not be until the signing of the General Agreement on the Establishment of 
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Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan on June 27, 1997 in Moscow, that the Tajik Civil 
War would “officially” come to an end. 
There are a number of reasons for this failure to reach a compromise, which according to 
Nourzhanov have their genesis within the cultural peculiarities of Tajik society, in 
particular the need to “maintain honour and group solidarity, and to keep one’s word only 
when it pertains to one’s own community, therefore any deed that was beneficial to a 
Tajik’s community (or harmful to the competing entity) can be morally justified”.154 This 
ethos cultivated lack of trust between the two opposing sides, who with “breathtaking 
ease” would consistently breach internationally-brokered agreements on ceasefires and 
troop movements whenever a strategic gain could be made on the battlefield. Military 
operations were often carried out only days before a round of talks as a means to bolster 
each side’s respective position and as a mechanism to demand further concessions, thus 
delaying and compromising diplomatic processes, much to the chagrin of the UN and the 
international observer states. Only adding to these difficulties was the fact that often the 
agreements brokered by the government and the opposition were held hostage to the 
whims of warlords and commanders on the ground. A prominent example of this was the 
hostage-swap agreement that was reached between the two parties leading up to the 
Islamabad talks of November 1994. The International Red Cross, along with an Iranian 
official, were denied access to Tajik government prisoners held in Taloqan by a 
commander within the IRP. The IRP commander had claimed that the MIRT’s leaders, 
Nuri and Turajonzoda, had no authority to be making prisoner-swap agreements, and that 
he was in fact in charge. Following more than nine hours of negotiations, the prisoners 
were eventually released. The commander’s actions placed the peace talks in jeopardy, 
with Rahmon’s government claiming that the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) had in fact 
broken an agreement and threatened to end the negotiations. Luckily for all parties 
involved, the commander released the prisoners, and Rahmon reciprocated by releasing 
opposition prisoners held in Dushanbe. This only took place due to the dedication of the 
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International Red Cross staff, and the personal intervention of the Iranian officials in 
Tajikistan.155  
Apart from these “on the ground difficulties”, talks were also often bogged down by 
“technical issues” relating to the location of peace talks. Squabbles over the location of 
the talks often took place between not only the parties to the civil war, but also the 
observer states who sought to claim “victory” by hosting the talks in their respective 
capitals; Iranian officials often loudly and immaturely cried foul at the Kremlin’s attempts 
to hold critical rounds of talks in Russia. This created significant angst for the UN, who 
had to cope with prolonged delays in scheduling peace discussions and mediating 
between the interested stakeholders, engaging in frequent and time-consuming “shuttle 
diplomacy” efforts.156 The delays in the peace process and its inherent difficulties were a 
bitter pill to swallow for Iranian elites, who had invested significant political capital in 
the successful negotiation of peace in Tajikistan, and had in a sense underestimated how 
long this process would take. Out of frustration the Iranian government frequently used 
its official and semi-official media as a mouthpiece for its criticism of Rahmon’s 
government, who it felt was unwilling to negotiate in open and sincere terms, and also 
towards Russia,157 who it claimed was attempting to dominate the peace negotiations and 
was undermining the talks by continuing to militarily support the Tajik government 
(criticisms that were reciprocated by Moscow towards Iran’s support for the 
opposition).158 Despite these frustrations and political jealousies, Iran and Russia largely 
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worked together,159 and Iran scored something of a diplomatic coup following the Tehran 
round of negotiations in June 1993, with Deputy Foreign Minister Va’ezi playing an 
instrumental role in the signing of the first temporary ceasefire, and a prisoner exchange 
between the Tajik government and the opposition.160 This agreement would be one of 
many confidence-building measures that were used to try and bring both sides together, 
and was hailed as a key factor in placing the talks back on track after the peace 
negotiations began to lose momentum following the breakdown of negotiations in 
Moscow in April 1993. 
Iran also made tentative steps to smooth over its relations with the Rahmon government 
during this same period. Rahmon had throughout 1993 and 1994 largely consolidated his 
grip on power. In the November 1994 Presidential election, Rahmon had defeated his 
former Khojandi political partner, Premier Adbumalik Abdullojonov, gaining 60 percent 
of the vote to Abdulljonov’s 35 percent.161 This victory was hailed in Russia as “proof” 
of Rahmon’s “democratic legitimacy”, but came in the absence of the opposition, who 
boycotted the presidential poll due to their inability to choose a candidate and to campaign 
effectively.162 Rahmon’s electoral win, along with the victory of his supporters in the 
parliamentary election of February-March 1995, placed him in a much stronger domestic 
position, and throughout 1995 he swiftly reinforced his political power, along with that 
of his Kulobi allies throughout the country. Not only did Rahmon sideline the opposition, 
he also undermined his former allies the Khojandis, who had played an instrumental role 
in his rise to power. Iran, while taking a dim view of Rahmon’s sidelining of the 
opposition and his grab for power, nevertheless congratulated him on his victory, with 
                                                 
 
the matter in hand.” See "Iranian Press Reports on Tajik Talks 'Groundless'," Moscow ITAR-TASS World 
Service July 25, 1994 [FBIS-SOV-94-143, Daily Report. Central Eurasia, July 26, 1994] 8-9. 
159 Iji, Tetsuro, "Cooperation, Coordination and Interconnectedness in Multiparty Mediation: The Case 
of Tajikistan, 1993-1997." (PhD Diss. London School of Economics and Political Science, 2007): 80  
160 Ibid. 
161 Lynch, "The Tajik Civil War and Peace Process," 57. 
162 Hiro, Inside Central Asia, 342. 
188 
 
 
Rafsanjani personally phoning Rahmon to offer his felicitations, despite refusing to send 
an Iranian envoy to Rahmon’s swearing-in ceremony.163 
Following the election of Rahmon, a new chapter of relations between Iran and Tajikistan 
opened up, with Rahmon making his first state visit to Iran in July 1995. The symbolism 
of Rahmon’s visit was acknowledged by Rafsanjani, who hoped that the outcome of talks 
between his government and Rahmon’s delegation would “be registered as a turning point 
in the two countries’ relations”. Rafsanjani went on to further express his disappointment 
that the internal dispute in Tajikistan had precluded close cooperation between the two 
countries,164 and was hopeful that the apparent shared ties of history and culture could 
form the basis of future relations, a sentiment that was also shared by Rahmon in his 
official comments to the Iranian media.165 At the conclusion of Rahmon’s visit to Tehran, 
12 bilateral agreements were signed between the two states in the fields of agriculture, 
industry, and transport, among others. More importantly, however, was the pledge by Iran 
to provide the Tajik government with a $10 million line of credit from the Central Bank 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which would assist in easing the economic difficulties the 
country was facing.166 At the end of his first official visit to Tehran, Rahmon also met 
with the leader of the Tajik opposition, Nuri, praising the active mediation of the Iranian 
leadership, which allowed the high-level talks between the two leaders to go ahead, 
despite continued low-level fighting between the two sides’ forces in Tajikistan.167 
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The visit by Rahmon to Iran came during a period of regional flux and insecurity. The 
Tajik, Russian, and Iranian governments all held considerable fears over the stability of 
Afghanistan. Since 1992, ethnic Tajiks Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud 
had been the preeminent powers in post-Soviet Afghanistan, and had managed to wrest 
control of Kabul from centuries of largely Pashtun rule.168 Fighting between and among 
forces loyal to Rabbani and Massoud, and fellow prominent warlords—the ethnic Uzbek 
Abdul Rashid Dostum, and Pashtun Gulbuddin Hekmatyar—had created a highly 
unstable and chaotic political environment. These circumstances were not ideal for 
Tajikistan, Iran, or Russia, who all had a stake in a viable, stable Afghan state for their 
own security interests. However, with the rise of the largely Pashtun militant group, the 
Taliban, at the end of 1994, all three states drew closer together against what would 
become a common and increasingly deadly foe. The Taliban, whose roots lay in the 
Islamic madrassas of northern Pakistan, were backed substantially by the Pakistani 
government, with the tacit support of Washington. The Pakistani government hoped that 
the Taliban would overthrow Massoud and Rabbani from their Kabul and northern 
redoubts, pacify the increasingly unruly Afghanistan, and thus place the country firmly 
under the control of the Pashtun plurality. If this could be achieved, Pakistan could 
accomplish its wider geopolitical aims in the Central Asian region, and weaken both 
Russian and Iranian influence. The Taliban movement, for its part, while successful on 
the battlefield, was also extremely brutal and displayed a fervent hatred towards Tajiks, 
Uzbeks, Hazaras, and those of the Shi’a Islamic sect more generally. By February 1995, 
the Taliban had captured 12 of Afghanistan’s 31 provinces, and on September 27, 1996, 
captured Kabul.169 As the Taliban spread their brutal influence in Afghanistan, Iran and 
Russia redoubled their efforts to end the conflict in Tajikistan, which had already gone 
on for too long. Throughout 1996 and 1997, the opposition and the Tajik government 
continued to carry out political and military moves that caused deep alarm in both 
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Moscow and Tehran. Finally, after much foot-dragging, Nuri and Rahmon met in the 
Kremlin on June 27 1997 in the presence of Yeltsin, Primakov, Velayati, and the Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary General Gerd Dietrich Merrem, to sign the agreement 
which would bring peace to Tajikistan.170 
As Nuri and Rahmon finally put pen to paper and ended a conflict that had taken an 
estimated 23,500 lives,171 Iran was still recovering from the post-election hangover that 
brought reformist candidate Mohammad Khatami to power in a landslide victory over 
conservative candidate Nateq Nuri only a few weeks earlier. Just prior to handing over 
the reins of the Iranian presidency, Rafsanjani made what would be his only and final 
visit to Tajikistan as president of the Islamic Republic on May 9, 1997. Although 
Rafsanjani’s visit was overshadowed by recent turmoil in Afghanistan, where President 
Rabbani had been unseated from power following the Taliban’s capture of Kabul the 
previous year, it was clear that the Iranian president was pleased that very soon a peaceful 
outcome would be reached between the Tajik government and the opposition. Rather than 
having to lecture his Tajik colleagues about the importance of peace and negotiation, 
Rafsanjani talked up the potential for Iran to become a prominent economic partner to 
Tajikistan. Rafsanjani made a number of economic pledges during the three-day visit to 
Tajikistan, committing to Iran’s future investment in the Sangtuda hydroelectric project—
construction of which remained incomplete following the collapse of the Soviet Union—
and offered Tajikistan $28 million to upgrade the dilapidated highway linking Kulob to 
the Darvos district in the GBAO, as well as the development of oil and gas fields in the 
republic. For his part Rahmon, while making it very clear in a speech that Tajikistan 
would not follow any “foreign model” of government—in other words Iran’s Islamic 
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form of government— said Tajikistan would ensure that it would not allow its territory 
to become a springboard for those who would seek to “inflict damage on Iran”.172 
Although Rafsanjani had overseen what was Iran’s darkest period of relations with 
Tajikistan, he successfully navigated Iran through what was a treacherous minefield of 
seething local hatreds and regional jealousies that had the potential to ensnare Iran into 
another unwanted military conflagration. Although question marks remain over Iran’s 
conduct in the violent events that led to the civil war in Tajikistan, and the Tajik 
government remained highly suspicious of Iran,173 it is clear that under Rafsanjani’s 
leadership Iran played a crucial role in bringing peace to Tajikistan. Rafsanjani and his 
government had done all it could to ensure that Iran was a central actor in the 
developments taking place throughout the Tajik Civil War, and had proven that it was a 
“player”, and its interests had to be respected in regional developments moving forward. 
Furthermore Rafsanjani, particularly in his final two years in office, had placed Iran’s 
new government under Khatami on firm footing to benefit from the political, economic, 
and cultural potential of a peaceful Tajikistan. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined Iran’s relations with Tajikistan from independence to the close 
of the civil war period under the presidency of Ali Akbar Rafsanjani. Throughout this 
period of relations it is apparent that Iran consistently acted in a manner which was 
pragmatic, and placed its state interests and regional position above all other concerns. 
Iran’s early support and so-called “charity” towards the opposition during its period of 
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political ascendency, the attempt to play a “central role” in the inter-Tajik peace talks, its 
efforts to maintain a correct relationship with its giant neighbour Russia, and finally its 
support and effort to broker strong ties with the Rahmon-led government, are all examples 
of a state that, while often acting in a surreptitious and at times reactive manner, was also 
pragmatic and extremely cautious. Despite the constant refrain of those who believe that 
Iran during this early period of relations with Tajikistan was trying to spread “Islamic 
revolution” into the region, the reality is not so exciting. If anything, Islamic revolution 
and the interests of the so-called Tajik “Islamists” were never paramount in Iran’s 
political calculations. What was paramount, however, was the need to expand Iran’s 
political influence, and defend its geopolitical position. In most respects Iran was 
successful at doing this, and under the steady, albeit reserved, hand of Rafsanjani Iran 
came out of the brutal early period of Tajik independence in a relatively strong position. 
However, in many respects the close ties that were expected to develop between the two 
states on the eve of Tajik independence were not to be, and substantive Iranian-Tajik ties 
remained a pipe dream. 
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Chapter Five: Iran and Tajikistan 1997-2005 – Regional Competition and 
Instability 
As Tajikistan entered the post-civil war period and embarked on its first tentative steps 
towards political and economic redevelopment in the summer of 1997, Iran itself was also 
experiencing its own watershed historical moment. The landslide victory of so-called 
moderate reformist candidate Mohammad Khatami in Iran’s 1997 presidential election 
raised hope of a major shift in Iran’s domestic and foreign agendas. International news 
media outlets and political observers were instantly enamoured of Iran’s mild-mannered 
“Ayatollah Gorbachev”, who would invoke an Iranian version of “perestroika” and 
“glasnost” which would reshape an increasingly isolated Iran.1 Khatami himself fed these 
hopes by declaring that the centrepiece of his foreign policy would be an effort to seek 
détente with the United States and the West, based upon a number of normative themes, 
the most prominent of which was an effort to engage in an apparent “Dialogue of 
Civilisations”.2 Unfortunately, while Khatami pursued his lofty internationalist agendas, 
Tajikistan, with its weakened economy and teetering post-civil war political and security 
situation, rarely rated a mention within his broader foreign policy approach. Instead more 
pressing regional events took precedence, such as the continued rise of the Taliban in 
neighbouring Afghanistan, and Iran’s international efforts to improve its relations with 
Europe, the neighbouring Middle East, and the United States.  
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Iran’s lack of focus upon Tajikistan would however come to an abrupt end following the 
geopolitical shift brought about by the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). The attacks 
highlighted the potential for Tajikistan to become a strategically and politically 
significant actor in US efforts to rid neighbouring Afghanistan of the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda. The United States’ newfound interest in Tajikistan and the Central Asian region 
did not augur well for Iran’s influence in Tajikistan moving forward, and also highlighted 
the low level of inter-state interactions that existed between Iran and Tajikistan. The shift 
in focus of not only the United States but a number of other international players upon 
Tajikistan and the wider Central Asian region would force Iran to devote much greater 
attention upon Tajikistan, establish ties that went beyond simplistic notions of cultural 
solidarity, and rectify a series of empty political and economic promises.  
This chapter will analyse the political, cultural, and economic interactions between Iran 
and Tajikistan throughout the eight-year period of the Khatami administration. This 
chapter argues that Iran’s foreign policies in Tajikistan throughout the presidency of 
Khatami, while continuing on the pragmatic and cautious path set during the Tajik Civil 
War period, underwent both a period of stagnation and transformation. It is argued that 
the Khatami administration, throughout its first four-year term, displayed an almost 
complete disregard towards developments in Tajikistan, however following the events of 
9/11 Iran’s engagement with Tajikistan rapidly shifted gears. Iran went from having a 
considerably low base of engagement with Tajikistan, particularly in the economic sphere, 
to become one of Tajikistan’s major foreign investors following 9/11. Iran’s renewed 
interest in Tajikistan was motivated almost solely by geopolitical interests, and can be 
considered to be ad-hoc, reactive, and overwhelmingly defined by the US encroachment 
into the Central Asian region, the reinvigoration of Russian influence in Tajikistan, 
developments occurring in post-9/11 Afghanistan, and more importantly by Tajikistan’s 
efforts to diversify its international political and economic partners.  
5.1 Post-Civil War Tajikistan and Iran – New Hopes and Expectations 
While Iranian elites basked in the glow of their “success” in bringing about peace between 
the Tajik government and opposition, it was clear that much more needed to be done to 
ensure Tajikistan’s long-term stability and viability in the post-civil war era. The civil 
war wreaked havoc upon Tajikistan’s society and economy, with the country sliding into 
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an economic abyss so deep that by the turn of the twentieth century it had become one of 
the poorest countries in the world. For instance, in 1997 manufacturing and agricultural 
output was only 27 percent and 50 percent respectively of pre-independence 1990 levels, 
and most of Tajikistan’s physical infrastructure was either obsolete, poorly maintained, 
or destroyed. One of the only significant industrial enterprises to escape destruction 
during the civil war was Tajikistan’s aluminium smelter, which alone contributed to a 
staggering 31 percent of Tajikistan’s economic output in 1996, increasing from 8 percent 
in 1990.3 Other prominent industries, such as coal mining and cement production, were 
almost wiped out during the civil war period, and to the present day have not fully 
recovered.4 Filling a major portion of the void left by the destruction of Tajikistan’s main 
industries, the black market economy expanded substantially in Tajikistan throughout the 
civil war period and directly following its official cessation.5 The many thousands of 
Tajiks who had fled to Afghanistan following the outbreak of violence in 1992 had 
increased Tajikistan’s exposure to Afghanistan’s major export—the trade in opium and 
heroin. Organised criminal gangs sprang up in Tajikistan, and with the complicity of Tajik 
government officials, the trade in narcotics took over as a major source of revenue, 
leading a number of observers to declare that Tajikistan was in fact a “narco-state”.6 The 
development and consolidation of the narcotics trade in Tajikistan had the effect of not 
only lining the pockets of corrupt government officials, but also empowering regional 
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warlords and their supporters, who on a number of occasions challenged the authority of 
the Tajik central government.7  
Unfortunately, Tajikistan’s post-civil war ills escaped the attention of the international 
community. 8  Donor conferences held throughout 1997 and 1998 did not provide 
Tajikistan with the economic and humanitarian assistance it required.9 Tajikistan was 
“too distant and insecure to merit support” and its government and people—over 65 
percent of whom lived below the poverty line,—were left to fend for themselves and deal 
with the difficult task of post-war economic, social, and political reconstruction alone.10 
In these circumstances Tajikistan’s political leaders turned to the country’s main political 
partners during the civil war period, Russia and Iran, for support and assistance in the 
country’s post-war reconstruction. As the central supporter of the Tajik government, 
much of the burden of ensuring Tajikistan’s security and stability fell upon the Kremlin, 
which remained committed to protecting Tajikistan’s southern border with Afghanistan, 
and also sought to insulate Tajikistan’s diabolically weak economy from complete 
disaster by allowing an increasing number of Tajik labour migrants to work in Russia’s 
comparatively much stronger economy. Tajikistan’s fragile domestic situation, and 
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Russia’s strong military presence of 11,500 border guards and 6,500 soldiers, therefore 
made it only natural that Dushanbe would focus much of its outward attention towards 
Moscow.11  
Throughout 1997, however, Tajik elites also sought to take a number of tentative steps to 
increase their country’s relations with Iran, particularly in the fields of economics, 
industry, and trade. President Rahmon and Prime Minister Yahyo Azimov on separate 
occasions throughout 1997 highlighted the potential for Iran to expand its role in 
Tajikistan through private investment and state-to-state economic cooperation. While Iran 
had played a major political role in Tajikistan during the civil war, and was particularly 
influential with the Tajik opposition, commercial and economic ties between the two 
states remained limited. In 1997 Iran-Tajik trade ties stood at a lowly $32 million, with 
Iran’s share of Tajikistan’s total trade turnover constituting only seven percent. 12 
Furthermore, beyond the fields of economics and trade, other measures of Iran’s 
interactions with Tajikistan also remained minimal. Very few Tajiks undertook study in 
Iranian higher education institutions,13 the early Iranian encouragement for Tajiks to take 
up the Arabic script in place of Cyrillic had fallen by the wayside,14 air-routes between 
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the two countries were patchy and irregular, 15  and many of the memoranda of 
understanding signed between the two states remained unfulfilled.  
The low level of ties between the two states was of course not surprising. Throughout the 
civil war period it was almost impossible for Iran to deal with Tajikistan in what could be 
considered a “normal political setting” and in light of the problematic circumstances 
within Tajik domestic society, the level of Iran’s trade and economic ties and societal 
engagement was, if anything, commendable. However, with an economy thirsty for 
investment and a political elite hankering for support it seemed indisputable that Iran 
would play a defining role in shaping Tajikistan’s political future. Added to this was the 
fact that Iran’s own domestic and international situation markedly improved under the 
presidency of Khatami. For example, Iran’s GDP had increased from $100 billion in 1997 
to $150 billion in 2001, and the per capita income of Iranians had also expanded thanks 
to rising oil prices, and the expansion of public investment in to the Iranian economy.16 
Furthermore, Iran’s international position had stabilised dramatically, providing it further 
room to manoeuvre and avoid the attempts by the United States to isolate it from the 
wider region. For example, a number of European states had endeavoured to establish 
close economic and political ties with Iran and had disregarded American sanctions to 
invest in Iran’s expanding economy, while Iran’s Persian Gulf neighbours had also sought 
to reconcile with Iran after many years of hostility.17 Although Iran continued to face 
significant international and domestic challenges, on the surface there seemed to be very 
little reason why Iran and Tajikistan’s relationship would not develop into an “idyllically 
close relationship, ethno-culturally and politically”, with Iran treating Tajikistan “as Israel 
is by the United States”.18  
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In numerous interviews with Tajik political experts it was noted that there was a strong 
belief that Iran would become Tajikistan’s foremost partner in the post-civil war period. 
For instance, a Tajik political scientist interviewed by the author claimed that there 
existed many politicians within the Tajik government who strongly favoured close post-
civil war ties with Iran.19 Furthermore, a former advisor to Rahmon noted that following 
the civil war the Tajik government attempted to have “good economic relations [with 
Iran]. The government wanted Iran, the Iranian enterprises, the Iranian businessmen to 
participate in construction of [infrastructure], and industrial enterprises.” However in 
seeking such support, the Tajik government was adamant that Iran did not “target the 
religious sentiments of the people. Because first of all our state is secular. Therefore, any 
impact of religion [would] not be accepted.” 20  The advisor raised an interesting 
contradiction that existed in Iran’s relationship with Tajikistan throughout the post-civil 
war period. While Tajikistan was open and enthusiastic towards Iranian economic and 
political engagement, it remained nervous towards the religious aspects of Iranian politics 
and society. However, in discussions with Iranian political elites there was also a strong 
awareness and acknowledgement of these Tajik fears towards Iran’s “Islamic character”. 
For instance, a prominent Iranian academician interviewed by the author was adamant 
that when dealing with Tajikistan, Iran’s elites completely and purposefully precluded 
any mention of Islam or revolutionary-inspired discourse in an attempt to overcome the 
suspicions harboured by certain segments of Tajikistan’s ruling regime. Instead Iranian 
elites focused their attention upon purely economic and political engagement with the 
Tajik government, and restricted their cultural engagement to linguistic and non-religious 
cultural commonalities.21  
Nonetheless, no matter how pragmatic or constructive Iran could be in its foreign policy 
agendas towards not only Tajikistan but also the wider region, it would still be “perceived 
and treated as revolutionary”.22 However, with a new president who sought to emphasise 
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normative notions such as “culture” and “civilisation”, and tolerance and mediation in 
international relations over the more divisive and ideological elements of Iranian politics, 
it was possible that these lingering suspicions towards Iran could be overcome. There 
were early positive signs that the Khatami administration would place a high level of 
emphasis on assisting Tajikistan in its post-civil war economic and political recovery. At 
his opening speech23 to the 52nd session of the UN General Assembly in September 1997, 
new Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi made a key point of not only mentioning 
Iran’s cherished political causes—the plight of the Palestinians, and the need for a 
multipolar international system—but also made direct mention to events in Tajikistan: 
In Tajikistan, we are witnessing promising and positive developments following the 
signing of the final peace agreement in Tehran and Moscow.…Islamic Iran believes 
that the peace and security in Tajikistan need care, patience, restraint, and 
continuous cooperation between different groups and currents in that country…it is 
expected that the international community support the outcome of the peace process 
and its consolidation in Tajikistan through augmenting reconstruction and 
development assistance to this country. 
Kharrazi went on further to underline the priority of Iran’s foreign policy under his 
stewardship would be for Iran 
[T]o make every effort to strengthen trust and confidence and peace in our 
immediate neighbourhood, which in cases such as Tajikistan have had encouraging 
achievements…taking full advantage of historical affinities, cultural ties, and 
religious bonds and sparing no efforts for the efficient coordinated utilization of 
human and natural potentials and resources of the region constitute the single best 
long term guarantee for security and tranquillity…our message to our neighbors is 
one of friendship and fraternity, and we shall warmly welcome any initiative to 
strengthen the foundations of confidence and cooperation in this region. 
Taken at face value Kharrazi’s speech represented a clear signal that Iran would focus a 
significant amount of political attention upon Tajikistan, and would take full advantage 
of the prominent role it played during the civil war to expand its political and economic 
influence in post-civil war Tajik society. Unfortunately such hopes would be dashed by 
Iranian political mismanagement, and seemingly more important regional and 
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international developments, which would make Tajikistan a very low priority within 
Iran’s broader regional foreign policy.  
5.2 The Taliban Crisis  
While Tajikistan’s security situation continued to gradually improve following the peace 
accords of 1997, Iran’s attention was quickly shifting towards events taking place in 
neighbouring Afghanistan. Following the fall of Kabul in 1996, the Taliban continued 
their long march to dominance in Afghanistan, leaving a trail of destruction and 
bloodshed in their wake. Iran refused to recognise the Taliban, and was not only deeply 
alarmed by the group’s strident anti-Shi'ism and anti-Iranianism, but also by the 
establishment of what Milani referred to as a “Kabul–Islamabad–Riyadh axis” that had 
been established on its eastern borders. Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia provided 
significant support to the Taliban, and shared the common economic objective of 
establishing a Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipeline, which would solidify 
their own strategic interests in the region,24 while further isolating and cutting off Iran 
from both Afghanistan and Central Asia.25 Even more disturbing to policy planners in 
Iran was the fact that these moves by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan neatly aligned with the 
interests of the United States to contain Iran and weaken its regional influence in Central 
Asia.26 Milani claims that both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan “used their considerable clout 
in Washington to portray the Taliban as a force that would restore order, neutralise Iran, 
and provide a safe gateway for US interests within Central Asia”.27  
There were a number of prominent figures in the White House who welcomed the 
potential for the Taliban to act as a countervailing force against Iran in the region, and 
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were not displeased as the Taliban expanded its presence throughout Afghanistan. For 
instance, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Robin L. 
Raphel, believed that the Taliban had to be acknowledged as an indigenous movement, 
which had “demonstrated staying power”.28 Furthermore, in 1996, Zalmay Khalizad, the 
first post-9/11 US Ambassador to Afghanistan, actively lobbied the Clinton 
administration to engage with the Taliban, claiming that there were “common interests 
between the United States and the Taliban”,29 and “the US should actively assist the 
Taliban because even though it is fundamentalist, it does not practise the anti-US style 
fundamentalism of Iran”.30 
The United States became increasingly amenable to forwarding such recognition to the 
Taliban, and even considered the possibility of dispatching diplomats to Kabul to confer 
with the Taliban leadership and reopen an American embassy there.31 However, as the 
Taliban’s violent actions and medieval ideology gained increased attention within the 
international community, the Clinton administration distanced itself from the Taliban, but 
did little to confront this violent movement. Unfortunately it would take the tragic 
bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August, 1998, for Washington to 
grasp the wider threat posed by the Taliban.32 These terrorist attacks committed by Al 
Qaeda, an organisation which had been sheltered by the Taliban for a number of years, 
focused American attention upon Afghanistan, and while these events were considered to 
be a seminal moment in how the United States perceived the Taliban, Washington’s 
response was circumspect. Outside of a volley of missile strikes launched against Al 
Qaeda encampments close to the city of Khost in eastern Afghanistan on the 20 August, 
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1998, the United States was unwilling to fully retaliate against the Taliban, and was 
pusillanimous in providing substantial support to anti-Taliban forces.33 Instead, it was 
largely left up to Iran and Russia, two states who shared similar regional threat 
perceptions in the form of Sunni-inspired extremism and narcotics trafficking, to organise 
a “sphere of resistance” against the Taliban.  
Since at least 1996, Iran and Russia had supplied arms and equipment to the anti-Taliban 
Northern Alliance forces led by warlords Abdur Rashid Dostum, Ahmad Shah Massoud, 
and former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani. In supplying vital military materiel 
to the Northern Alliance, Iran conducted large-scale airlift operations through the 
Northern Alliance redoubt of Mazar-e Sharif, while the Russians relied upon supply 
routes through Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.34 Iran’s ability to supply arms and supplies to 
the Northern Alliance was severely compromised, however, following the fall of Mazar-
e Sharif in August, 1998. The Taliban pushed the Northern Alliance out of the city to a 
narrow strip of land abutting the Tajik border35, and lashed out against Tehran’s support 
of the Northern Alliance by ransacking Iran’s consulate and murdering 10 Iranian 
diplomats and intelligence officers, and a journalist.36 More disturbingly, the Taliban 
continued its penchant for violence, murdering thousands of male members of the Hazara, 
Tajik, and Uzbek communities who had remained in Mazar-e Sharif during the Taliban 
siege. Enraged by these gruesome acts, Iran amassed more than 200,000 troops on 
Afghanistan’s borders, and promised to punish the “savage” Taliban.37 Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Khameini pointed the finger squarely at American “oil and gas companies” and 
the Pakistani military, who he believed were directly responsible for the rise of the 
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Taliban.38 Notwithstanding the venomous rhetoric that spewed forth from Tehran towards 
Kabul, Islamabad, and Washington, cooler heads in Iran prevailed, with President 
Khatami unwilling to ensnare Iran into another regional conflagration. Instead Iran 
stepped up its support of the Northern Alliance even further, becoming its “principle 
source of military assistance”.39  
It was through the prism of this crisis in Afghanistan that Iran’s relations with Tajikistan 
were largely shaped throughout the early period of Khatami’s presidency, and most inter-
governmental meetings between the two countries leading up to 2001 revolved solely 
around events occurring in Afghanistan. Following the fall of Kabul in 1996, President 
Rahmon stood firmly with Russia and Iran in their attempts to contain the Taliban, 
offering Tajik territory to be used as a safe haven for anti-Taliban fighters, and allowed 
both Russia and Iran to use the airport at Kulob40 to ferry supplies into Afghanistan.41 
This cooperation was on display in 2000, when a framework agreement was signed 
between the three states that would see Iran purchase weaponry from Russia, which would 
be sent directly to Kulob, and then transferred to the Afghan border by Tajik authorities 
to Northern Alliance forces.42 Furthermore, the Tajik government also agreed to allow 
Iranian military flights of humanitarian aid, weaponry, and other supplies that would 
move directly into and out of Tajikistan. Although such agreements and cooperation 
placed Tajikistan directly in the firing line of the Taliban, who made a number of threats 
towards the regime in Dushanbe, Rahmon saw cooperation with Russia and Iran in the 
support of the Northern Alliance as critical to shielding Tajikistan from the instability and 
violence taking place within Afghanistan. In particular, Tajikistan’s government was 
alarmed by the fact that the Taliban were unwilling to negotiate a political solution to the 
violence in Afghanistan, and continued to push ever more closely to the Tajik border, 
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raising the spectre of the Taliban continuing their military offensives beyond Afghanistan 
into Tajikistan itself.43 
While Rahmon remained vehemently opposed to the Taliban, Tajikistan’s Central Asian 
neighbours—Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—all 
wavered on earlier undertakings to oppose the Taliban. For example, Uzbekistan had 
earlier allowed Russia to supply Northern Alliance forces under the command of the 
ethnic Uzbek, Dostum, through its territory, but now had closed its borders with 
Afghanistan following the Taliban’s capture of Mazar-e Sharif in August 1998.44 Uzbek 
President Karimov even took the step of declaring that the threat of the Taliban “had been 
over exaggerated and invented” particularly by Russia, who he claimed had sought to 
remain militarily entrenched within the region, and that since the Taliban’s takeover of 
most of Afghanistan its borders had in fact become safer.45 Similarly, Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz Republic sought to portray events in Afghanistan as a 
domestic problem, rather than a regional one. Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev, 
in a meeting with Pakistani military chief General Pervez Musharraf, agreed that the 
Taliban was a “legitimate” political force and that outside involvement in the conflict 
needed to end—a diplomatic swipe aimed directly at Iran and Russia.46  
The reliability of Tajikistan vis-à-vis the capriciousness of its neighbours was on full 
display in October, 1998, when 16 rail cars carrying 700 metric tonnes of armaments and 
300 tonnes of flour intended for the Northern Alliance were confiscated in the Kyrgyz 
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Republic. At around the same time a third consignment of armaments was stopped in 
Uzbekistan, where two wagons were confiscated by Uzbek authorities. These arms 
shipments had originated in Iran and were intended to reach Tajikistan, where they were 
to be unloaded and distributed to Northern Alliance forces. According to a number of 
sources, Iran would not, and could not, have taken this circuitous and complicated rail 
route without the express permission and coordination of authorities in Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic. The Kyrgyz government however 
denied knowledge of this shipment, causing major embarrassment to not only Iran, but 
also Russia. The consignment of weapons was eventually allowed to continue onwards 
to Tajikistan, with the Kyrgyz government blaming the stoppage as a “miscommunication” 
between different Kyrgyz government departments. Many observers dismissed this 
explanation. Many believe that the Kyrgyz were “leaned upon” by American authorities, 
who were bent on publicly embarrassing Iran and exposing its involvement in the illegal 
shipment of weaponry in not only Central Asia, but also the Middle East. Such a theory 
does not seem too far-fetched. At the time the Kyrgyz Republic was in the middle of a 
financial crisis and was desperately seeking further US aid and World Bank grants, thus 
making it highly amenable to American pressure to undermine Iran. In what might seem 
an unlikely coincidence, at around the same time the Uzbek government had also 
“confiscated” two rail cars carrying Iranian armaments, which according to a number of 
accounts neither reached the Northern Alliance nor were returned to Iran. Rather, it is 
believed these weapons fell into the hands of separatists who sought to challenge the Tajik 
government later that same year. Uzbekistan, it seems was playing its own game, and was 
only too happy to also get in on the act of undermining and weakening Iran’s regional 
standing.47 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan’s retreat on 
Afghanistan was deeply confronting to elites in Tehran, who believed their stances were 
directly linked with their ever-tightening security and political relations with the United 
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States. Throughout the post-Soviet period, the United States had attempted to woo the 
Central Asian republics into joining Western economic and security institutions. For 
example, all of the Central Asian republics, with the exception of Tajikistan, joined 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace program (PFP) and the North American Cooperation 
Council (NACC). 48  By waving the carrot of substantial institutional, financial, and 
security support, the United States was able to further curtail Iran’s regional influence 
and increase its isolation. Furthermore, by enmeshing themselves more closely with the 
United States, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were 
able to gain significant security and other political assistance from the United States and 
diversify their security relations. Furthermore, in the words of a former Iranian 
ambassador, the Central Asian republics were able to use the “threat of Iran” as a 
“strategic commodity”,49 and their leaders were not at all adverse to “offering themselves 
to the West as ramparts against Islamic fundamentalism and as a barrier to Iranian 
influence”.50 Uzbekistan especially sought to use Iran’s “Islamic character” to promote 
its own interests and to further its agenda for regional domination.51 Tashkent often 
played a double game, displaying rhetorical warmth towards Tehran while at the same 
time undermining Iran’s regional agendas, accusing it of a number of far-fetched terrorist 
plots, which strengthened its importance in the eyes of US policy planners.52 According 
to the same former Iranian ambassador, the prevarication displayed by the Central Asian 
republics in regards to Afghanistan and their warming relations with the United States 
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caused anger in Tehran, and highlighted their “untrustworthiness”. 53  The former 
ambassador went on to claim that while Iran kept up the allure of friendly ties with the 
republics of the region, behind closed doors Iranian officials felt they had been “stabbed 
in the back”, and this turn of events had not only undermined diplomatic ties between 
Iran and the Central Asian republics, but also increased the importance of cooperation 
with Russia and Tajikistan, particularly in the context of Afghanistan.54 
 5.3 Muddling Through; Iran and Tajikistan in the Lead-up to 9/11 
Outside of Iran and Tajikistan’s bilateral and multilateral interactions in relation to the 
difficult developments taking place in Afghanistan, there were a number of opportunities 
for both states to mutually benefit from close ties. Although Tajikistan constituted only a 
small market, it nonetheless offered Iran an unrivalled opportunity to expand its economic 
influence. In particular, Iran had significant expertise and capacity to fulfil Tajikistan’s 
vital infrastructural needs, particularly in the fields of energy production, dam 
construction, and road building. Tajikistan also stood to benefit from Iran’s large and 
comparatively well-developed economy, which offered a market for Tajikistan’s raw 
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materials, particularly in the form of cotton, coal, gold, and aluminium.55 Outside of 
mutually beneficial economic relations, close historical, linguistic, and cultural 
connections proffered an invaluable space for both states to cooperate in the fields of 
culture and education. Furthermore, Iran’s close relations with Tajikistan’s main 
international partner, Russia, and the lack of interest shown by Iran’s international rivals, 
namely the United States,56 in Tajikistan’s post-civil war recovery, provided Iran with 
what could be considered a free hand to significantly expand its influence in Tajikistan. 
However, rather than seek to expand Iran’s influence in Tajikistan, Khatami’s 
administration displayed very little interest in Tajikistan’s post-civil war redevelopment. 
While continuing to support Tajikistan’s national reconciliation, and encouraging the 
Tajik government to reintegrate the opposition into wider Tajik society, Iran was 
unwilling to provide the investment and financial support Tajikistan needed to rebuild its 
shattered society. Many of the promises that Rafsanjani had made prior to Khatami’s 
election, such as investment in the Sangtuda hydroelectric project, the development of oil 
and gas fields, and road redevelopment projects, remained on the backburner. Instead, 
Iran dragged the proverbial chain, publicly committing to these and other infrastructure 
projects on an almost annual basis in meetings with Tajik elites, without actually taking 
the necessary steps to implement their construction. For instance, Iranian Foreign 
Minister Kharrazi visited Tajikistan on no less than five occasions between 1997 and 
September, 2001. On each one of these occasions Kharrazi made a series of grandiloquent 
statements about the importance of Tajikistan and the willingness of his government to 
fund the country’s reconstruction, all of which turned out to be fanciful at best, and plain 
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deceptive at worst.57 Adding to these contrived statements was the commitment made 
directly to Tajik President Rahmon by Iranian President Khatami during inter-
governmental discussions in Tehran in December, 1998. During Rahmon’s visit, the two 
states signed 10 inter-governmental agreements over a wide area including banking, 
defence, taxation, foodstuff production, and dam, railway and power plant construction. 
Iranian news media hailed the signing of these agreements as a “qualitative and 
quantitative upgrading” of the two states’ bilateral relations, while President Rahmon 
declared his confidence that an “all-out promotion” of ties between Iran and Tajikistan 
had begun. Unfortunately for Rahmon his confidence was misplaced, and Iran did little 
to fulfil its promises to the Tajik government, with numerous deals signed between the 
two countries— stemming as far back as 1994—remaining unimplemented.58  
The Tajik government grew increasingly frustrated at Iran’s unwillingness or inability to 
fulfil its economic promises to the country. In his third state visit to Iran in 2000, Rahmon 
voiced his opinion that ties between the two states needed to move from “words to deeds” 
and noted that the numerous agreements signed remained unimplemented.59 Earlier that 
same year, Rahmon had used less diplomatic language, declaring that he had to call “a 
spade a spade” on Iran-Tajik economic relations. In an address to Tajikistan’s parliament 
Rahmon was particularly scathing in his comments towards Iran: 
We have wanted mutually beneficial cooperation with [Iran] for eight years. I say 
this openly. We want cooperation with all the countries in the world and, first and 
foremost, with the Islamic Republic of Iran, with which we have a common 
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language, culture and other things. However, over the last eight years the volume 
of economic cooperation has been zero between the two countries.60 
Tajik Foreign Minister Talbak Nazarov followed up on this blunt message, stating in a 
meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi that “economic cooperation between the 
two countries were low”, and that it was a “necessity to step up” cooperation between the 
two states. For his part, Kharrazi batted away the veiled criticism towards Iran, stating 
that he agreed that economic cooperation should be expanded, but pointing to unnamed 
“obstacles” that existed which would have to be removed by the Tajik government before 
Iranian businesses could enter the Tajik domestic market. 61  Interestingly, when 
interviewed on his return visit to Iran, Kharrazi made no mention of these obstacles, 
instead praising Tajikistan’s security and stability, which “had created the necessary basis 
for the country’s economic development”.62 
The unwillingness of Iran to invest in the redevelopment of Tajikistan’s infrastructure 
was particularly galling in light of Tajikistan’s external vulnerabilities vis-à-vis its much 
larger neighbour, Uzbekistan. Due to the political and economic exigencies of the Soviet 
period, exit routes for Tajikistan’s road and railway lines, and much of the country’s 
electricity grid, crossed Uzbek territory.63 Tajikistan’s over-reliance upon Uzbekistan 
was brought into sharp relief as ties began to worsen between the two states following the 
conclusion of the civil war. In 1999, Uzbekistan arbitrarily closed its border crossings 
with Tajikistan, introduced costly tariffs and onerous visa regulations, and took the 
aggressive step of laying mines on the border with Tajikistan—which had not been 
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delimited or demarcated—killing a number of civilians.64 These measures substantially 
weakened Tajikistan’s already teetering economy, and left the country largely isolated 
from world markets, and even more alarmingly followed Uzbekistan’s support of an 
irredentist challenge in the northern region of Leninabad the previous year, when former 
Tajik army officer Mahmud Khudoberdiev attempted to militarily take the economically 
and strategically vital northern Tajik city of Khojand. Since 1997, Khudoberdiev, an 
ethnic Uzbek, had received asylum with his militia in Uzbekistan, and had been provided 
substantial military and other support by the Uzbek government. Attempting to destabilise 
a weakened Tajik government, Khudoberdiev crossed into Tajikistan from Uzbek 
territory in November, 2008, with a 1000-strong militia made up largely of Afghans and 
Uzbek mercenaries. Khudoberdiev’s forces held Khojand for a week before the Tajik 
government was able to push the militants back into Uzbekistan. Although the Tajik 
government eventually retook the city, the incursion of Khudoberdiev and his militants 
from Uzbek territory raised fears that Uzbekistan was attempting to fulfil long-held 
irredentist claims on the northern regions of Tajikistan. 65  
Uzbekistan had taken these unilateral measures ostensibly in the name of quarantining 
itself from insecurity emanating from Tajikistan, which Uzbek leaders claimed had 
become a breeding ground for terrorism and organised crime.66 Uzbek President Islam 
Karimov blamed internal issues in his own country directly upon Tajikistan, and claimed 
that the Tajik and Russian governments had not done enough to crack down on anti-
Uzbek government terrorists hiding in Tajikistan.67 Uzbekistan’s legitimate security fears 
were however undermined by its heavy-handed actions towards Tajikistan, and rather 
than seeking to assist in the development of a strong Tajik state, which could confront 
these security issues, Karimov took every opportunity to destabilise Tajikistan and 
impose Uzbek hegemony over its weaker neighbour. The vulnerability of Tajikistan’s 
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economic position vis-à-vis Uzbekistan ensured that questions of infrastructure 
development and economic independence were strongly intertwined with questions of 
security. Although Tajikistan relied predominately upon Russia to ensure its political 
survival, Tajik political elites also turned towards Iran for support in the face of these 
security challenges emanating from Uzbekistan. Unfortunately for Tajikistan, Iran’s 
leaders, while big on rhetoric, lacked the resolve required to become a reliable political 
and security partner. Between 1997 and 2001, Iranian political leaders consistently 
condemned the “aggressive” actions taken by Uzbekistan towards Tajikistan, even going 
so far to compare Karimov’s actions towards Tajikistan to that of the despotic policies of 
former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.68 However, apart from such condemnations, Iran took 
very few concrete steps to protect Tajikistan from Uzbekistan’s unilateral political and 
military actions, or to mediate in the ongoing dispute between the two states.  
Iran and Tajikistan did sign a number of defence agreements, however these lacked 
substance, and Iran was careful not to link the signing of these documents with any 
attempt to challenge or undermine Uzbekistan. Furthermore, these agreements largely 
revolved around the training of Tajik forces in drill marching, and the provision of 
uniforms—hardly the type of cooperation that would strike fear within the corridors of 
Uzbek power.69 Uzbekistan’s actions towards Tajikistan did not in any way form the basis 
for closer Iranian-Tajik security cooperation. Instead Tehran displayed considerable 
caution and attempted to maintain correct diplomatic and economic ties with the Uzbek 
regime, while ignoring some of Karimov’s more inflammatory rhetoric and actions. Iran 
did, however, display serious concern towards the level of security cooperation that had 
developed between the United States and Uzbekistan, which had led Tashkent to become 
a regional “champion” of Washington’s anti-Iranian containment policies.70 Furthermore, 
Iran also reacted negatively to the possibility of Washington bringing Tajikistan into 
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Western security institutions. For example, the visit by US Assistant Secretary of Defence, 
Jeffrey Starr, to Dushanbe in late January, 2001—the first by a senior American defence 
official—sounded alarm bells in Tehran. During Starr’s visit, Tajik officials expressed a 
willingness to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, while the Americans 
highlighted the “unmistakeable” role Tajikistan played in Central Asian security, and the 
possibility of Tajikistan expanding its military cooperation with the United States.71 In a 
matter of weeks, Iran’s Defence Minister Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani had rushed to 
Dushanbe to reiterate the strategic importance of Tajikistan to Iran, and expressed his 
hope that ties between the two countries would continue to expand. Shamkhani also 
offered up Iran’s services as an arms provider, and expressed a willingness to exchange 
military intelligence with Tajik authorities. Rounding out his short visit, Shamkhani also 
raised the possibility of establishing an Iranian-Tajik-Russian tripartite military 
agreement which could strengthen stability and security in the region.72  
Shamkhani’s visit was but one of a number of occasions where Iran had sounded out the 
possibility of forming a strategic alliance with Russia and Tajikistan as a mechanism to 
check American strategic advances. However, very little came out of such initiatives 
despite the publicly-stated enthusiasm of officials in Moscow, Tehran, and Dushanbe. 
Despite the rhetoric, Iran never truly set out to establish substantive security relations 
with Tajikistan or, for that matter, with the wider Central Asian region. According to 
Herzig, Iran was more than willing to “leave Central Asian security matters to Russia and 
its CIS initiatives”.73 Furthermore, in the opinion of Herzig, Iran’s “international isolation 
and general lack of experience of cooperative security relations” could also considered to 
be a factor behind Iran’s inability to develop its own indigenous regional security 
initiatives. Iran could be forgiven for its nervousness at fully engaging with Tajikistan on 
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security matters.74 Iran’s elites feared further regional isolation, and were reticent to 
undermine Russia’s prominent political role in Tajikistan, and to further raise the ire of 
the United States. Furthermore, the prospect of acting as a guarantor of Tajikistan’s 
security, or engaging in political conflict with Uzbekistan—a state that had delusions of 
grandeur—did not hold any attraction to Iran, a state which coveted regional stability and 
economic prosperity above all else, especially after experiencing more than 20 years of 
instability and chaos upon its own borders.  
Tajikistan’s post-war reconstruction did not solely revolve around material economic and 
security concerns—two areas in which Iran seemed unwilling to assist Tajikistan to any 
substantial extent. Since the conclusion of the civil war, the Tajik government had almost 
obsessively focused upon the need to develop a strong national narrative and sense of 
communal political identity that could pull the country’s disparate sub-national groups 
together after the violence of the civil war period. As Nourzhanov aptly notes, 
[B]ecause of the civil war and the ensuing fragility of the centralized state, the 
ruling elite of Tajikistan had been slow to develop a comprehensive ethno-historical 
paradigm with elaborate mythology, didactic overlay, and a cohort of martyrs, 
prophets, and champions of the National Idea. However, the achievement of a 
semblance of stability and the beginning of the process of national reconciliation in 
1997 provided an impetus and a rationale for a movement in this direction.75  
In attempting to carry out these agendas, and restore pride in “their” national history, the 
Tajik government again turned to Iran as a source of financial support for national cultural 
projects and as an inspiration for its nation building approach, which focused heavily 
upon notions of pan-Iranianism and “Aryanism”.76 Iran and its history therefore became 
a key reference point in the building and rebuilding of a post-civil war Tajik national 
identity.  
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Perhaps the most prominent example of the Tajik government’s attempts to build a strong 
national narrative and identity was its focus upon the Iranian Samanid dynasty as the 
forefathers of the Tajik state and its people. The Samanids made an ideal symbol for the 
secular Sunni Tajik state, due to the fact that they predated “the establishment of Shi’ism 
as a state religion in Iran. They [were] primarily known for their cultural patronage rather 
than their religious beliefs, and their civilisation spans the geographic regions 
encompassing all of the territories see as their cultural realm.” 77  In 1997 President 
Rahmon declared that 1999 would mark the 1100-year anniversary of the Samanid’s rise 
in Central Asia. In the lead-up to the 1999 celebrations, numerous scholarly works on 
Tajik history and the Samanids were commissioned, the renovation and building of 
cultural sites instigated, and a range of mass national spectacles produced which would 
assist Tajiks in reflecting on the “sagacity of statehood and spiritual greatness” of 
Tajikistan’s forefathers.78 Rather than throw its support behind these overt attempts to 
define a distinctive Tajik identity, Iran did not even send one high-level government 
minister to the 1999 celebrations commemorating the jubilee of the Samanids, and the 
assistance it offered for the celebrations seemingly did not go beyond the training of the 
Tajik military in drill marching exercises79 Although the Khatami administration had 
placed an emphasis upon notions of civilisation and culture in its wider foreign policy 
stance, and consistently alluded to the shared cultural bonds that existed between Iranians 
and Tajiks, in practice the government took very few practical steps to strengthen these 
so-called “bonds” of history and culture.80 
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Beyond the Samanid celebrations, a broader stagnation in cultural and inter-societal 
cooperation between the two countries had taken place during Khatami’s first term. For 
example, the training of Tajik diplomats by Iran’s foreign ministry was discontinued in 
1999,81 and Iran refused to send its most competent foreign ministry staff to the country 
and the wider region, instead sending them to Western capitals, which were considered 
diplomatically more important to Iran.82 University enrolments of Tajik students in Iran 
remained at a minimal level, with only 16 Tajiks studying in Iran in 2001,83 with most 
Tajiks preferring to undertake their international higher education studies in Turkey and 
Russia.84 Furthermore, the focus of Iran’s cultural thrust into Tajikistan focused almost 
solely upon matters of “high culture”, with Iran sponsoring numerous annual academician 
meetings and seminars where discussions of the development of Persian language and 
literature programs took place. Along with Iranian financial assistance of theatre troupes, 
these events rarely garnered the interest of “everyday” Tajiks, who while ignoring these 
Iranian cultural initiatives, voraciously consumed the musical and theatrical works 
emanating from the United States Iranian diaspora, and also Indian Bollywood 
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productions which were not only easily accessible, but also immensely popular.85 This 
was further highlighted by a researcher from an Iranian think tank, who lamented to the 
author that in “modern Tajikistan the younger generation have been very interested in 
Persian culture, especially in rap and pop music. Unfortunately, this isn’t produced by 
Iran, but by another Iran, the one in California.”86 Adding to these comments, another 
Iranian academician suggested that the lack of cultural engagement with Tajikistan was 
based on the fact that the Iranian government felt uncomfortable with focusing on 
“national” aspects of Iran’s culture over the more prominent Shi’ite Islamic aspects. Thus 
the idea of celebrating non-Islamic and non-Shi’ite aspects of Iranian culture in Tajikistan 
was neither fully pursued nor understood by Iranian elites making policy in the region at 
the time. 
Overall, Iranian political experts were highly critical of the Khatami administration’s 
approach to Tajikistan, and the wider Central Asian region. For instance, Atai declared 
that there was an “absence of modern ideas and innovative thinking in the execution of 
Iran’s policies in the region”.87  Former Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Maleki was 
particularly scathing of Khatami’s policies, declaring that Tajikistan and the other Central 
Asian republics were “not a priority”88 of the Khatami administration, and that under the 
stewardship of Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi, Iran’s relations with Tajikistan had 
effectively been mismanaged: 
Kharrazi was formerly Iran’s ambassador to the UN in New York. He did not have 
any interpretation of Central Asia and Caucasus. So he took many, many trips to 
New York, to Washington, to Boston but [rarely] went to Dushanbe…and his trips 
were from noon to afternoon, he did not want to stay even one night in 
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Dushanbe.…Khatami and his cabinet felt that we had [to have good ties with] 
Europe and the Arab countries that we didn’t need these countries [Tajikistan and 
the Central Asian republics]. They believed that these countries could not add 
anything to Iran.89 
This theme of mismanagement was further taken up by Koolaee, who in 2001 declared 
that Iran’s policies in Central Asia were 
perhaps one of the most vivid pieces of evidence of the failure of the foreign policy 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran…we have not been able to take sound advantage of 
the opportunities created…the significance of the region was not properly 
appreciated despite the attention we emphatically underlined in our approach 
towards our northern borders in recent years.90 
These Iranian experts did not only believe this was an issue at the decision-making level 
of Iran’s government, but one which had also filtered down into the bureaucratic and 
academic sectors, which were ill-prepared and largely unwilling to fully understand or 
grasp the importance of Tajikistan and Central Asia. Accordingly, bureaucrats, 
particularly within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were poorly trained, and unable to 
fulfil Khatami’s agendas, and Iran’s tertiary sector had paid little attention to the region 
since the immediate collapse of the Soviet Union, with students not actively encouraged 
to study the region.91 
This all around inattentiveness towards not only Tajikistan but also the wider Central 
Asian region had created a general situation whereby under Khatami, Iran had “almost 
forgotten the region” and had lagged behind its competitors despite its geographical 
proximity and material capabilities. This mismanagement of Iran’s relationship with 
Tajikistan leading up to 9/11 constituted a missed opportunity for Tehran. Domestic and 
international developments during Khatami’s presidency had placed Iran in a strong 
position to expand its influence in Tajikistan. However, these opportunities were 
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conveniently ignored, and following 9/11 Iran would face the greatest challenge to its 
ability to influence events in the region since the rule of the Soviet Union.  
5.4 9/11 and the Impact of American Regional Encroachment  
The aftermath of 9/11 constituted what many scholars considered to be the further erosion 
of Iran’s regional security position.92 As noted in Chapter Two, although Iran welcomed 
the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the presence of American military forces within 
Central Asia caused further uncertainty among Iranian policy elites, who viewed the 
expansion of American influence in the region as a further move to militarily encircle the 
country and extend its international isolation.93 This fear was compounded by the fact 
that all of the Central Asian republics, in some way or another, sought to assist the United 
States in its so-called “War on Terror”, thus increasing their economic, political, and 
military relations with Iran’s major international rival.94 Unfortunately for Iran, Tajikistan 
also initially greeted the presence of the United States in Central Asia with open arms. 
Tajikistan’s President Rahmon rushed to declare that Tajikistan was “in solidarity with 
the United States people, we at the same time express [our readiness] to cooperate with 
the international community, including the US government, in the struggle against 
terrorism and international extremism”.95  This enthusiasm was to be expected when 
considered in light of the potential benefits substantial American economic aid and 
security assistance could bring to a country that had, up to that point, remained politically 
peripheral within international affairs. By the close of 2001, Tajikistan had provided 
airfields for United States and NATO operations in Afghanistan, overflight rights for 
American military aircraft, and even sounded out the possibility of the permanent 
stationing of US troops in the country.96 As a reward for Tajikistan’s loyalty in the “War 
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on Terror”, the country received substantial economic aid and security assistance. For 
example, the United States increased its aid budget exponentially from $72 million in 
2001 to $162 million in 2002.97 Furthermore, the new US presence in Tajikistan also 
paved the way for the country’s accession into NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, 
and the development of close collaboration between the two country’s militaries.98  
Although the United States consistently declared that its interests in Tajikistan revolved 
solely around its fight against “extremism” emanating from Afghanistan, and that its 
presence in the country was only temporary, it soon became clear that Washington was 
using its foothold not only in Tajikistan, but also the wider Central Asian region, to pursue 
much more expansive long-term goals.99 Most prominently Washington, with its NATO 
partners, devoted considerable attention and funds to the upgrade and modernisation of 
Tajikistan’s defence and internal security forces. Washington policy planners hoped that 
if Tajikistan’s military and security services could attain a measure of self-sufficiency, 
they could not only act as a bulwark against the threat of terrorism and drug trafficking 
emanating from Afghanistan, but also minimise the country’s security dependence upon 
Moscow, while at the same time increase Tajikistan’s integration within Western security 
structures. Such security assistance was embraced by the Tajik leadership, who were 
happy to receive any type of funding and assistance that could increase the country’s 
security capacity. The second prominent American policy in the country, namely the 
promotion of democracy and liberalisation of Tajikistan’s economy and society, was 
however viewed much more cautiously by Tajik elites. Much of the developmental aid 
and economic incentives that Tajikistan was touted to receive from the United States was 
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linked to the development of a functioning, liberal democracy. 100  The United States 
believed that Tajikistan and its Central Asian neighbours acted as incubators for Islamic 
extremism due to their economic weakness and the repressiveness of their ruling systems. 
Therefore the “cure” for terrorism in the region would be the development of prosperous 
and free societies. By embarking upon an ambitious program of democracy promotion, 
the United States hoped to minimise the attraction of Islamism and entrench so-called 
“Western values” within Tajikistan and the wider region.101  
Apart from these two expansive goals, there were even larger American geostrategic 
calculations that fed into its engagement with Tajikistan. The United States had a long-
term strategy for Tajikistan and Central Asia that went well beyond its commitments in 
Afghanistan. The “War on Terror” legitimated the extension and widening of an 
American military presence throughout the so-called “arc of instability” running along 
the southern Eurasian landmass.102 Establishing a patchwork of military bases throughout 
the Caucasus and Central Asia allowed the United States to effectively link together its 
already well-established presence in East Asia and West Asia, and further extend its 
global military footprint. Although this was legitimated in terms of responding to the 
“War on Terror”, the side benefits of expanding the US presence into the heart of the 
Eurasian landmass were easily apparent in the context of replacing Russia’s prominent 
historical regional role, and further isolating the key player in the so-called “Axis of Evil”, 
Iran. American policy planners viewed any Iranian influence in the Central Asian region 
as a negative and destabilising force, and quarantining the Central Asian republics from 
Iran would be imperative to the region’s future development and ongoing stability.103 
This newfound US influence in Tajikistan did not have the effect that was hoped for by 
policy planners in Washington. While Tajikistan happily accepted American aid funds, 
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the ability of the United States to influence internal developments in Tajikistan was at 
times minimal. Rather than American engagement in Tajikistan auguring a new 
democratic beginning, President Rahmon expanded his authoritarian rule, and became 
increasingly adept at ignoring American demands for liberalisation. As noted by Goldman, 
Rahmon “had neither the will nor the capability to pursue the kind of democratisation the 
Bush administration wanted of him as the price of being a US ‘ally’”.104 Furthermore, 
Tajikistan’s government, while coveting humanitarian aid, also desperately sought 
economic investment in the country, and assistance in the development of key 
infrastructure, which was largely unforthcoming from the American government. 
American private enterprise, while encouraged to invest in Tajikistan by the Bush 
administration, were hesitant to engage with a government that was unwilling to 
implement key political and economic reforms and to provide investment guarantees. 
Along with this issue was the fact that Tajikistan did not offer the economic potential of 
its hydrocarbon rich neighbours Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, who 
received the bulk of American business attention.  
Similarly, US-Tajikistan security cooperation did not develop as closely as was initially 
envisaged by Washington, and Tajikistan remained firmly ensconced within Russian 
security frameworks. Although the United States did wish to weaken Russia’s influence 
over Tajikistan’s security affairs, and enmesh the country deeply within Western security 
institutions, Tajik elites never entered into any large-scale military cooperation with the 
United States without the approval of Moscow. Nor did these Tajik elites ever consider 
dropping their close political and military partnership with Russia in exchange for an 
alliance with the United States, whose reliability as a long-term political partner was often 
brought into question by its attempts to influence Tajik domestic politics.105 Furthermore, 
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Tajikistan did not provide a blank cheque for American military engagement in the 
country. Although Tajikistan had allowed an American military presence in the country, 
such presence was minor in comparison to the extensive US military engagement and 
cooperation with the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan, who both hosted large contingents 
of American and NATO military forces.106 The military infrastructure Tajikistan offered 
the United States and its NATO partners in support of operations in Tajikistan was sub-
standard, and required large levels of capital investment to operate effectively. For 
example, Rahmon offered the use of facilities at the Dushanbe International Airport, 
Kulob, and Qurghenteppa. However, only Dushanbe “was fit for immediate use by the 
Americans because of its capacity to receive heavy aircraft, though it was so run down 
that it needed about $50 million for repair and upgrading”.107  
Although Tajikistan was placed under significant pressure by Moscow to not “go all the 
way” with the United States, and many of Tajikistan’s interactions with Washington were 
dictated and restrained by the need to not alienate Russia,108 the political shrewdness of 
Tajik political elites in dealing with the new strategic environment which had brought the 
United States into the region should also be recognised. As a small state, which up to 9/11 
received very little support or attention, and one that had an uncertain political future, it 
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was apparent to Tajik political elites that the changing regional security environment 
offered significant benefits.109 Tajikistan sought to use this new American interest to 
exact much-needed economic rents, while lowering yet maintaining an ongoing Russian 
presence and interest in the country. Furthermore, the Tajik leadership recognised early 
on that cooperation with the United States could not only reshape what up to that point 
had been an imbalanced and overwhelmingly dependent relationship with Russia, but 
could also provide it with the leverage necessary to “implement a policy of reaching out 
to the world…pursuing a kind of multi-vector policy, which it had previously been unable 
to pursue”.110 Using and building upon its newfound importance to the United States and 
the West, Rahmon elucidated a foreign policy approach which would be based upon an 
“open-door policy”, whereby Tajikistan would cooperate with any state willing to 
cooperate with it, above all in the field of economics. Although this entailed a difficult 
balancing act, Tajikistan was mindful that diversifying its relations with as many 
international partners as possible would ensure its stability, and provide it much-needed 
breathing room within its international affairs.111  
This newfound Tajik confidence and assertiveness on the international stage, along with 
the presence of the United States—Iran’s major political rival—within Tajikistan and the 
wider region, initially acted as a lightning rod for Iranian-Tajik relations in the post 9/11 
period. Prior to 9/11, Iran could afford to pay only a cursory glance at a poorer cousin, 
which lacked substantial strategic, economic, and political weight. However, with the 
United States seeking to influence the political trajectory of Tajikistan, such a stance 
seemed foolish. If Iran was to maintain and increase its influence in Tajikistan, a drastic 
reinvigoration of Iranian foreign policy would be required. In the weeks following 9/11, 
Iran viewed the courting of Tajikistan by the United States with intense interest, and for 
its part sought to maintain an open dialogue with Rahmon throughout this process. 
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Khatami had not only spoken personally to Rahmon via telephone to express his concerns 
relating to Afghanistan, but also sent in short order a special envoy and Foreign Minister 
Kharrazi on separate visits to Tajikistan to ensure that Iran’s interests were recognised, 
and to drum up the possibility of further cooperation between the two states.112 As already 
highlighted in Chapter Two, Iran had hoped that by actively assisting the United States 
in its attempts to remove the Taliban and Al Qaeda from Afghanistan, the path would be 
laid for an improvement in overall bilateral relations between the two states, and to this 
end the Iranian government was conspicuously silent towards the prospect of US military 
forces being stationed in Tajikistan and the wider Central Asian region.113  
Iran’s quiet consent to American inroads into Tajikistan and Central Asia quickly ended 
following Bush’s notorious State of the Union address on 29 January 2002, where he 
accused Iran of being part of an “Axis of Evil”, and of promoting regional terrorism, 
attempting to procure weapons of mass destruction, and undermining American 
operations in Afghanistan.114 The effects of this speech were dramatic. In the words of 
Hunter, with “early expectations of better relations with the United States all but shattered 
and a hardening of the US position towards Iran, the growing US military presence in 
Afghanistan and Central Asia heightened Iran’s security concerns”. 115  Drawing the 
curtain on his attempts to bring about political rapprochement with the United States,116 
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Khatami declared that when “a big power uses a militant, humiliating, and threatening 
tone to speak to us, our nation will refuse to negotiate or show any flexibility”.117 It was 
in this atmosphere of heightened threat perceptions and increased Iranian anger towards 
the United States that Khatami made his first visit to Tajikistan in April, 2002. This long 
overdue visit, although couched in terms of expanding economic, trade, and cultural 
relations between the two states, was mainly driven by Iranian security concerns and the 
fear that the United States was attempting to push Iran out of its own “cultural backyard”. 
This was evident in Khatami’s comments in the days leading up to his visit to Dushanbe, 
when he remarked in a state visit to neighbouring Kazakhstan that the United States “must 
not get entrenched on this or that territory, setting up bases under the disguise of an anti-
terrorist campaign…this is sheer humiliation for our nations that have the right to resolve 
their problems on their own and decide for themselves what is good or bad for them”.118 
However, Khatami’s fears towards the United States were not shared by Rahmon, who 
only a week prior to the Iranian president’s state visit made a speech where he thanked 
the United States for its presence in the region, which had provided Tajikistan with a 
“favourable situation” due to the possibility of further cooperation and much-needed 
Western economic investment in the country.119  
Rather than raising his discomfort about the ongoing Tajik cooperation with the United 
States, Khatami skirted around the issue, instead focusing almost solely upon the 
commonality that he believed existed between Iran and Tajikistan. Khatami also sought 
to temper Rahmon’s disappointment towards the low level of relations between the two 
states by proposing new opportunities for inter-societal, cultural, and economic 
cooperation. Promoting the shared ties that existed between the two states, Khatami went 
much further than any previous Iranian high level official, declaring: 
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Tajikistan is smaller than most of the neighbouring countries from the geographical 
point of view. But this small part [of the world] is a very great country from the 
historical point of view and the [point of view of the] role that the Tajik nation had 
in human history.…Iran and Tajikistan are historically joined to each other. The 
role that the two nations had, in fact, made them like two parts of one intellect, 
culture and civilization. This long historical past and integrity in history and their 
role in human civilization and culture also require now from these two nations and 
the two states, which represent the will of these two nations, to support each 
other.120  
Building upon what Khatami referred to as the “pillar of essence” that was the two state’s 
shared historical foundation, he affirmed Iran’s commitment to assisting Tajikistan in 
raising its cultural and material standards of living. In doing so, Khatami in clichéd terms 
proposed the ambitious revival of a new “Silk Road”, which would “connect the 
communication road from the East to the West in cooperation between Tajikistan and 
Iran….via Afghanistan to China, to free waters [of Iranian ports]”.121 Khatami’s focus on 
connecting Iran to Tajikistan via northern Afghanistan was a clear indication of Iranian 
fears towards American encirclement, and the need to ensure that its international rival 
did not fully cut Iran off from regional developments.122 Furthermore, it represented a 
small but highly symbolic shift in Iran’s foreign policy priorities, from one that had 
focused almost single-handedly upon economic links with Europe and the Middle East to 
a greater recognition of the need to open up lines of trade via Central Asia and onwards 
to East Asia.  
The Iranian government’s plan to develop a road corridor linking Iran to Tajikistan was 
but one of a number of economic and infrastructural aid announcements made by Iranian 
officials between 2002 and 2004, and there was a keen awareness among Iranian elites 
that economic diplomacy in Tajikistan would anchor Iran’s interests and influence in the 
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country.123 Other large-scale infrastructure projects, such as the construction of the five 
km-long Anzob tunnel, which would link Dushanbe through the Hissar Ranges to the 
northern region of Khojand, were also finally slated to begin construction after almost a 
decade of empty Iranian promises. The Anzob tunnel’s construction had initially begun 
during the Soviet period, but had ground to a halt due to funding issues and the difficult 
geology of the site. The Khatami government had pledged to provide $31.2 million to 
offset the estimated $110 million cost of the project, consisting of $10 million as a grant, 
and $21.2 million as a loan. 124  Constructing the tunnel was viewed by the Tajik 
government as a major economic and strategic priority. For a large portion of the year 
Tajikistan was geographically split in two due to winter snowfalls, avalanches, and the 
decision by the Uzbek government to unilaterally close road and rail lines connecting 
Tajikistan with its northern province. 125  The Iranian government shared the Tajik 
government’s concerns that this ongoing situation could lead to the eventual annexation 
of the province of Sughd (formerly Khojand) by Uzbekistan, who had since the cessation 
of the civil war acted in a hostile manner towards the weaker Tajikistan.126 Therefore, the 
construction of this tunnel was not only economically important but also geopolitically 
important, and affirmed Iran’s support towards Tajikistan in its tense relationship with 
neighbouring Uzbekistan. 
The most prominent infrastructure project to which Iran committed however was the 
construction of the Sangtuda-2 hydroelectric station. The Sangtuda hydroelectric project 
initially began construction during the 1980s, and was originally envisaged to consist of 
two hydroelectric plants, namely Sangtuda-1—which would have an energy output of 
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671MW—and the smaller Sangtuda-2—with a capacity of 220MW.127 However, due to 
the financing issues and the chaos wrought by the civil war, the project remained 
unfinished throughout the 1990s. As a consequence, Tajikistan’s electricity production 
sat well below domestic consumption levels throughout the post-independence period, 
with large swathes of the country suffering from frequent blackouts and limited daily 
supplies of electricity, acting as a major drag on the country’s continued economic 
development. Since the conclusion of the civil war Tajikistan had been seeking partners 
to assist it in the completion of the Sangtuda project, and assist the country in the 
development of new power plants, which could exploit its massive hydroelectricity 
potential, to little or no avail.128  However, in the post 9/11 regional environment of 
increased strategic competition, Tajikistan had now finally found a series of potential 
suitors to fulfil the country’s hydroelectric ambitions.129  
In the summer of 2004, the Russian government sought to take a 51 percent controlling 
stake in the Sangtuda-1 project for the sum of $100 million.130 Unhappy with this level 
of investment in a project that was estimated to have had a total cost of $620-720 million, 
Rahmon attempted to play Russia and Iran off against each other. During Khatami’s 
second visit to Tajikistan in September, 2004, Rahmon canvassed the possibility of Iran 
investing in Sangtuda-1. Much to Rahmon’s surprise, Khatami accepted, and proposed 
an Iranian investment of $250 million in the project.131 Rahmon’s government had not 
expected Iran to offer such a large sum, and quickly signed a memorandum of 
understanding for Iran’s investment in the project. At a press conference at the end of 
Khatami’s visit, Rahmon stated that Iran would become the lead investor in the Sangtuda-
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1 project, while Russia and Kazakhstan would be secondary investors, investing $100 
million and $30 million respectively.132 
Embarrassed by the prospect of becoming a secondary economic player to Iran in this 
project, a month later Russian President Putin trumped Tehran by offering Tajikistan 
investment to the tune of $2 billion. These investment funds would allow for the 
completion of Sangtuda-1, the construction of the controversial Rogun dam project,133 
and funds to modernise Tajikistan’s aluminium smelter.134 This offer was too good to 
refuse, and Tajikistan quickly accepted Putin’s proposal. In an effort to placate Iran and 
maintain its much-needed investment in the country, Tajikistan’s government offered 
Tehran the opportunity to invest in the much smaller power plant, Sangtuda-2, at a cost 
of $220 million, participation in which Iran duly accepted. Although disappointed at 
taking a secondary role in the project, Iranian foreign policy experts consider Iran’s 
involvement in the construction of Sangtuda-2, eventually inaugurated in 2011, as the 
crowning achievement of Khatami’s foreign policy in Tajikistan, and that it solidified 
Iran’s economic and political presence in the country.135 Apart from this project, Iran also 
pledged to construct 15 smaller scale hydroelectric projects in the country, and sought to 
assist Tajikistan in the training of energy workers.136 Iran hoped to import electricity from 
Tajikistan across Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to domestic markets, and also saw great 
potential for the establishment of electricity exports to Afghanistan. The Iranian 
willingness to invest in large-scale infrastructure projects in Tajikistan marked a major 
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improvement in the two state’s economic engagement. From the close of 2001 to 2005, 
total trade between Iran and Tajikistan increased from a lowly $36.95 million to a 
respectable $104.7 million, with Iran becoming Tajikistan’s fourth-largest import partner, 
but only its 23rd largest export destination.137  
Although there had been an increase in the level of economic and trade cooperation 
between Iran and Tajikistan, significant challenges remained. Iran’s notoriously weak 
private sector, and inability to compete with its more technologically advanced and 
wealthy neighbours such as Turkey and Russia, acted as a major stumbling block to the 
fulfilment of closer economic relations.138 However, the main factor hindering economic 
relations between the two states found its origins in the corrupt practices and poor 
governance inside Tajikistan itself, and the difficulty Iran had in conducting trade with 
its geographically close but hard to reach neighbour. Although the straight line distance 
from Iran’s second-largest city, Mashhad, to Dushanbe was only 900km, the actual road-
based distance was in fact one and a half times longer, and extremely cost prohibitive due 
to corrupt customs practices emanating not only from within Tajikistan, but also the key 
transit states of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In a wide-ranging study conducted on 
behalf of the World Bank by Ojala, Kitain, and Touboul, it was commented that 
[I]n a perfect world, and based on average road transport costs in the region, a 
roadtrip to Mashhad could be made at $1,200, and to Tehran at $3,000, excluding 
unofficial payments. In reality, the going rate for a full truckload is $3,000 to 
Mashhad and $5,000 to Tehran, including unofficial payments.…For a load of 
cotton textiles, for example, that equals 4 to 10 percent of cargo values, 
respectively.139 
Confirming this 2002 study, Iranian officials considered corrupt border practices to be 
the main impediment to Iran’s ability to conduct fruitful trade relations with Tajikistan 
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throughout the 2000s. In an interview with an Iranian trade expert, these issues were 
summed up succinctly: 
It is expensive, dangerous and insecure to go from Afghanistan to Tajikistan. 
Instead we have to go through Turkmenistan to Uzbekistan, and then Tajikistan. 
The first issue is that Uzbekistan charges us high taxes for transportation; and 
second, they inspect the packages, which often causes a lot of damage. Even 
sometimes they wouldn’t let our goods enter their country…Consequently 
[Uzbekistan] overwhelmingly influences imports and exports between us and 
Tajikistan.140 
Exasperated, and using much less reserved language, an Iranian expert on Central Asia 
declared that 
[C]orruption has been the main obstacle to our trade with Tajikistan since the end 
of the civil war! The corruption with Uzbeks and Turkmen is difficult and has not 
been managed well enough. Because we do not have a direct border to Tajikistan, 
we have to cross these two countries. Police checkpoints, they are corrupt and get 
money illegally. If you do not give money, you have to go back. Iranian businesses 
have to pay, the things they are carrying such as food has to go there, and so they 
have to pay, and if they don’t the goods spoil. The Iranian government built the 
road through Afghanistan but as you know it is not safe unfortunately.141 
Only compounding the corrupt practices emanating outside Tajikistan’s borders was the 
inability to protect Iranian business and investment in the country. In informal discussions 
with the author a number of Iranian businesspeople declared their unwillingness to 
conduct business in Tajikistan, citing their experiences of having to pay bribes to Tajik 
officials, which often made doing business in the country extremely difficult.142 The 
unwillingness of Rahmon’s government to clamp down on corruption and provide a 
conducive investment environment alarmed Iranian officials. An Iranian trade expert 
interviewed by the author commented further on these issues, declaring that “investment 
in Tajikistan causes lots of problems, including legal issues, even in company registration 
rules. There is a very prolonged bureaucracy in this matter; and Tajikistan’s Human 
Development rank is 167 among 180 countries in the world. These are challenges which 
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have halted the development of our relations with Tajikistan.”143  These issues were 
acknowledged by Tajik experts themselves, with one declaring that “the Iranians don’t 
like us because of the corruption. They came here, they felt it, and they stopped coming. 
I think that they have much more better opportunities in other countries.”144  
5.5 Beyond Economic Diplomacy? 
While Iran had managed to increase its economic presence, there still remained a long 
way to go before Iran could be considered a prominent political and security actor in 
Tajikistan. Iran’s focus upon economic diplomacy in Tajikistan had led to a much greater 
and well-developed level of inter-state dialogue and interaction between the two states’ 
political elites, which was evidenced by the many meetings and summits held between 
the two states following 9/11. Overall however, Tajikistan remained largely peripheral to 
Iran in its wider regional foreign policy stance, particularly when considered in light of 
Afghanistan, where Iran had committed hundreds of millions of dollars in aid and had 
actively attempted to undermine the US military and political presence.145 Furthermore, 
Iran continued its deference to Moscow when it came to Tajikistan, unquestionably 
supporting Russia’s position as the key security guarantor of Tajikistan, and was almost 
never willing to challenge Russia’s central political role in the country.146  Iran also 
displayed an outright reluctance to fully back Tajikistan in its ongoing disputes with 
Uzbekistan, despite the fact that Uzbekistan had thrown its full support behind the US 
“War on Terror”, and had not only placed Tajikistan in a geopolitical bind by blocking 
most trade routes into the country, but had also endorsed American containment policies 
towards Iran. Instead, Khatami refused to openly criticise Uzbekistan, and had actively 
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sought to develop close political and economic relations with the Karimov regime.147 
While this lack of substantive Iranian political and security engagement in Tajikistan 
stemmed from a seemingly deferential and cautious Iranian political agenda in the country, 
it was also apparent that Tajikistan, in the post 9/11 period, never really looked to pursue 
active politico-security links with Iran in any case.  
Arguably in the post-9/11 period, greased as it was with international aid funds and 
newfound outside political interest, Tajikistan had very little enthusiasm for developing 
all-out relations with one of the most politically isolated states on earth, and one which 
looked almost certain to be the next target on the US list of states due for “regime change”. 
148  Rather, Tajikistan happily sought Iranian investments in its economy, without 
pursuing strong political and strategic ties. As an Iranian foreign policy expert bluntly 
asserted to the author: “You see, when the Tajik government needs money, they say, ‘we 
are Iran’s brother’. Any country that helps Tajikistan is their brother! Whether that be 
Iran, Russia, or the United States, it doesn’t matter to them.”149  
5.6 Conclusion 
While Khatami had built the foundation of Iran’s longer-term interests in Tajikistan 
through the investment in large-scale infrastructure projects, his administration failed to 
develop close political and societal relations with Tajikistan. Prior to 9/11 Iran had 
significant opportunities to become one of Tajikistan’s major political, economic, and 
cultural partners. As a state that had very few opportunities to develop relations with 
outside states, Tajikistan had been desperate for greater engagement with Iran. 
Unfortunately, Iran was unwilling or unable to expend economic, cultural, and political 
capital upon Tajikistan, which was seen by the Iranian political establishment as too small 
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and unworthy of attention within the country’s wider foreign policy. This calculus 
changed dramatically following 9/11, however, with Tajikistan taking a “central” role in 
developments taking place in the so-called “War on Terror”. Almost overnight Tajikistan 
had become blessed with international partners lining up to provide much-needed aid and 
investment, which had the effect of making Iran a much less attractive political partner. 
In these changed circumstances Iran scurried to maintain its interests and influence in 
Tajikistan, focusing much of its attention upon becoming a key economic partner to 
underdeveloped Tajikistan. Despite 9/11 reinvigorating Iran’s focus and attention upon 
Tajikistan, Iran remained a relatively minor player in Tajikistan.  
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Chapter Six: Iran and Tajikistan 2005-2013 - Ahmadinejad and Foreign 
Policy Dysfunction  
The presidential election victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 heralded a sea 
change in the politics of Iran. Ahmadinejad’s populist, nationalist rhetoric and 
confrontational stance on a range of political issues indicated that a major shift was about 
to take place in how Iran conducted itself on the international stage. Khatami’s eight-year 
struggle to bring about rapprochement with the West, and his efforts to improve Iran’s 
international image, had largely come to naught. Ahmadinejad’s often antagonistic 
approach to international relations, while bringing about a much more assertive Iranian 
foreign policy position, also instituted a pattern of crisis that would see the imposition of 
further economic sanctions and increased international isolation. Rather than providing 
the Iranian people with a grand and prosperous future, Ahmadinejad, to the contrary, 
brought further economic hardship domestically, and an erosion of Iran’s strategic and 
political position internationally.1 
Iran’s relations with Tajikistan during this period cannot be disassociated from this 
pattern of crisis and international tension. Iran’s growing isolation on the international 
stage, and its increasingly hostile relationship with the West had an immense impact upon 
the trajectory of Iran’s relations with Tajikistan. Both out of necessity in the face of ever 
mounting sanctions and international isolation stemming from the West, and out of choice 
due to Ahmadinejad’s emphasis on “Looking East” to fulfil Iran’s foreign policy 
agendas,2 Tajikistan became, on the surface at least, an increasingly important political 
partner to Iran. While Rafsanjani and Khatami arguably paid only a cursory glance to 
developments in Dushanbe, Ahmadinejad devoted significant attention to establishing 
relations with Tajikistan, which went well beyond the efforts of his predecessors. 
Tajikistan, according to Ahmadinejad, was a “strategic partner”, and in fact the two states’ 
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“common history and culture” made them inseparable.3 Backing this rhetorical flourish 
Ahmadinejad made a special effort to ensure that Tajikistan would play a critical part in 
his broader regional foreign policy approach, visiting the country, and meeting President 
Rahmon, on an almost annual basis.4 Furthermore, Ahmadinejad sought to go beyond the 
almost purely economic relations instituted during the Khatami period, seeking to develop 
strong cultural, political, and strategic ties, while fostering greater state-to-state and inter-
societal interactions. These moves instigated by Ahmadinejad led to considerable 
discussion among regional observers and analysts, who declared that the relationship 
between Iran and Tajikistan could potentially develop into a so-called “Persian alliance”, 
which could reorder the regional political balance.5 However, lying just below the surface 
of relations between Iran and Tajikistan was a striking disjuncture between rhetoric and 
reality.  
This chapter argues that despite the public amity that existed between the two states 
throughout Ahmadinejad’s presidency, strong and substantive Iran-Tajik relations were 
not achieved, due in part to a dysfunctional Iranian foreign policy approach, which often 
led to the mismanagement of this inter-state relationship. This factor, along with the 
unwillingness of Tajik elites to go from words to deeds, and the broader impact of 
sanctions, international isolation, and regional rivalry, meant that Iran was largely unable 
to fulfil its prominent political and economic agendas in Tajikistan.6 
6.1 The Ahmadinejad Presidency and International Crisis 
Prior to his unexpected election victory over former President Rafsanjani in 2005, 
Ahmadinejad had never held an elected office, and was an unknown quantity within 
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international politics.7 As Iran’s first non-clerical president, Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric and 
presidential style was vastly different to that of his predecessors. While Khatami and 
Rafsanjani had sought to reform Iran’s economy and bring about some form of domestic 
and international stability and accommodation after the worst excesses of the early 
revolutionary era, Ahmadinejad on the other hand sought a return to the populist and fiery 
politics of Khomeini’s Iran, and with it an Iranian society galvanised by the spirit of 
revolutionary fervour and third world militancy.8  
As a university student from a lower working class family during the time of the 
revolution, and later as a member of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corp and Basij militias 
serving in the Iran-Iraq War,9 Ahmadinejad was imbued with a sense of class injustice, 
nationalistic zeal, and religious piety, which formed a combustible political mix. 
Ahmadinejad consistently castigated the so-called “managerial class” of technocrats and 
high-ranking clerics, who he believed had lacked faith in Iran’s Islamic revolutionary 
culture due to their efforts to reform Iran’s political system and seek rapprochement with 
the West. 10  Accordingly, Ahmadinejad had “an unshakeable belief in the apparent 
perfection of the Islamic Republic”, and any notion of reform, criticism, or the 
surrendering of Iran’s national interests were simply incomprehensible to a man who had 
dedicated his life to upholding its precepts. 11  With gusto, Ahmadinejad sought to 
implement his own version of a “cultural revolution” in Iran, cracking down hard on 
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regime critics, reformists, and those who sought to question the regime’s rule. 12 
Furthermore, Ahmdinejad’s use of religo-nationalistic ideology, which often fused 
traditional Shi’a symbolism with the embrace of Iran’s pre-Islamic history, was viewed 
with suspicion in the region, and fervour among his countrymen.  
Ahmadinejad’s unflinching faith in the righteousness of the Islamic Republic, and his 
disdain for the managerial class, had an undisputable impact on his domestic agendas, 
particularly in the realm of economics. Ahmadinejad railed against the economic policies 
of his two predecessors, Khatami and Rafsanjani, who he believed were responsible for 
widespread corruption, particularly in the upper stratums of Iranian society, and who he 
considered had focused too heavily on the urban middle and higher classes while 
neglecting the “true” supporters of the Islamic Republic, the poor and the dispossessed. 
In an attempt to alleviate the considerable economic imbalances that existed in Iranian 
society, Ahmadinejad attempted to redistribute Iran’s oil wealth to the lower classes and 
the rural underdeveloped areas of Iran.13 According to Habibi, “Ahmadinejad believed 
that people deserved to gain tangible economic benefits from the government’s oil 
revenues”, and undoubtedly Ahmadinejad did have the concerns for the lower classes of 
Iran at heart.14 However, while he did improve the lot of Iran’s poor, and reduced both 
the developmental gap and income inequality in the country, the economic instruments 
Ahmadinejad used in the attempt to achieve this improvement were often misguided and 
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poorly managed, with his administration overseeing a general degradation of Iran’s 
economic position throughout its tenure.15  
Ahmadinejad had no time for “elitist” and Western theories of economic policy, and 
practically ignored Iran’s five-year economic plans, which had formed the basis of Iran’s 
economic goals for decades. Instead, Ahmadinejad preferred to roam the countryside to 
great fanfare, providing cash grants, no-interest loans, and unfunded infrastructure 
promises to his poorer constituents.16 As aptly summed up by Ansari: 
With oil prices at unprecedentedly high levels, Ahmadinejad effectively declared 
that the bad times were over, the good times were here and utopia was within reach. 
The new president indulged in spending a glut of oil money in a spree which proved 
intoxicating and irresistible.17  
While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to delve too deeply into Ahmadinejad’s 
domestic economic policies, it should be noted that the impact of his economic populism 
was dramatic. Ahmadinejad effectively squandered what noted Iranian economist Reza 
Ghasimi described as a “golden opportunity to use high revenues from oil and gas to 
facilitate an environment” which could have alleviated Iran’s heretofore high inflation, 
grinding unemployment levels, and low growth and productivity.18 Rather, Ahmadinejad 
facilitated the further hollowing out of Iran’s private sector by giving preferential 
treatment to his former IRGC and Basiji cadres, who received easy finance from Iran’s 
banks, and preferred status in the privatisation of Iranian state-run organisations. 
Furthermore, Ahmadinejad’s loose monetary policies, coupled with increased 
international economic sanctions, were responsible for rampant inflation and a slowing 
of economic growth, while untold waste was perpetuated through poorly-managed state 
cash subsidy programs that, rather than being targeted at the poor, were offered to the 
                                                 
 
15 Ibid., 1-8; Reza Ghasimi, "Economy of Iran under Fourth and Fifth Five-Year Development Plans," 
Money and Economy 7, no. 1 (2012): 161-86. 
16 Arjomand, After Khomeini, 161. 
17 Ansari, "Iran under Ahmadinejad: Populism and Its Malcontents," 14. 
18 Ghasimi, "Economy of Iran," 163. 
242 
 
entire Iranian population.19 By the end of Ahmadinejad’s two-term tenure in 2013, Iran’s 
economy was in a shambles, with inflation exceeding 27 percent.20 Furthermore, Iran’s 
currency, the Rial, had lost more than 80 percent of its value to the US dollar since 2011, 
and with a bevy of international sanctions being imposed upon Iran on an almost monthly 
basis, Iranian oil revenues plummeted to their lowest levels in decades.21 Effectively, 
Ahmadinejad had placed Iran in an economic hole so deep that many within the country 
had expressed an exasperated belief that the status quo could not remain in place, and 
drastic measures would eventually need to be taken in order to save the Islamic 
Republican system.22  
Ahmadinejad’s economic populism, bombast, and his confidence in the righteousness of 
the Islamic Republic’s cause was initially viewed in somewhat jocular terms by Iranian 
political observers and Western elites, who considered Ahmadinejad to be nothing more 
than a populist simpleton who was not to be taken seriously. However, very shortly after 
his presidential inauguration, it was clear that Ahmadinejad possessed a series of hardline 
views, which would lead to substantial regional and international tension. 23 
Ahmadinejad’s hardened views were particularly clear in the context of Iran’s nuclear 
program. Iran had, since the time of the Shah, sought to develop an extensive civilian 
nuclear program. However, despite consistent claims by both pre and post-revolutionary 
political leaders that this program was focused solely on the provision of “peaceful” 
nuclear energy, questions remained regarding Iran’s intentions. In particular, there was a 
fear in the West that Iran was seeking to acquire the wherewithal to develop nuclear 
weapons, and Iran’s apparently peaceful nuclear energy program was nothing more than 
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a cover to fulfil much more sinister ambitions. Although issues relating to Iran’s nuclear 
program had dominated the Clinton administration’s policies towards Iran throughout the 
1990s, it was not until the 2002, when it was publicly revealed that Iran was developing 
a nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water reactor at Arak, that the Iranian 
nuclear issue developed into a full-blown international crisis.24 Despite the fact that Iran 
had not violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by constructing these 
facilities, their announcement did raise serious concern within the international 
community about the actual scale of Iran’s nuclear program. Arak and Natanz set off a 
lengthy chain of negotiations, stringent international sanctions, and referrals to the United 
Nations Security Council, which dominated Khatami’s last three years in office and 
would place a dark pall over Ahmadinejad’s presidency.25  
Following the failure of nuclear negotiations between Iran, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), and the EU3 (Great Britain, Germany, and France), Khatami’s 
last executive order in July, 2005, lifted Iran’s self-imposed nine-month moratorium on 
its nuclear program. 26  Therefore, from the outset of its first term, Ahmadinejad’s 
administration was placed at the centre of international controversy and tension. However, 
rather than attempting to alleviate concerns about the ending of this moratorium, 
Ahmadinejad implemented an intensification and expansion of Iran’s nuclear program, 
defying the United States and its Western partners, while at the same time painting the 
program as a “populist cause and national political priority”.27  Ahmadinejad applied 
tough rhetoric towards the nuclear negotiations. Speaking in the braggadocio manner that 
would characterise his presidency, Ahmadinejad declared that “nuclear technology is our 
right and no one can deprive us of it. We have come so far, and, God willing, we will 
need just one more push.” He added that Iran’s journey towards a nuclear future was like 
a “flood which cannot be stopped by a matchstick”—a reference to mounting Western 
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sanctions.28 Such rhetoric only inflamed tensions, and reports proliferated throughout the 
international press that the United States, and Israel—a state that Ahmadinejad claimed 
“must disappear from the page(s) of time”29— were planning on launching military 
strikes upon Iranian nuclear facilities. Nonetheless, Ahmadinejad remained stoic against 
such pressures, and did not soften his stance. In fact, at his first visit to the UN General 
Assembly in New York, he declared that if the threats towards Iran continued, his 
government would be forced to reconsider their “entire approach to the nuclear issue”. 
Ahmadinejad’s statement was a not-so-subtle counter-threat that Iran would pursue 
nuclear weapons capabilities if international pressure did not decrease.30  
Despite years of shuttle diplomacy, and offers and counter-offers which were placed on 
the table between Iran and the EU3, and later the EU3+3 (P5+1) of the United States, 
Russia, China, Great Britain, France, and Germany, no incentives were large enough for 
the Ahmadinejad administration to cave in on its “right” to nuclear enrichment. From the 
Iranian perspective the West’s position upon its nuclear program was fundamentally 
unfair, and Iran’s “peaceful” nuclear program, as stipulated by the NPT, was legally 
defensible.31 On the other side of the ledger however, were the years of apparent Iranian 
intransigence on the nuclear issue, which now coupled with Ahmadinejad’s fiery rhetoric, 
only further fed Western fears that Iran intended to develop a nuclear weapons program. 
Although Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric was aggressive, his position on Iran’s nuclear program 
was overwhelmingly consistent with that of his predecessors, who had all sought to 
uphold and defend the legitimacy of the nuclear program. However, in this highly charged 
political atmosphere, things could only end badly for the increasingly isolated Iran. 
In December, 2006, despite the initial objections of China and Russia, Iran was subjected 
to UN Security Council Resolution 1737, which placed multilateral economic sanctions 
upon Iran and Iranian individuals involved in nuclear proliferation activities. This 
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resolution was followed by a further five Security Council Resolutions, which enhanced 
the sanctions regime against Iran and called for the suspension of its uranium enrichment 
program, and for its government to undertake a series of confidence-building measures 
as outlined by the IAEA.32 The regime of sanctions against Iran became even more taxing 
following the election of American President Barack Obama in 2009. Although Obama 
had initially taken a conciliatory tone towards Iran, tension persisted between Iran and 
the United States. Only six months into his first term, Obama was forced to react to 
violence and instability that erupted on the streets of Iran following Ahmadinejad’s 
contested re-election of June 2009.33 Despite claiming to have won 62 percent of the 
presidential vote against former Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hussein Mousavi, massive 
protests erupted on the streets of major Iranian cities among Mousavi’s supporters, who 
were of the firm belief that the election had been rigged. Much of these protests had been 
aimed squarely at Ahmadinejad’s mismanagement of the economy, and Iran’s growing 
isolation within international politics. 34  In the face of this violence the Obama 
administration sought to apply further punitive measures upon Iran, which came quickly 
following the conclusion of talks between Iran and the P5+1 in Geneva in October, 2009. 
The Obama administration focused considerable attention upon reaching an international 
consensus on the Iranian nuclear issue, and was able to win the support of Russia and 
China in particular to pass further resolutions against Iran in the UN Security Council.35 
The United States also imposed a series of measures that cut Iran off from the 
international banking system, making it almost impossible for Iran to sell its oil, and 
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receive foreign direct investment in an increasingly financially-interlinked world. 
Furthermore, Obama was able to garner the backing of the EU, which had a long history 
of being unwilling to support the imposition of sanctions upon Iran.36  
In January of 2012, the EU announced it would ban all oil imports from Iran from July of 
that year, a decision that would seriously undermine Iran’s economy due to the fact that 
at the time the EU purchased 20 percent of Iran’s crude oil exports.37 Further to this, the 
EU also banned investment in Iran’s petrochemical industry, disallowed European 
business entities from insuring Iranian maritime transport, and froze the assets of Iran’s 
central bank.38 These steps only compounded the above-mentioned issues that the Iranian 
economy was already facing, and had deleterious impact upon Iran’s petrochemical 
industry, whereby total Iranian oil exports in March 2013 sat at one million barrels per 
day (MBPD), a major decline from the roughly 2.4 MBPD that were shipped from Iran 
in 2011. Tellingly, Iran’s government revenue from the sale of oil dropped from $95 
billion in 2011 to $67 billion in 2012.39 Despite claims by key figures within the Iranian 
government that it would overcome these economic hardships and resist the “unjust” 
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measures taken by the international community, it was clear that Iran’s economy was a 
basket case, and arguably at no point in Iran’s post-revolutionary history had the country 
ever been so isolated on the international stage, or its economy in such a wretched position.  
6.2 Defying the West – Iran Looks East 
Although the full weight of Western economic sanctions did not take effect until midway 
into Ahmadinejad’s second presidential term, as already noted above, from the very outset 
of Ahmadinejad’s presidency Iran had faced ever-growing pressure from the West. In 
response the Ahmadinejad administration actively sought to develop a foreign policy that 
would circumvent economic sanctions, and elude Western attempts to isolate Iran from 
the international community. Key to these efforts was Ahmadinejad’s emphasis upon 
“looking East” towards Russia, China, and India as a means to counter-balance Western 
threats to Iran’s economic and political security.40 In particular, Iran attempted to develop 
stronger ties with China, whose meteoric economic rise had fed a voracious appetite for 
energy resources to fuel its continued economic growth. 41  The side effect of these 
attempts was that the region of Central Asia became increasingly important as a vital link 
between the two states. Both Iran and China proposed the development of a series of 
roads, rail lines, and gas and oil pipelines, which would criss-cross Central Asia, and link 
the two states together via a new Silk Road that would not only ensure economic 
prosperity, but also provide a pragmatic opportunity for the two states to bind their 
political futures much more closely together. Such a focus paid dividends, particularly 
for Iran, who received substantial foreign direct investment from Chinese companies who 
were unwilling to accede to the Western regime of economic sanctions.42 In 2009, China 
became Iran’s largest trading partner, surpassing the EU, who had sought to minimise its 
links with a recalcitrant Iran. 43  From the Chinese perspective, Iran’s international 
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isolation placed it in the box seat to gain a comparative advantage within Iran’s struggling, 
yet growing, economy, and make the most of the unfortunate opportunities sanctions had 
proffered.  
Along with Iran’s stronger focus upon China, it also sought to use a number of regional 
and international organisations, which had not been subjected to United States and 
Western “domination”, to further enmesh itself politically and economically with the East. 
As highlighted in Chapter Three, Iran had attempted to join the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO) as a fully-fledged member throughout Ahmadinejad’s administration, 
and this was the first time in Iran’s post-revolutionary history where it had displayed such 
a strong interest in joining a regional security organisation.44 As a staunchly non-aligned 
state actor, Iran up to that point had displayed apprehension towards any notion of 
sacrificing its sovereignty and international independence. However, in the chaotic 
circumstances it found itself in following its inauguration, the Ahmadinejad 
administration saw significant strategic benefit in joining an organisation that could 
counter US international hegemony, and that “would not take a neutral stand should its 
stability and security come under threat”.45 Furthermore, the SCO’s future potential to 
effectively morph into an “OPEC with bombs”, thus threatening the West’s energy 
security, was also considerably attractive to Iranian elites.46 If Iran, a state that sat upon 
the world’s second-largest gas reserves and the fourth-largest oil reserves, could join an 
organisation that consisted of a number of energy-rich states from Central Asia—
including Russia who controlled the world’s largest gas reserves and eighth-largest oil 
reserves—the SCO could effectively dictate world energy prices.47 The enthusiasm of 
Iranian leaders in countering the West, and being part of an organisation that could shift 
the global balance of power, was on full display during the 2007 SCO Summit in 
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Shanghai, when advisor to the Supreme Leader, Ali Akbar Velayati, declared that “the 
alliance of the SCO member states comprising half of [the] world’s population, and one 
quarter of the world’s landmass as well as the largest reserve in natural resources, would 
make the organisation the largest power in the world”.48 Unfortunately for Iran, such 
enthusiasm was not matched by the SCO’s two most prominent members, China and 
Russia, who grew increasingly concerned at the international tension surrounding Iran’s 
nuclear program.  
Russian and Chinese elites did not want the organisation to be perceived as “anti-
American” in orientation, and although both states had significant economic and political 
partnerships with the Islamic Republic, they also had relations with the United States, 
which were much more important and substantive.49 Iran’s hopes of joining the SCO were 
not helped by Ahmadinejad, who often used SCO summits to forward his disdain for the 
United States and to bring Iranian nuclear grievances to the fore. For instance, in 2006 at 
an SCO summit meeting in Shanghai, Ahmadinejad declared that (without mentioning 
the names of the states he was referring to): “We want this organisation to develop into a 
powerful body, influential in regional and international politics, economics and trade, and 
also serve to block threats and unlawful strong-arm interference from various 
countries.”50 Going even further, Ahmadinejad went on to add that Russia, China, and the 
Central Asian republics, as members of the SCO, had to do more to thwart the threat of 
“domineering powers” in international politics. While Russia and China had consistently 
opposed US regional agendas, in particular its efforts to promote democracy and regime 
change in the Central Asia region, they were also extremely uncomfortable with 
Ahmadinejad and his desire to bring Iran’s nuclear crisis and tense relationship with the 
United States into the SCO equation. By potentially allowing Iran to join the SCO, 
Moscow and Beijing feared the prospect of only further regional tension and instability, 
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and both states were loath to come into open conflict with Washington. Despite consistent 
professions of friendship, and interest in allowing Iran to join the SCO, Iran never 
realistically stood any chance at becoming a full member of the organisation while 
Ahmadinejad remained president. Despite its best efforts, Iran remained largely isolated 
and without any “strategic” partners within the international political arena. 
6.3 Ahmadinejad Comes to Dushanbe 
The international and domestic political rollercoaster ride on which Ahmadinejad had 
placed Iran had an undeniable impact upon the scope and trajectory of its relations with 
Tajikistan. Ahmadinejad’s approach to both domestic politics and to Iran’s controversial 
nuclear dossier in many respects carried over to the way in which he dealt with Dushanbe. 
In his first state visit to the country in July, 2006, Ahmadinejad met his Afghan and Tajik 
presidential counterparts, promulgated a range of Iranian investment projects and 
initiatives, and more notably, promised even further Iranian assistance to its so-called 
“close cultural cousin”. This first visit to Tajikistan by Ahmadinejad would not only be 
an instructive example of the Iranian president’s approach to Tajikistan, but also of the 
inherent challenges faced in wider Iranian-Tajik relations, and the constant controversy 
that Ahmadinejad courted and seemed to thrive upon.  
Arriving in Dushanbe to a rousing public reception, Ahmadinejad inaugurated the 
opening of the Anzob Tunnel, a project which had originally been promulgated by his 
predecessor, Khatami. The Iranian government had committed $31 million to the project, 
while Tajikistan had contributed $7.8 million,51 however it was common knowledge 
among well-informed Tajiks that a considerable amount of these funds had been siphoned 
off by the corrupt practices of Tajiks and Iranians alike. 52  Furthermore, poor 
workmanship by the Iranian state-owned company Sobir, who had begun work on the 
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tunnel in 2003, had led Tajik locals to nickname the tunnel Anzob, “the tunnel of death” 
due to its almost non-existent ventilation and lighting, alongside its poorly-maintained 
road surface that was often waterlogged and badly potholed due to groundwater that 
would flood from the tunnel’s crudely-sealed walls.53 Many Tajik experts interviewed by 
the author blamed both governments for what one scholar claimed to be a “nightmare” in 
the building of Anzob, which at the time of writing still has not been completed. 54 
However, much of the mirth was aimed squarely at Iran, which was seen to have 
mismanaged the project and had not carried through with its political and economic 
promises. Capturing this mood, a noted Tajik scholar was of the opinion that Iran had 
taken too long to build the tunnel, and that which had taken the Iranians 10 years to build, 
the Chinese could have done in six months. Going even further, the scholar declared that 
“basically they screwed up that whole thing. In other words [they misjudged their own 
capabilities]…and they don’t have the expertise they claim to have.”55 Nevertheless, 
despite these criticisms (which were repeated by a number of other Tajik experts), the 
opening of Anzob was rushed ahead to provide Ahmadinejad with the public relations 
boon he so often desired. Casting aside, or at least ignoring, the unfinished and poorly-
constructed nature of the tunnel, Ahmadinejad bathed in the glow of this Iranian 
engineering achievement, boasting in front of a crowd of Tajiks Iran’s role in securing 
their future independence and sovereignty by constructing a tunnel, which would vitally 
connect Dushanbe to its northern regions. Furthermore, Ahmadinejad blithely declared to 
the Tajik crowd, “I look at you and I see Iranians” and that “the tears of happiness I see 
in your eyes are our happiness too”, and highlighted his wish to see further close relations 
between the peoples of these two states.56  
Following the opening of the Anzob tunnel, Ahmadinejad proceeded to undertake several 
discussions with Tajik President Rahmon, whom he had previously met in Tehran in 
January of the same year. According to a number of US diplomatic cables, which were 
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released by WikiLeaks in 2010, senior Tajik officials expressed significant discomfort and 
worries towards Ahmadinejad’s visit to Dushanbe. In private discussions with United 
States diplomatic officials, and with the US Ambassador to Tajikistan, Richard Hoagland, 
the Director of the Tajik President’s Strategic Research Centre, Suhrob Sharipov, 
acknowledged that Tajikistan did not wish to have its international reputation sullied by 
politically engaging too closely with Iran. However, Sharipov also noted that Tajikistan 
desperately required foreign investment, and therefore welcomed Iranian economic 
assistance.57 Such a stance was also confirmed by Tajik Foreign Minister Nazarov, who 
bluntly surmised that it didn’t matter which country invested in Tajikistan as “all money 
smells the same”, basically alluding to the fact that the country had to take what it could 
get.58 In a discussion with Hoagland only days before Ahmadinejad’s arrival, Nazarov 
continued his somewhat blunt, yet pragmatic assessment of international relations. 
Speaking openly and frankly about Iran, Nazarov claimed his government had “no special 
love” for Iran, and simply required its economic assistance above all else. Furthermore, 
Nazarov also highlighted his fear that Ahmadinejad would make the visit overly 
“political”, and expressed a strong desire for the visit to stick to the safe realms of 
discussions on bilateral economic cooperation. As a veteran politician who had displayed 
a consistent and categorical disdain for Tajikistan’s Islamic opposition, it is no surprise 
that Nazarov would hold anti-Iranian views, and it seems he had not forgotten Iran’s 
support for the opposition during the civil war, remarking to Hoagland that Iran’s 
infrastructure projects in the country were “compensation for the enormous damage” it 
had done during Tajikistan’s early days of independence—a direct reference to Iran’s 
support of the IRP.59  
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Unfortunately for Nazarov, his worst fears became a reality. Coinciding with 
Ahmadinejad’s visit to Tajikistan was the Israeli decision to launch a military offensive 
into Lebanon, ostensibly to attack Hezbollah militants, a group for which Iran had 
provided significant financial and military support. Ahmadinejad effectively drew 
Rahmon into this dispute by using his meeting with the Tajik president as a platform to 
criticise Israel, and to pressure Rahmon into signing a joint declaration condemning 
Israel’s “use of force against Palestine and Lebanon”.60 In unfamiliar territory, Rahmon 
stressed that Tajiks as part of the “larger community of Muslims of the world” were of 
the opinion that the Israeli-Hezbollah dispute had to be resolved through a “political 
route”, and that Lebanon’s territorial integrity and independence had to be respected. 
Even Foreign Minister Nazarov for good measure conducted a volte-face from his earlier 
private comments to US Ambassador Hoagland, urging the Israelis to put an end to what 
he called a “real war that has already killed more than 400 peaceful Lebanese residents”.61  
The unexpected and uncharacteristic Tajik political commentary on Middle Eastern 
affairs overshadowed what was meant to be a rather low-key bilateral set of discussions 
surrounding agreements in the areas of law and order, tourism, free economic and trade 
zones, and preferential tariff deals.62 Instead, Tajikistan found itself at the centre of an 
international issue that was of little concern to its national interests. As was highlighted 
in a private discussion with a Tajik international relations scholar: “Tajikistan’s 
government has no issues with Israel. Hell! If they invested in our projects and provided 
more money than Iran, they could also be a ‘strategic partner’.”63 However, economic 
imperatives outweighed the risks of alienating Iran and its new president on his first state 
visit to the country. Rahmon and Nazarov’s hope that bilateral talks would stick firmly to 
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discussions upon “cultural, commercial, and assistance matters” quickly fell by the 
wayside, and matters only got worse on the second day of Ahmadinejad’s visit, when he 
was slated to meet Afghan President Karzai and Rahmon in trilateral discussions.64  
The trilateral meeting between Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Iran had been anxiously 
awaited. Karzai had originally arranged to meet Rahmon and Ahmadinejad in Tehran in 
January of 2006, but after consultations with the United States withdrew due to “domestic 
issues”—a not-so-subtle indication that he was pressured by US officials not to attend the 
meeting.65 Nonetheless, Karzai only played a very low-key role during the meeting, and 
his arrival late in the afternoon to Dushanbe from Kabul led to only a short overlap with 
Ahmadinejad’s time in Tajikistan’s capital.66 Despite the international press breathlessly 
reporting what seemed like an intensification of political relations between these three so-
called “Persian states”, very little of substance came out of the meeting, with the three 
leaders signing a number of memoranda of understanding in the realms of economic 
cooperation and in combatting drug trafficking and political terrorism.67  
At the close of the meeting Ahmadinejad declared simplistically, and somewhat falsely 
given the ethnic, religious, and linguistic demographics of all three states, that they were 
“united by a common language, culture, and religion. It’s impossible to divide us by 
borders or talk about our differences….There are a number of global threats that unite us. 
Security in Tajikistan and Afghanistan increases Iran's security.”68 In reality however, 
Afghanistan’s strong links and reliance upon the United States to fulfil its security, as 
well as Tajikistan’s continued relationship with the United States through basing 
agreements and cooperation, made such a statement extremely awkward for both the 
leaders of Afghanistan and Tajikistan. However, it would be the discursive salvo 
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Ahmadinejad would launch against the United States that would send Tajik officials into 
a state of discomfort and annoyance. 
Addressing a large assembly of journalists to announce the agreements that the three 
leaders had signed, Ahmadinejad waited for both Karzai and Rahmon to exit the press 
conference before launching into a tirade against the United States, declaring that now he 
could finally “tell you what I really think”, claiming that the United States had “spread 
slander” against Iran to “conceal its own shortcomings”. According to American 
diplomatic cables, Nazarov had stressed to Hoagland that he had asked Ahmadinejad not 
to use the meeting as a platform to criticise the United States, however he could not 
guarantee that Ahmadinejad would not respond to the “provocations” of the assembled 
journalists. In later discussions with American diplomats, Nazarov seemed genuinely 
shocked that Ahmadinejad had used this visit to Tajikistan to express himself in such a 
way.69  
The visit by Ahmadinejad to Dushanbe, and the subsequent controversy he stirred, was a 
microcosm of Iran’s relations with Tajikistan throughout his presidency. Every trip by 
Ahmadinejad to Tajikistan, and Rahmon to Iran, revolved around the signing of numerous 
memoranda of understanding, promises of large-scale economic investment, and the 
emphasis upon the apparent political and cultural closeness of the two states. 
Unfortunately, as can be seen in the above visit by Ahmadinejad to Tajikistan, a number 
of issues plagued inter-state relations between Iran and Tajikistan, and would continue to 
do so for a number of years to come. 
6.4 Iranian-Tajik Economic Relations 
Nowhere was the disjuncture between rhetoric and the reality of Iran’s relations with 
Tajikistan any clearer than in the realm of economic policy and engagement. The Anzob 
tunnel continued to be a festering wound of exposed rebar and jagged surfaces, which 
seriously harmed political goodwill towards Iran. This was apparent when in 2013, seven 
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years after project was opened to great fanfare by Ahmadinejad, Tajik Transport Minister 
Nizom Hakimov declared that he preferred that Iran did not complete the project: “We 
wanted to involve Chinese experts to finish the construction of the tunnel, however, some 
political considerations did not allow us to do so….I would like to choose a Chinese 
company, as it is very difficult to work with Iranian companies. They say one thing but 
act very differently.”70 Hakimov’s statement was a damning indictment of Iran’s actions 
in relation to Anzob.71 However there were also a litany of other Iranian projects and 
proposals which were also held hostage to mismanagement, political manipulation, 
corruption, underfunding, and the impact of international sanctions that stifled Iran’s 
capabilities to deliver on its economic promises. 
These included the establishment of a $2 billion “industrial city”—a project that was 
announced by Ahmadinejad in March 2012, yet less than a year later was shelved due to 
the impact of sanctions placed upon Iran 72 —to the construction of numerous 
hydroelectric projects, cement factories, and roads, tunnels and railways that would 
connect Tajikistan to Iran’s much vaunted “new Silk Road” to China,73 These projects 
were so ambitious in scope and large in scale that many experts, even within Iran, 
questioned the ability of their own government to carry through with such lofty promises. 
74 Nevertheless, it seems that no project or commitment was too large for Iran during 
Ahmadinejad’s visits.75 
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The issues surrounding Iranian economic engagement with Tajikistan were evident in the 
context of its largest Tajik investment, the Sangtuda-2 hydroelectric plant. Sangtuda-2 
was viewed by Iranian officials as a showpiece of Iranian engineering mastery, as well as 
evidence of Iran’s predominant economic role in Tajikistan.76 From the Tajik point of 
view, it was hoped that Sangtuda-2 would be only the first of many Iranian projects which 
could fulfil the country’s hydroelectric ambitions, and provide the country with much-
needed economic independence by lowering its reliance upon neighbouring, energy-rich 
Uzbekistan. Very quickly, however, Sangtuda-2 ran behind schedule. Initially it was 
hoped that the project would be finished before Khatami left office in 2005,77 however 
construction did not even begin until 2008, with the contract only awarded to Iranian 
state-owned company Farab in 2007.78 Although the main factor behind this delay was 
the need to secure funds and navigate through Iran’s and Tajikistan’s byzantine and 
inefficient bureaucracies, later delays came with the inability to ship construction 
materials from Iran to Tajikistan via Uzbekistan, a state that had consistently displayed 
hostility towards both Tajikistan and Iran throughout the post-Soviet period. Uzbek 
authorities had instituted a rail blockade upon Tajikistan in 2010 in an attempt to stop the 
dam’s construction due to fears it would stem the flow of water to Uzbekistan’s large 
cotton-growing sector. Although Iran threatened Uzbekistan with its own blockade on 
Uzbek rail cars entering Iran, Uzbekistan only lifted the blockade for a short period of 
time. In response, Iran had to take the expensive step of airlifting the plant’s transformers 
and turbines and other construction equipment, totalling more than 75 tonnes, from Iran 
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to Tajikistan, which further delayed the project, and highlighted Iran’s powerlessness in 
exerting pressure upon Uzbekistan. 
With these delays in construction came increased tension between Iranian and Tajik elites, 
as well as continued questions surrounding the ability of poverty-stricken Tajikistan to 
pay back the debts it owed to Iran for the building of the dam.79 This tension burst out 
into the open following the opening of Sangtuda-2 in September 2011. Although 
Ahmadinejad and Rahmon inaugurated the project to much fanfare, it was not fully 
completed, with only one of the plant’s two 110MW turbines operating. After further 
delays, which have never been fully explained, Iran planned to finally open the second 
turbine of Sangtuda-2 in February 2013. However, after Tajikistan’s national energy 
provider, Barqi Tojik, was unable to pay for the supply of electricity being produced from 
the hydroelectric station and pay arrears amounting to $12 million to the Iranian operator 
Sangab, the Iranian company cancelled the full commissioning of Sangtuda-2, and 
Ahmadinejad postponed his visit.80 In lieu of this payment Sangab, a state-run Iranian 
enterprise, eventually took the drastic step of shutting down the station in winter 2013, 
which only exacerbated Tajikistan’s energy crisis.81 Despite earlier claims by Rahmon 
that Sangtuda-2 was an “outstanding example of cooperation between Tajikistan and 
Iran”, and was evidence of the “rapid development and good future of 
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constructive cooperation between our countries”,82 the facts on the ground told a different 
story. Sangtuda-2 remained an economic and political debacle of the highest proportions, 
both for the Tajiks who had expected the project to begin fully operating over a half a 
decade earlier, and to the Iranian government and its state-run companies who had lost a 
significant amount of money on building and operating the project.  
Despite the issues that surrounded Sangtuda-2, and the constant complaints by Iranian 
experts that it was Tajikistan’s corrupt business and political environment that was 
delaying projects in the country, Iran continued to publicly express a strong willingness 
to invest in other large-scale hydroelectric projects in Tajikistan. For example, Iranian 
Ambassador to Tajikistan Ali Ashgar Sherdoust proclaimed to local media that Iran 
would be “involved in the construction of the Roghun hydroelectric power station, both 
at the governmental level and through the private sector”. 83  The ability of Iran to 
undertake such a large project, which was slated to cost between $2 billion and $6 billion, 
was fanciful at best, and it is highly likely that Sherdoust was engaging in nothing more 
than a game of political one-upmanship after Russia had backflipped on earlier 
commitments to fund Roghun’s construction. 84  Only adding to the Iran’s publicly 
professed economic commitments was the Iranian construction company, Farab’s, 
declaration that following the construction of Sangtuda-2, it would begin construction on 
the Ayni hydroelectric project. Ahmadinejad was a staunch advocate of the 130MW Ayni 
hydroelectric station, so much so that on almost every visit to Tajikistan between 2010 
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and 2013 he would either sign another commitment to its construction, or announce that 
Iran would start construction soon.85 At the time of writing, however, Farab—a company 
with strong links to the IRGC—has done very little to fulfil its previously-made 
commitments.86 In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, and the widening of sanctions 
upon Iranian companies linked with the IRGC,87 it became extremely difficult for such 
Iranian companies to invest in Tajikistan. The impact of these sanctions can be seen in 
the fact that in 2012 Iran’s state investments in Tajikistan had dropped to $26 million, 
making it the fifth biggest state investor in the country, from a peak when Iran was 
Tajikistan’s leading state investor in 2010 with investment figures amounting to $65.2 
million.88 Furthermore, Tajikistan’s at times shady dealings with Iranian businessmen and 
companies that acted as fronts for IRGC business interests89  had provided the Tajik 
government with unwanted international attention, and led to serious misgivings within 
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the Barack Obama administration towards Tajikistan’s unregulated financial sector, 
which had provided a foothold for Iran to avoid sanctions.90  
The questioning of Iranian economic promises and unhappiness towards the standard of 
Iranian investments in Tajikistan was a consistent theme that was raised in private 
discussions with the author. Furthermore, Iranian trade experts themselves were aware of 
their country’s limitations. Although noting that sanctions negatively impacted upon 
Iran’s ability to fulfil its obligations in Tajikistan, a trade expert from the Iranian 
government’s Trade Promotion Organisation considered that 
Iran itself is the main problem in this case. In fact we haven’t been able to use our 
potential in a well organised and powerful way. However, because of foreign 
pressures, and sanctions that Iran has been facing, and international disputes that 
we are encountering, we couldn’t concentrate on producing better quality goods and 
services…our companies are facing inflation and other economic issues like foreign 
exchange rate, and are facing many challenges. In political point of view, we 
encounter international pressure; for example we can’t import technology from 
Australia, England, Germany, in order to produce better quality goods. We have 
enough money for that, but we are not able to import technology because of the 
political tensions which would have influence on our economy.91 
Iran’s empty promises in the construction of a number of large-scale projects, as well as 
the inability to complete smaller projects such as a three-tower residential and commercial 
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complex92 that now sits as a wasted concrete shell in Dushanbe’s urban heart, was the 
subject of much anger among Tajikistan’s intelligentsia, and denial and embarrassment 
among Iranian experts interviewed.93 Furthermore, despite Iranian and Tajik leaders alike 
publicly lauding the level of economic interaction and trade between the two states, which 
had increased from a bilateral level of $134.6 million in 2006 to $220 million in 2011,94 
outside of its large state-driven investments Iran was only a minor player in Tajikistan’s 
broader economy. Privately-run Iranian companies, for instance, only invested $1 million 
into Tajikistan’s economy in 2009, a figure that paled in comparison to Iran’s Kazakhstani, 
Chinese, and Russian business rivals.95  In particular, Iranian private enterprise often 
found itself pushed out by the rapidly-increased influence of China. According to an 
Iranian trade expert,  
Ten years ago, China’s trade with countries in Central Asia was less than US$50 
million; while today it is billions of dollars. At that time, our trade rate was higher 
than China’s; so China has grown a lot, while we have stayed where we used to 
be….Not only is China causing problems for us, but also it is making it difficult for 
other countries as well. A country like Tajikistan has certain amount of trade 
capacity, let’s take it as x, if China takes half of it, the share of others decreases; it 
certainly causes some limitations for the other countries. This is a competition.96 
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Among the failures there were success stories, however. For instance, according to 
official Tajik statistics there were a total of 52 Tajik-Iranian joint ventures operating in 
the country in 2009, and 20 Iranian companies operating in a number of areas such as 
livestock, poultry production, and detergent making. 97  The most successful of these 
ventures included large poultry farms operating in the Sughd and Khatlon provinces, and 
a tractor manufacturing plant and vegetable oil factory in Dushanbe. Although not of the 
grand-scale hoped for or claimed by Iran’s president, it appeared that if Iranian policy 
planners had accepted their limited capabilities, and stuck to much more realistic 
economic goals in Tajikistan, Iran could have achieved much more success and been the 
recipient of substantial political goodwill. 
6.5 Iranian-Tajik Cultural Engagement 
Apart from Ahmadinejad’s strong push to improve Iran’s economic position in Tajikistan 
was his focus upon cultural diplomacy. Placing a much larger emphasis upon notions of 
cultural, national, and historical commonality between Tajikistan and Iran than his 
predecessors had ever done, Ahmadinejad often claimed that Iran and Tajikistan were 
like “one spirit in two bodies”, and that the two states’ “single history, culture, tradition, 
and religion” had made them inseparable.98 Such rhetoric flew in the face of the widely-
held view within the international community that Ahmadinejad was nothing more than 
an Islamist hardliner or revolutionary fanatic, and exposed Iran’s pragmatic use of its 
national culture and history for political and strategic purposes. Ahmadinejad sought to 
use Iran’s history and civilisation as a means to bridge political divides and to emphasise 
commonality with his Tajik counterparts, and avoid wider regional isolation in the face 
of international pressures. Although warmly embraced by Tajikistan’s intelligentsia, and 
viewed favourably by Tajikistan’s government who had consistently sought to keep Iran’s 
                                                 
 
97 Quoted in US Embassy, "Iran's Role in Tajikistan: Limited but Increasing?". Despite numerous claims 
by Iranian and Tajik officials, Iran’s economic footprint in the country is quite modest.. For instance, it is 
often suggested that there are more than 150 Iranian companies operating in the country. For example see  
"Envoy: Iranian Companies Implementing over 160 Projects in Tajikistan," Asia News Monitor, May 1, 
2013; "FM: Iran-Tajikistan Trade Ties Surpass $210mln in 2012," Asia News Monitor, July 22, 2013. 
98  Olivia Kroth, "Russia, China, Iran Close Ranks in Tajikistan," Pravda (October 30, 2012). 
http://english.pravda.ru/world/asia/30-10-2012/122620-russia_china_iran-0/, accessed July 31, 2014. 
264 
 
ideology and Islamic proclivities at arms-length, Ahmadinejad’s cultural diplomacy 
efforts were not free from the controversies and issues that dogged Iran’s wider foreign 
policy agendas, and unfortunately for Ahmadinejad his endeavours were often stymied 
by mismanagement, over-exuberance, and lingering suspicions relating to Iran’s “real” 
intentions. 
During Ahmadinejad’s presidency he firmly supported the extension and promotion of 
Iranian arts and cultural festivals, and programs which sought to bolster Persian language 
and literature in the country. He oversaw the sponsoring of Tajik intellectuals to travel to 
Iran, and provided stipends and funds for the publication of their works into both the 
Persian and Cyrillic alphabets. 99  Along with these efforts, the Ahmadinejad 
administration oversaw the establishment of 17 cultural centres throughout Tajikistan 
where Tajik students learnt how to read and write in Persian, study the Koran, and also 
had access to Iranian films, magazines, books, and other materials. 100 These programs 
were a continuation of policies and actions which had long predated Ahmadinejad’s 
presidency, and while continuing to support these activities, Ahmadinejad and his 
administration also sought to institute much grander plans that would use Iranian culture 
and national history as key diplomatic tool to expand Iran’s political influence in 
Tajikistan and the wider region. For instance, Nowruz, an ancient Zoroastrian festival 
celebrating the beginning of the vernal equinox, which had been banned for much of the 
Soviet period in the Central Asian and Caucasus regions, became a cornerstone of 
Ahmadinejad’s cultural diplomacy efforts. Although all of the Central Asian republics 
had openly celebrated Nowruz since the fall of the Soviet Union, on an annual basis 
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Ahmadinejad’s administration encouraged state leaders within the “Iranian plateau”, such 
as Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, and the other Central Asian 
Turkic republics, to use the occasion as a means to increase political dialogue.101 The first 
two International Nowruz Festivals which brought these states together were held in 
Tehran in 2010 and 2011, and held in the following years in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Afghanistan. The International Nowruz Festival became an institution for the region’s 
leaders, and was used as a means to strengthen regional stability and promote 
“brotherhood”.102 According to a number of Iranian political experts, this initiative was 
one of Ahmadinejad’s key foreign policy achievements, and also served a dual purpose 
in not only promoting regional friendship and cultural commonality, but also allowed Iran 
another much-needed international platform to highlight its political grievances and fulfil 
its ambition to be seen as a regional leader.103 
Another prominent initiative within the Ahmadinejad administration’s cultural 
diplomatic effort was the establishment of the Persian-Speaking Association between Iran, 
Tajikistan, and Afghanistan.104 This association stemmed from the first trilateral meeting 
that took place between Rahmon, Karzai, and Ahmadinejad in January, 2006, and sought 
to promote political and cultural commonality between the three states, as well as to 
discuss measures to address the geographical, economic, and political isolation all three 
continued to suffer. This somewhat informal association between the three states was 
often breathlessly referred to as an “alliance” and a “union” among regional observers, 
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and without doubt Ahmadinejad was confident that by building upon perceived notions 
of cultural commonality, this association could eventually catapult itself into the realm of 
a political and strategic alliance.105 Ahmadinejad’s enthusiasm for expanding political 
relations through the Persian Speaking Association was shared, rhetorically at least, by 
Rahmon, who hoped this initiative could balance the influence and pressure of Uzbekistan, 
and provide Tajikistan with its own regional grouping to rival the Turkish-Speaking 
Association made up of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic. However 
Afghan President Karzai did not share his two counterpart’s interest in developing closer 
political links, and displayed only very limited interest for what became one of 
Ahmadinejad’s pet projects. Karzai was well aware that the extension of the association 
beyond informal cultural links to a political or strategic alliance would be unacceptable 
to his American backers, who continued to bankroll his government and acted as a 
domestic security guarantor within his country.106 Furthermore, Afghanistan as a multi-
lingual and ethnic state, where 35 percent of the population spoke Pashto as a first 
language made such a project highly problematic. Apart from these obstacles, the Persian-
Speaking Association rarely instigated any policies of real substance, and often descended 
into nothing more than a talk-fest of over-the-top rhetoric and commitments to 
cooperation, which sounded good on paper and at news conferences, but often failed in 
practice.107  
A prominent example of the association’s failure to instigate even the most modest of 
agendas was the attempt to establish a joint television station, which would air shared 
content and promote the three states’ so-called shared “Persian culture”. Regrettably this 
initiative became yet another symbol of Iranian missteps in Tajikistan and the broader 
region. At the first trilateral meeting between the three leaders in July, 2006, Ahmadinejad 
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had first advocated this project,108 but it was not until July, 2008, that a working group of 
Iranian, Afghan, and Tajik ministers inked an agreement on the establishment of the joint 
television station, which would be headquartered in Dushanbe and televise programs and 
news from all the three states, and begin operating in the “very near future”.109 By 2010, 
the joint television station was still not in operation, however it was claimed by Tajik 
Culture Minister Mirzoshohruh Asrori that the station would begin airing during the 
annual Nowruz celebrations in March, 2010.110 When interviewed by international news 
media outlets, Iranian Ambassador to Tajikistan, Sherdoust, claimed that the delays in the 
project had come about due to “reservations” held by Afghan authorities towards the 
television channel, and that the issues would be “resolved soon”.111 Despite the claims by 
these two political figures, the television station did not begin operations in March 2010, 
nor were the “issues” surrounding the project ever resolved.  
Speaking two years later, Sherdoust claimed that the Tajik authorities now had the 
television equipment and if they would allow it to be installed, the channel could start 
operating. However, the Tajik authorities did not allow the equipment to be installed, and 
by 2012 were demanding that the Iranian embassy pay customs duties totalling $400,000 
for the importation of the equipment, which had cost Iranian authorities more than $2.5 
million to purchase in the first place.112 Tajik customs officials claimed that the duties 
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would be waived if the equipment was to be used strictly by the embassy; if not, the duties 
would indeed have to be paid. At the time of writing the television equipment remains in 
a Tajik customs’ warehouse, and eight years since the initial proposal there remains no 
joint Iranian, Afghan, and Tajik television channel to speak of. While publicly the reasons 
for this delay have been put down to miscommunication, technical difficulties, Afghan 
disinterest, and other seemingly “minor issues”, the real reason came down to the 
fundamental differences that existed between Iran and Tajikistan’s societies and forms of 
government. 113  Tajikistan’s staunchly secular government, despite the public 
pronouncements to the contrary, neither had the time nor inclination to support the 
programming of Iranian television content, particularly content that was religious in 
nature.114 This is confirmed by a Tajik political scientist, who claimed that 
[T]he common TV channel for Iran, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, this so-called 
Persian, Farsi speaking channel, has failed mostly because of the Tajik 
position….Afghanistan also hampered the project for their own reasons. But the 
major obstacle was the position of the Tajik government.115  
This view was backed in an interview with a former advisor to Rahmon. According to the 
advisor, he was made aware by Tajik government colleagues almost immediately after 
the signing of the television agreement with the Iranian government that the project was 
“impossible” to implement. In particular, Tajik elites were concerned with the appearance 
of females wearing the hijab on television, and the influence of Iranian Islamic mores 
upon Tajik society. According to the advisor “Iranian TV does not show what Tajikistani 
TV shows. A woman with an open face, a working woman, a singing woman, a talking 
woman….Unless the political issue, that is the [Iranian government’s attitude towards 
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society] is not solved, this television station will not be organised.”116  When asked 
publicly about this very issue, the chairman of the Tajikistan Committee for Television 
and Radio Broadcasting, Asadullo Rahmonov, (apparently jokingly) declared that if the 
Iranian government insisted that Tajik female presenters wear hijab on programs airing 
on the proposed television channel, that “we will insist that Iranian female [presenters] 
do not wear hijab”.117While Rahmonov insisted that he had made these comments in jest, 
the reality is that Tajikistan’s government continued to have lingering suspicions about 
Iran’s religious ideologies, and the nature of its cultural influence in the country.  
These fears were perhaps justified when considering that for nearly every Iranian project 
that promoted strictly Persian culture and language, there were others which were 
seemingly much more opaque in their intentions and priorities. For example, Radio Tajiki, 
also known as “The Voice of Khorasan”, with its links to the IRGC, promoted Iranian 
government views on international political issues, and described its mission as: 
“Familiarising audiences with Islam and the message of the Islamic Revolution and the 
propagation of the pure ideas of the founder of the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Imam Khomeini (peace be upon him).”118 Furthermore, Iranian organisations such as 
Imam Khomeini Relief Fund (IKRF) also expanded its presence in Tajikistan during 
Ahmadinejad’s two terms in office. Between 2005 and 2009, for example, IKRF had 
placed more than 5000 individuals under its “protection”, while also consistently 
increasing the amount of funds it distributed in the country.119  
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In addition to this expansion of the presence of IKRF, Iran also increased the availability 
of stipends and scholarships for Tajik students to study in Iranian universities and 
madrassas, which caused serious consternation within the Tajik government, and 
contributed to tension behind the scenes among the elites of both states. Responding to 
fears that Tajik students were being inculcated with fundamentalist Islamic values which 
could destabilise the country, Rahmon ordered almost 1400 Tajik students studying in 
madrassas and Islamic universities in neighbouring countries to return home. Declaring 
that if Tajik parents did not recall their children from foreign madrassas and Islamic 
universities, the majority of the students “may turn into extremists and terrorists in five 
or 10 years’ time”.120 Of these 1400 students, almost 200 were studying in Iran. There 
was particular suspicion in relation to Tajik students adopting Shi’ism in Iran and 
attempting to bring these values back into the country by organising study groups and 
other gatherings.121 The Tajik government also cracked down upon Iranian educational 
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efforts within the country, ordering a local Iranian school run by the Iranian embassy to 
expel 90 Tajik students, as well as 150 Afghan students. While the official explanation 
given was that the school only had accreditation to teach children of local Iranians and 
Iranian diplomats and embassy support staff, Iranian scholars interviewed by the author 
believe this was just another example of Tajik suspicion and distrust towards Iran. As a 
former Iranian foreign ministry official pointed out: “There are 12 Turkish-run schools in 
Tajikistan. I doubt the Tajik government would seek to shut them down, their government 
claims to be our friend but their actions at times speak otherwise.” 122  
In response to these measures a number of Iranian officials cancelled visits to Dushanbe, 
and as the Tajik government imposed further restrictions upon the practice of Islam in the 
country, such as banning children from attending mosques and restricting women from 
wearing the hijab, anger grew among segments of Iran’s government towards Tajikistan’s 
“Islamophobic rules”. 123  Seeking to tiptoe around these issues and not interfere in 
Tajikistan’s domestic situation, Iran’s Ambassador to Tajikistan, Sherdoust, declared in 
an interview (while also conveniently forgetting his own government’s interference in its 
citizen’s religious and personal rights) that he felt that “beliefs and religion are personal 
matters and governments should not obstruct people’s beliefs….Religion is a personal 
matter; no government can take away my religion. I personally believe that governments 
should not interfere with it.”124 In a conversation with the author an Iranian politician 
expressed great concern towards the Tajik government’s position towards Islam, and 
while he unequivocally declared that Iran did not interfere in Tajikistan’s domestic 
                                                 
 
called an infidel from two talibehs who had returned to my village from Pakistan. They said that I was a 
liberal and that I shouldn’t be there. They said I was an infidel, so I had to flee my village, because I have 
been brought up in Qom with this mentality.” In respect to the study bans, the former official disagreed that 
the Tajik government action was aimed at Iran. He felt that the Tajik government was forced to impose a 
blanket ban so as not to cause too much of a ruction in relations with other states, such as Pakistan, a 
destination to which many Tajiks who held “extremist” views had gone to undertake their religious studies. 
Former Iranian foreign ministry official. Recorded interview with author. The view that this ban was also 
not aimed at Iran is also advanced in Nourzhanov, "Omnibalancing," 376. 
122 Former Iranian foreign ministry official. Recorded interview with author. 
123 Catherine Putz, "Tajikistan: Between a Rock, a Hard Place and Iran," Atlantic Sentinel, April 2, 2012. 
124 David Trilling, "Tajikistan: Q&A with Iran’s Envoy to Dushanbe," Eurasianet (April 12, 2012). 
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65257, accessed July 21, 2014. 
272 
 
policies towards religion, he felt that Tajikistan had made “the wrong decision” in its 
crackdown on Islam in the country, and in particular towards students wishing to study 
in Iran. In fact, he felt that by instituting such anti-Islamic agendas, radicalism would only 
grow in Tajikistan, and contribute to future instability. 125  Most Iranian scholars 
interviewed felt that Tajikistan’s hostility towards Islam would continue to act as a 
challenge towards Iran’s cultural agendas into the foreseeable future, and that while Iran’s 
money was welcome, its religious influence was not. 
6.6 Iranian-Tajik Political and Strategic Engagement 
The Ahmadinejad administration couched the motivations for its focus upon Tajikistan in 
terms of charity, cultural commonality, and concern for their economically poorer Tajik 
“Persian brothers”, however the reality is that Iran’s motivations were instead driven in a 
similar manner as during the Rafsanjani and Khatami periods, firmly through strategic 
and hard-edged political concerns. However, despite leaders in both states loudly 
proclaiming that Iranian-Tajik relations constituted a strategic partnership,126 substantive 
engagement and measurable actions to support such discourse was sorely lacking by the 
close of Ahmadinejad’s second term. Iran’s ability to carry through on its leader’s rhetoric 
was very difficult in light of its political and economic emaciation following the 
imposition of ever-growing economic sanctions and international isolation. However, 
much more influential in hindering the growth of real, substantive political and strategic 
ties between Tehran and Dushanbe was Tajikistan’s reluctance to go beyond words to 
deeds, and its continual and shrewd efforts to take advantage of regional political rivalry 
to exact political and economic benefits from Iran, bringing into question the rhetoric of 
political and strategic closeness between the two states.  
In comparison to previous Iranian administrations, Ahmadinejad and his colleagues were 
not afraid to “go all in” in attempting to build political and strategic ties with Tajikistan. 
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From the outset of his presidency, Ahmadinejad had declared that there would “no limit” 
to Iran and Tajikistan’s relations, and that the development, security, independence, and 
dignity of Tajikistan were Iran’s top priorities.127 In line with this rhetoric, Ahmadinejad 
not only attempted to promote close political ties with Tajikistan on a trilateral level—as 
mentioned above through the Persian-Speaking Association with Afghanistan (the 
outcomes of which had been quite modest)—but also bilaterally encouraging Tajikistan 
to sign cooperation agreements in the realms of anti-terrorism, drug trafficking, and 
military assistance. Furthermore, Ahmadinejad also solicited Tajikistan’s support in its 
attempts to gain membership to the SCO, with Tajik President Rahmon declaring on a 
number of occasions that he was happy to facilitate Iran’s eventual accession to this 
important regional organisation.128  
More important, however, was Ahmadinejad’s apparent success in enlisting Rahmon and 
his Tajik colleagues to publicly support Iran’s “right” to peaceful nuclear energy. Rahmon 
insisted on a number of occasions that it was perfectly legitimate for Iran to pursue a 
nuclear energy program, and asserted that a diplomatic solution needed to be found in the 
ongoing crisis between Iran and the West.129 In a statement to the international media in 
2012, Rahmon declared in the strongest terms his belief that Iran’s nuclear program was 
indeed peaceful: 
According to our data, the Islamic Republic of Iran is not seeking to obtain or build 
a nuclear weapon. The Islamic Republic of Iran is on the path of progress, the 
country is developing.…All the issues, one way or another connected with the 
nuclear issue, should be resolved only through dialogue and diplomacy.130  
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This public support was viewed as important in Iran, which lacked friends in the region 
and was finding it difficult to count even on the support of its traditional partners in 
Beijing and Moscow, both of whom baulked at unquestionably supporting Iran’s nuclear 
stance at the cost of their relations with the West.  
Although Tajikistan publicly supported Iran’s nuclear program, behind closed doors 
Tajikistan’s leaders were not as resolute in their support of Iran, especially in the audience 
of Western diplomats. As already highlighted above, Tajik elites detested the prospect of 
finding themselves ensnared within Iranian political and diplomatic foibles, and 
consistently sought to avoid being drawn into international controversy. Nonetheless, as 
the nuclear dispute heated up, they would increasingly find themselves between a rock 
and a hard place, and often drawn into an international feud of which they wanted very 
little part. By soliciting Iranian economic investment, Tajikistan was expected—if not 
compelled—by Tehran to support its nuclear program, while at the same time cajoled by 
officials in Washington to cool political and economic ties with the Islamic Republic.131 
In conversations with American diplomats, Tajik elites displayed incredulity towards 
Iran’s “reckless” stance on the nuclear dossier, and declared that they were against the 
prospect of Iran gaining nuclear weapons, however they were adamant that they would 
not confront Iran on this issue because they needed Tehran’s money.132 If the United 
States and Europe had been willing to fill the economic gap provided by Iranian 
investment, Tajikistan’s stance may have altered in respect to the nuclear dispute.133  
The difficult position Tajikistan found itself in, and its somewhat conflicted public and 
private stance towards Iran’s nuclear program, carried over to other areas of the two 
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state’s political and strategic ties. While happy to sign innumerable cooperation 
agreements with Iran in a range of different fields, which would give off the impression 
that ties between the two states were strong, when the time came to actually implement 
and bring about real measureable cooperation it seems that Tajikistan’s elites lacked the 
stomach to carry through with their publicly-stated positions. For example, following the 
signing of a defence cooperation agreement between the Iranian Defence Minister, 
Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, and his Tajik counterpart, Colonel General Sherali 
Khayrulloyev, in Dushanbe in May, 2010, Vahidi spoke enthusiastically of the potential 
expansion of defence relations between the two states, declaring: “Iran follows long-term 
and strategic relations with Tajikistan…[and] believe[s] that powerful neighbours can 
pave the way for their progress and development if [they] stand by each other.”134 While 
such comments were music to the ears of Rahmon, further comments made by Vahidi 
during his visit were viewed with suspicion by the Tajik president. According to 
Nourzhanov, Vahidi had during his visit made a series of statements that were construed 
by local and Russian experts as Tehran’s promise to render direct military 
assistance to Tajikistan, and even a testing ground for the possibility of assuming 
some form of joint control over northern Afghanistan. This was a bit too much for 
the President of Tajikistan, on whose assistance another planned briefing featuring 
Gen. Vahidi was abruptly cancelled. Rahmon’s press service issued a curt and dry 
statement cutting further speculation: “The President of the Republic of Tajikistan, 
having expressed satisfaction with the current level of cooperation with Iran, called 
on the defence institutions in both countries to broaden engagement in all 
directions.”135  
Unfortunately for Iranian elites, it seems Tajikistan was never willing to establish “real” 
strategic and defence ties with Iran, and the actions taken by Rahmon towards Vahidi 
continued a long line of Tajik repudiations of Iranian defence and strategic overtures. 
This was aptly pointed out in an interview between the author and a researcher from an 
Iranian think tank, when she noted that 
[W]e sign many agreements with Tajikistan, but I would not call Iran’s relationship 
with Tajikistan as strategic. The Tajik government has not and never will allow Iran 
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to establish military bases there, they have never sent their military officers here to 
Iran for training, and we never have joint military manoeuvres…it is very difficult 
to say that Iran and Tajikistan have a strategic relationship.136 
Overwhelmingly, Iran as a “strategic partner” to Tajikistan was much more a myth then 
a reality. Although this was the case, Tajikistan was also only too willing to use Iran in a 
manipulative fashion to improve its strategic value and ward off regional threats.  
Tajikistan’s tense relationship with Uzbekistan and its at times complicated ties with 
Russia played a crucial role on impacting Tajik-Iranian strategic ties. Uzbekistan’s 
dalliance with the United States, which came to an abrupt halt following the Andijan 
uprising of 2005, led to a gradual warming of ties between Moscow and Tashkent. This 
warming of relations between Tajikistan’s major foe and its traditional security guarantor 
caused bewilderment in Dushanbe, where there was a fear that Moscow was turning its 
back on Tajikistan in favour of Uzbekistan.137 Such fears were placed into sharp relief 
following Uzbek President Karimov’s highly-touted visit to Moscow at the end of 2007, 
in the midst of massive energy shortages and a food crisis brought upon partly by Uzbek 
unilateral blockades of Tajikistan’s borders and energy grid. Following Karimov’s visit 
to Moscow, Rahmon also sought out new partners, and in a surprise move went to Tehran 
where he basked in the glow of Iranian political and economic support for his country. 
This visit was portrayed as a major development by the Tajik media, who lauded Iran’s 
financial contributions, which would apparently alleviate Tajikistan’s energy and food 
shortages.138 Abdulloh Rahnamo of Tajikistan’s Strategic Research Centre noted that 
Russia had historically been Tajikistan’s “best partner”, but its changing position in 
regards to Uzbekistan had left the country in a “hard situation”, meaning that Tajikistan’s 
government desperately required new international partners, and was much more 
amenable to pursuing relations with Iran in this context.139 Only adding impetus for 
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Tajikistan to continue to pursue strong ties with Iran was Russia’s cancellation of its 
investment in the Roghun hydroelectric project in 2008, viewed by Tajik experts as only 
a further symbol of Russia’s “siding with” Uzbekistan in its long-running feud with 
Tashkent over water and energy supplies. This decision by Moscow only accentuated the 
apparent rift between Tajikistan and Russia, leading Rahmon to cancel a meeting with 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in early 2009, while inviting Iranian trade and 
defence ministers to Dushanbe in a not-so-subtle nod towards Tehran at Moscow’s 
expense.140  
Tajikistan’s courting of Iran to balance the threat of Uzbekistan, and to perhaps step into 
the breach left by Moscow’s warming relations with Tashkent, was duly accepted by Iran. 
Whereas Khatami and Rafsanjani had always attempted to take a neutral stance in the 
plethora of Central Asian political squabbles, and not involve Iran in the ongoing dispute 
between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Ahmadinejad and his colleagues displayed no such 
restraint. As has already been mentioned in this chapter, under the leadership of 
Ahmadinejad, Iran strongly supported the construction of the Roghun and Ayni 
hydroelectric power projects, which were initially slated to be constructed by Russia and 
China respectively,141 and also was a strong critic of Uzbekistan’s blockade of Tajikistan, 
much to the chagrin of Tashkent. The Ahmedinejad administration’s efforts to portray 
itself as a key backer and strategic partner to Dushanbe were evident in the comments 
made by former first Vice President and Presidential Chief-of-Staff Esfandiar Rahim 
Mashaei. According to Mashaei, Iran disagreed strongly with Uzbekistan’s stance on 
Tajikistan, and argued that Tashkent should not view its relations with Iran separately 
from Tajikistan. Furthermore, he declared that “the government of Iran stands by the state 
and nation of Tajikistan. We regard this as a strategic policy and will not desist from it. 
It is our policy to expand our cooperation with Tajikistan in a strategic manner.” 142 While 
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the local media breathlessly reported the words of Mashaei and claimed that Karimov had 
finally “been defeated”, Uzbekistan continued its blockade, thus ignoring what ended up 
being an empty set of Iranian threats. 
As tensions continued between Tajikistan and Dushanbe into 2011, Tajik Defence 
Minister Sherali Khairulloyev shocked many when he declared during a visit to Tajikistan 
by Ahmadinejad that 
[T]oday, if necessary, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Armed Forces can reach 
Tajikistan in two hours.…We support each other under any conditions and both 
friends and foes consider us as two friendly and brotherly countries.143 
According to a number of Tajik experts, this statement by Khairulloyev was not only 
aimed at Uzbekistan but also Russia, who was in the process of negotiating a new 
military-basing agreement with the Tajik government. In comments made to Eurasianet, 
Arkady Dubnov, a journalist and Central Asian expert, was of the opinion that “Rahmon’s 
dalliance with Iran is aimed at Russia, telling Moscow that is has other friends who could 
protect it, too”.144 Unfortunately, the absurdity of an apparent Tajik-Iranian strategic 
partnership was made clearer only a couple of days later when a small contingent of 
Iranian soldiers was invited to attend Tajikistan’s independence day parade. As the troops 
embarked upon their journey from Iran their flight was blocked from entering Turkmen 
and Uzbek airspace. The Iranians, according to Kucera, were forced, ironically, to reroute 
through Afghanistan, whose airspace at the time was controlled by the United States, 
Iran’s arch foe.145  
Despite the Tajik government’s seeming embrace of Iran, elites in Dushanbe knew that 
Iran could not be relied upon as a military and strategic partner. Furthermore, without 
Moscow’s military and political support the country would be placed at the mercy of a 
much stronger Uzbekistan, which would also leave the country much more open to 
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instability emanating from its southern Afghan border. Eventually this bumpy patch in 
relations with Russia was overcome, with Moscow’s integral role in Tajikistan confirmed 
in October, 2013, when the Tajik Parliament ratified a deal extending Russia’s military 
presence in the country for another three decades. While numerous defence pacts and 
cooperation agreements were signed throughout Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Tajikistan 
showed very little interest in building substantive cooperation with Iran in this field. By 
the close of Ahmadinejad’s presidency in 2013, Iran remained a very minor player in 
Tajik strategic affairs despite the public rhetoric to the contrary. Instead, Tajikistan often 
used Iran in a manipulative fashion to improve its strategic value and ward off regional 
threats, particularly in the context of its relationship with Uzbekistan. In the 
Machiavellian world of international politics, Tajikistan, a small and insecure state, 
understandably put its own strategic and political self-interests above all else, and it seems 
unlikely that the country even pursued a strong strategic relationship with an Iran that was 
increasingly under siege and isolated.  
Nevertheless, what could be considered a relationship of convenience was by no means 
one-sided, and was in many respects reciprocated by Iran, who really only began to focus 
upon Tajikistan as international economic and political isolation began to bite early on in 
Ahmadinejad’s first presidential term. For all of Ahmadinejad’s ebullient rhetoric, he 
carried on a long history of Iranian foreign policy pragmatism, and behind the façade of 
populism was a shrewd desire to expand Iranian influence eastwards as a means to avoid 
isolation stemming from the West. Such a view is confirmed by an Iranian academician, 
who suggested that as the international pressure on Iran increased over recent years, so 
too did Tajikistan’s importance. She predicts however that when, or if, this pressure 
eventually does decrease, so will Iran’s interest in Tajikistan, which will be relegated to 
a second-rate and peripheral position within modern Iranian foreign policy.146  
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6.7 Conclusion 
Although Ahmadinejad and his administration placed a significant emphasis upon 
building multifaceted cultural, economic, and political relations with Tajikistan, Iran was 
largely unable to fulfil its agendas. The impact of sanctions, international isolation, and 
regional rivalry often left Iranian-Tajik relations at the mercy of factors far beyond either 
state’s control. It is also apparent that despite the friendly rhetoric exhibited by elites in 
both states, tension and suspicion often lay just below the surface of the bilateral 
relationship. Tajikistan’s elites, while publicly stating their willingness to engage 
substantively with Iran in all facets, were in practice less sanguine at the prospects of deep 
ties. Iran was often viewed with caution among some segments of Tajikistan’s political 
elite, especially those who held strong secular biases. Iran did its best to overcome these 
suspicions by focusing heavily upon the cultural bonds that were believed to exist 
between the two states, and did make some strong inroads in creating goodwill among 
Tajikistan’s public. Nonetheless, some of Iran’s more religiously ambiguous cultural 
programs and initiatives did little to prevent suspicions that Iran held an Islamist agenda 
in Tajikistan.  
While Iran may not ever overcome fears towards its Islamic nature and political heritage, 
this factor played very little role in contributing to the underlying issues that have plagued 
its relations with Tajikistan in recent years. Rather, the main factor that limited Iran’s 
interactions with Dushanbe was the consistent mismanagement of this inter-state 
relationship by Iranian political elites. Throughout Ahmadinejad’s presidency Iran 
promised a lot but at times delivered very little. Many of Iran’s economic projects suffered 
from funding issues, or technical shortcomings, which were ignored for the sake of an 
often misguided desire to display that Iran was somehow Tajikistan’s foremost 
international partner. Compounding this theme of mismanagement was the fact that on 
almost every visit to Tajikistan by Ahmadinejad and his cadres, a new political and 
economic commitment was made or agreement signed that Iran had little intention, or 
ability, to fulfil. These actions spoiled Iran’s reputation among Tajikistan’s political elite, 
many of whom would often question, both in public and in private, Iran’s reliability as an 
economic and political partner.  
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Unfortunately for Iran, the great hopes of a deep, multifaceted, Iranian-Tajik relationship 
have yet to come to pass. Although Iran and Tajikistan share many common bonds, which 
will ensure relations into the future, Iran has not done enough to use its cultural, political, 
and economic assets to best effect in Tajikistan. Despite claims to the contrary, Iran 
remains a secondary player in Tajikistan, and does not wield the influence so often 
portrayed both within Iran and the wider international community. Instead, Iran’s 
relations with Tajikistan, particularly during the period of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, is 
a prominent, yet understudied example of Iranian foreign policy underperformance in a 
context and country where it should be playing a much more substantial role.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis set out to explore Iran’s foreign relations with Tajikistan between 1991 and 
2013. In attempting to uncover the basis and outcomes of Iranian-Tajik ties, it argued that 
relations between the two states had been consistently hampered by not only mutual 
mistrust and misunderstanding, but also significant regional and international constraints, 
which cruelled the ability for Iranian and Tajik elites to sustain close bilateral political, 
economic, cultural, and strategic relations over the past two decades. In analysing the 
course of Iranian-Tajik ties, the thesis applied the approach of neoclassical realism, which 
provided a useful framework for what is a multifarious and highly complex bilateral 
relationship. The dissertation filled a major gap in the literature on Iranian-Tajik relations, 
which has rarely been the focus of in-depth scholarly analysis. 
The analysis of Iran’s relations with Tajikistan, from the fall of the Soviet Union to the 
conclusion of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s term in office, provided a number of 
key insights into what is a relatively new bilateral relationship. From the outset of 
Tajikistan’s independence, Iranian political elites displayed a consistent interest in 
developing a close relationship with a state, which has often been called a “cousin” and 
“brother” on account of shared language, history, and culture. These bonds have played 
an important role in focusing Iran’s attention upon Tajikistan, and framed much of 
Tehran’s policies in the country. Nevertheless, the presence of a real or imagined shared 
culture and history between Iran and Tajikistan should not be seen as the prime element, 
or driver, shaping Iran’s interests in the country. Rather, Iran’s interests in Tajikistan have 
almost solely related to wider geopolitical concerns. Tajikistan has, since its 
independence, formed a small, albeit important, cog in Iran’s efforts to develop political 
and economic relevance in a region where Iranian elites feel they irredeemably belong. 
In the eyes of Iran’s government, Tajikistan constitutes a strategic and economic pivot 
point in its attempts to further integrate into Central Asian political and economic 
structures, and to avoid further international isolation particularly at the hands of the 
United States. Furthermore, Tajikistan’s somewhat non-fortuitous position on the 
doorstep of the perennially-unstable Afghanistan has only sharpened the interest of Iran’s 
elite, who see vital importance in attempting to develop a well-rounded strategic, political, 
and economic relationship with Dushanbe. 
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When ascribing relations with Tajikistan, Iranian elites have sought to highlight an 
exceedingly harmonious bilateral relationship with Dushanbe, which is deep and 
multifaceted in nature, and more often than not, Iran has used its relations with Tajikistan 
as a symbol of its constructive economic and political approach to regional affairs, and 
an example of a key international strategic partnership. Indeed, it the case that Iran has 
played a critical role in developing major parts of Tajikistan’s infrastructure, and has been 
a reliable political partner to the government of President Emomali Rahmon, particularly 
over the past decade. However, such narratives gloss over the serious obstacles which 
have faced Iran in its efforts to develop close ties with Tajikistan. In particular, Iran has 
had to grapple with almost constant mistrust towards its intentions from Tajikistan’s 
highly secularised elite, and has been unable to form a clear plan or roadmap for its 
policies in the country. Furthermore, the presence of instability within Tajikistan and the 
wider region, as well as the ever-tightening noose of international sanctions, have also 
created significant obstacles in front of Tehran’s agendas in the country.  
Rather than being viewed as an example of “success”, Iran’s foreign policies in Tajikistan 
should be considered an unhappy symbol of Iranian dysfunction and underperformance 
in the context of the Central Asian region.  
Lingering Mistrust 
Trust, or the lack thereof, has been an issue which has been consistently raised throughout 
the thesis. Despite the oft-mentioned presence of cultural and historical commonalities 
and apparently close political interests, Iran’s theocratic political model and Shi’a religion 
has fuelled almost constant suspicion among Tajikistan’s political elite towards Iran’s 
“real intentions”. In particular, Iran’s conduct during the Tajik Civil War, and its support 
of the main opposition group the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), remains a controversial 
topic, which is often highlighted by important segments of the Tajik elite as an example 
of Iran’s ambiguous foreign policy objectives. However, as has been shown in this thesis, 
Iran’s support for the IRP was never primarily based upon ideological considerations, nor 
was this support as strong as has been consistently alleged.  
At the fundamental level, Iranian elites are well aware of the ideological fissures that 
existed, and continue to exist, between their Shi’a Islamic Revolution and the Sunni-
inspired ideology of the IRP. Iran’s support for the IRP during the Tajik Civil War was 
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based not on the fact that it was the most ideological, but rather because it was the 
strongest of the opposition groups with the best chance of succeeding in the conflict. 
Political motivations aside, Iran’s early strategic calculation that the IRP, in partnership 
with a number of regional-based and secular-nationalist groups, would eventually defeat 
Tajikistan’s communists was found to be flawed. Instead, the eventual rise to power of 
the staunchly secularist Rahmon and his former Communist cadres placed Iran at a 
political disadvantage as it sought to build state-to-state ties in the early stages of Tajik 
independence. Rahmon’s government has at various points throughout its two-decade 
rule questioned the nature of Iranian policies in Tajikistan, and also sought to leverage 
the influence of Iran and its apparent ideological agendas to gain support from rival state 
actors such as Russia and the United States. The stigma surrounding Iran’s allegedly 
ideological approach to Tajikistan’s civil conflict remains a burden, which continues to 
act as a wellspring of mistrust among important segments of Tajikistan’s secularist 
political elite.  
In an effort to overcome negative perceptions, Iran has had to act in an overwhelmingly 
cautious manner towards Tajikistan throughout the post-civil war period. Iran’s elites 
almost completely and purposefully preclude any mention of Shi’a Islam or 
revolutionary-inspired discourse when engaging in bilateral dealings with the Tajik 
government. Throughout his time in office, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a known 
firebrand who was only too willing to engage in the discourse associated with the Islamic 
Revolution, rarely did so in the context of Tajikistan. Instead, Ahmadinejad sought to 
build common ground and good relations with Tajik elites through emphasising apparent 
cultural and historical commonalities and shared political and economic interests. 
Nevertheless, numerous Iranian cultural projects over the past 15 years, which have 
sought to improve inter-societal ties, including the establishment of a Persian-speaking 
television channel, educational programs, charitable initiatives, and cultural exchanges, 
have often fallen victim to the sensitivities that exist within the Tajik elite towards Islam 
and Iran.  
Despite the mistrust that exists just below the surface of Iranian-Tajik relations, there is 
very little evidence to suggest that Iran has sought to systematically influence Tajik 
religious life, or spread its revolutionary ideology to Tajikistan. Rather, suspicion towards 
Iran’s “real intentions” has much more to do with the secularist nature of the Tajik elite, 
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rather than any of Iran’s historical or current policies. It could be argued that even if Iran 
had not supported the IRP during the early part of the Tajik Civil War, mistrust towards 
its agendas in the country would nevertheless remain a salient and important issue in 
influencing the course of bilateral relations. 
Mismanagement 
Fear of Iran’s Islamic political heritage by the Tajik elite has indeed acted as an obstacle 
to the fulfilment of Iran’s foreign policy agendas in Tajikistan. Arguably however, a much 
more important factor has been the consistent mismanagement of this inter-state 
relationship by Iranian political elites themselves. Throughout the post-civil war period 
in particular, Iran has had considerable opportunities to become one of Tajikistan’s 
preeminent international partners. However, throughout both the presidencies of 
Mohammed Khatami and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran largely acted in a reactive, ad-
hoc, and at times dysfunctional manner when implementing its foreign policies in 
Tajikistan. 
For example, in the immediate aftermath of the Tajik Civil War, Tajikistan’s government 
firmly looked towards Iran to assist it in post-conflict redevelopment. Iran had significant 
expertise and capacity to fulfil Tajikistan’s vital infrastructural needs, particularly in the 
fields of energy production, dam construction, and road building. But rather than seek to 
expand Iran’s influence in Tajikistan, Khatami’s administration displayed very little 
interest in Tajikistan’s post-civil war redevelopment, instead focusing much of its 
attention upon “big ticket items” such as engaging in a so-called “dialogue between 
civilisations” with the West. 
This lack of political interest in Tajikistan only ended following the events of September 
11, 2001, and the invasion of Afghanistan by the United States in the following months. 
The presence of American military forces within Central Asia created considerable 
uncertainty among Iranian policy elites, who viewed the expansion of American influence 
in the region as a further move to militarily encircle the country and expand its 
international isolation to the Central Asian region. Unfortunately for Tehran, Tajikistan 
enthusiastically welcomed the US presence in the region, and as a reward for its loyalty 
in the “War on Terror”, Dushanbe received substantial US economic aid and security 
assistance. Using and building upon its newfound importance to the United States and the 
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West, Rahmon was able to leverage his country’s “newfound importance” to gain 
economic benefits from its major benefactor, Russia, as well as increasing Iranian 
investment in his country.  
Newfound Tajik confidence and assertiveness on the international stage, alongside the 
presence of Iran’s major political rival the United States within Tajikistan, had the effect 
of acting as a lightning rod for Iranian-Tajik relations in the post 9/11 period. Iran scurried 
to increase its presence in Tajikistan, and quickly affirmed its commitment to assist 
Tajikistan in raising its material standards of living. In particular, Iran focused on large-
scale infrastructure projects which would better link Iran to Tajikistan and Central Asia, 
and solidify its place as a long-term international partner to Dushanbe. Such examples of 
this approach included the construction of the strategically important Anzob tunnel, as 
well as the Sangtuda-2 hydroelectric station. These projects were warmly welcomed by 
the Tajik government, however, they later became a major source of friction following 
years of cost overruns, delays, and mutual accusations of corruption and poor 
management. The jewel in Iran’s investment crown, the Sangtuda-2 project, for instance, 
was initially slated to be completed before Khatami left office in 2005, however 
construction did not even begin until 2008. The Anzob tunnel remained uncompleted in 
2013, despite its grand opening by Ahmadinejad in 2006. Beyond these projects were a 
litany of other Iranian proposals that were held hostage to mismanagement and capacity 
shortcomings. From the establishment of a $2 billion “industrial city”, a project that was 
announced in 2012, to the construction of numerous hydroelectric projects, cement 
factories, and roads, tunnels, and railways that would connect Tajikistan to Iran and 
beyond to China as part of a so-called “new Silk Road”, Iran more often than not over-
promised yet under-delivered.  
Iran’s empty promises in the construction of a number of large-scale projects, as well as 
the inability to complete smaller projects, were the subject of much anger among 
Tajikistan’s intelligentsia, and denial among Iranian experts interviewed for this 
dissertation. Rather than develop manageable and achievable goals, under the 
presidencies of both Khatami and Ahmadinejad Iran often seemed to make policy on the 
fly, or undertook their agendas as a direct response to other events occurring in the region. 
Iran’s inability to form a coherent approach to Tajikistan and follow through on its 
economic and political promises damaged its credibility, and has ensured that in recent 
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years Tehran has often been passed over by Tajik elites in favour of more “reliable” 
partners in Beijing, Astana, Moscow, and Ankara. 
International Constraints 
The mismanagement of Iran’s relationship with Tajikistan has in many respects been 
amplified by the difficult international position in which Tehran has found itself 
throughout the post-revolutionary era. Iran has had to deal with almost constant 
turbulence on its borders, which has focused much of its attention and political capacity, 
as well having to overcome a consistent effort by its international rivals, particularly the 
United States, to sideline it from Central Asian affairs.  
Iran’s toxic relationship with the United States has had a major impact on the course of 
Tehran’s ties with Dushanbe. The US-imposed sanctions have throughout the post-Cold 
War period, and earlier, weakened Iran’s economic capacity and ability to implement its 
regional agendas to a great extent, and played a major role in thwarting Iranian policies 
in Tajikistan. At the same time, the much stronger Russia and China have undermined 
Iran’s foreign policy agendas in Tajikistan, and sought to consistently sideline Tehran 
from regional economic and political institutions such as the SCO, thus lowering the 
attractiveness of Tehran as a potential political and strategic partner.  
Rather than being an economic and political lynchpin in Central Asia, Iran has instead 
been used as a pawn by both its regional allies and rivals alike, with Tajikistan being no 
exception. Throughout the thesis it was shown that Tajik elites used Iranian interest in 
their country to bargain for greater economic and strategic benefits from third-party 
countries, particularly the United States and Russia, and were more often than not 
unwilling to go from “words to deeds” in pursuing all-round political relations with 
Tehran. While happy to sign innumerable cooperation agreements with Iran in a range of 
different fields, which gave the impression that ties between the two states were strong, 
when the time came to actually implement and bring about real measureable cooperation, 
Tajikistan’s elites rarely, if ever, followed through with their publicly-stated positions.  
These actions were not only that of a small state rationally hedging its international 
position to ensure regime survival, but were also a symptom of Iran’s poor regional 
standing. In particular, as Tajikistan’s relative importance grew in the post-9/11 period, 
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its elites displayed less enthusiasm for developing all-out relations with one of the most 
politically-isolated states on earth, and one which looked almost certain to be the next 
target for US regime change. While Tajik officials publicly embraced Iran, it appears that 
they were never fully comfortable in establishing all-out relations with Tehran. Rather, in 
private conversations with American diplomats, Tajik elites displayed incredulity towards 
Iran’s reckless stance on the international stage, particularly in regards to its disputed 
nuclear program, and sought to distance themselves from relations with Tehran.1 Similar 
dynamics also occurred in respect to Moscow. While Tajikistan often would talk up the 
potential for defence and strategic ties with Iran in public, elites in Dushanbe knew that 
Iran could not be relied upon as a military and strategic partner, and that without Russia’s 
support their country would be increasingly vulnerable to further pressure from 
neighbouring Uzbekistan, and instability emanating from Afghanistan.  
The unwillingness of Tajik elites to pursue substantive ties was particularly humiliating 
for Tehran as it grew ever more isolated into the second term of Ahmadinejad’s 
presidency. While Rafsanjani and Khatami were largely circumspect in their efforts to 
develop relations with Tajikistan beyond the field of economics, Ahmadinejad made an 
all-out effort to build political and strategic ties with Tajikistan as a means to not only 
solidify Iran’s influence, but also to avoid complete isolation from the Central Asian 
region through American encirclement. Unfortunately for Tehran, the wider impact of its 
international relations could not be removed from its bilateral relations with Dushanbe. 
Tehran’s often timid deference to Moscow, its economic weakness in comparison to 
China, and much more importantly its fraught relationship with the United States, cruelled 
the ability of Iran to establish “all-out” ties with Dushanbe.  
Despite the presence of strong ethno-linguistic bonds and a set of shared mutual threats 
and strategic interests, close ties between Iran and Tajikistan have not ensued in the post-
Soviet era. Instead, Iran must be considered an important, albeit secondary, player in 
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Tajikistan’s affairs. Despite the rhetoric to the contrary, bilateral ties between the two 
countries have not reached a strategic level.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
This thesis, as the first English language, in-depth scholarly analysis of Iran’s relations 
with Tajikistan, was necessarily broad in scope. This breadth therefore provides future 
researchers with significant opportunities to delve much deeper into various areas of this 
critically important bilateral relationship. 
While the researcher spent a significant amount of time interviewing those with critical 
knowledge of Iran’s relations with Tajikistan during the Tajik Civil War, it appears that 
the full story of this period has yet to be fully canvassed. In particular, gaining access to 
primary Russian, Tajik, and Iranian archival material from this period would arguably 
provide further critical insights that the researcher was unable to glean from primary 
interviews and secondary research resources alone. Furthermore, as time passes, those 
with first-hand knowledge of the Tajik Civil War are arguably much more willing to share 
their insights into this critical period of relations, and an effort by a future researcher to 
gain access to a much larger sample of elites who were involved in this period of events 
should be considered. In particular, gaining access to not only Tajik and Iranian, but also 
Russian and Uzbek experts and elites involved in the Tajik Civil War would provide a 
much broader and well-rounded picture of Iran’s influence in this conflict.  
Another area of research, which was only briefly discussed in this thesis but should not 
be overlooked, is the influence of Iranian non-governmental and parastatal organisations 
in Tajikistan. Arguably, organisations such as the IKRF have played a crucial role in 
Tajikistan since its independence, however, their actual role and influence in the country 
has not been researched to any great extent, due to a dearth of publicly-available 
information and a lack of access to key policymakers. Furthermore, the researcher was 
unable to develop a clear picture of the role Iranian bonyads play in Tajikistan. While it 
was brought to the researcher’s attention in numerous interviews that bonyads, 
particularly those affiliated with the IRGC, were heavily involved in Tajikistan’s 
economy, ascertaining the veracity of such claims and the possible influence of such 
parastatal organisations could not be established, and should indeed be the subject of 
future research.  
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Finally, this thesis placed the major focus of its research on the “measurable” material 
aspects of Iran’s influence in Tajikistan—particularly in the economic and diplomatic 
fields. The notion that cultural similarities and historical commonalities were over-
emphasised by not only Tajik and Iranian elites, but also scholars and analysts who have 
studied this bilateral relationship, was highlighted throughout the thesis. However, this 
should not undermine the importance of culture as a topic of future research and one that 
future researchers may find of greater importance than that which was attributed within 
this thesis. In particular, undertaking analysis of important texts and discourses employed 
by not only policy elites, but also so-called “thought leaders” in both Iran and Tajikistan, 
would provide a useful ideational rejoinder to the materialist focus of this thesis.  
Final Remarks 
At the time of writing, Iran remains under some of the most stringent economic sanctions 
and international political restrictions known in modern political history. While the 
election of President Hassan Rouhani in May, 2013, has improved his country’s image 
on the international stage, Iran remains an international pariah, and has been unable to 
fully integrate itself within global affairs. If the nuclear deal signed between the EU3+3 
and Iran is successfully implemented in the coming weeks and months ahead,2 prospects 
of a much more engaged and materially-capable Iran is without question highly likely to 
become a reality.  
As shown in this thesis, Iran’s influence and interests in Tajikistan have been consistently 
burdened by its broader relations with the international community and by severe 
restrictions, which have curbed its capacity and ability to act as a normal state actor. If 
such a burden is lifted, Iran’s efforts to improve its economic and political influence not 
only in Tajikistan, but also the wider Central Asian region, may finally be fulfilled.  
                                                 
 
2 On 14 July the P5+1 and Iran adopted a final agreement on Iran’s disputed nuclear program. Under 
the terms of the agreement, the EU and the United States have agreed to lift their economic sanctions upon 
Iran. However, the lifting of economic sanctions will not take place until the IAEA first confirms that Iran 
has fulfilled a series of technical steps, including the dismantling of key nuclear infrastructure. Steps which, 
at the time of writing have yet to take place.  
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The lifting of sanctions would point to an increase in Iranian influence and interests in 
Tajikistan and Central Asia. However, this potential development should not be viewed 
in negative terms. While numerous Middle Eastern states fear the rise of an Iran 
unshackled, Tehran’s Central Asian neighbours should embrace the opportunities that 
will come with an Iran that is better linked to world markets, and one that could provide 
the region with a further avenue to diversify their relations and avoid over-reliance—both 
politically and economically—upon Russia and China. Furthermore it should indeed be 
reaffirmed that Iran has consistently shown throughout the post-Soviet period that it 
desires to see a stable and prosperous region on its northern and eastern borders, and the 
notion that Iran may spread disorder in this context should be dismissed. 
Although Iran will be offered significantly greater opportunities to increase its political 
and economic influence in Tajikistan and the wider Central Asian region if sanctions are 
lifted, this does not mean that a carte blanche will be given to Tehran moving forward. 
Iran will not only need to develop a clear strategy and approach to the region, but also 
will need to overcome its consistent inability to act in an efficient and effective manner 
and repair the damage that has been done to its reputation through the years of 
mismanagement of its relations with Tajikistan and the other regional states. If such steps 
can be taken, Iran may finally become a critically important player in Tajikistan and the 
broader Central Asian region. 
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